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Rival use of limited water resources among riparian states is often problematic 
and politically contentious.  The hydro-politics for transboundary rivers links its riparians 
in complex multidimensional networks of environmental, political, economic, and 
security interdependencies. In regions where water is politically scarce, expected to 
become hydrologically more so, and shared, it may be considered more valuable, thus 
potentially rendering cooperation or conflict prospects more significant.  Given the 
number of agreements, basin organizations, and joint and permanent commissions/ 
committees, transboundary water cooperation amongst southern Africa basin riparians is 
considered high.  Still, a riparian state’s competing claims for limited water resources is 
often problematic and politically contentious because: (a) water agreements are often not 
about water, (b) cooperation does not equal a lack of no conflict, and (c) understanding 
the strategic interaction among riparian states as signatories to transboundary river 
 
agreements requires a contextual framework. Water may not be the only story and history 
and hydro-hegemony are important.   
In this research, the contextual framework focuses on understanding when and 
under what circumstances the past, the problem, and the politics interfere with the 
prospects of cooperation, or enables riparian behavioral change which, in turn, produces 
the desired levels of cooperation.  It identifies and explains how South Africa as both 
basin and regional hydro-hegemon is driving hydro-cooperation and pursuing its own 
self-interests. 
This research explores how the geopolitical interests and history condition the 
types of environmental cooperation possible in the Orange and Okavango river basins in 
Southern Africa.  It posits a Maslowian perspective to navigating a hierarchy of obstacles 
blocking the journey towards reaching quality cooperation outcomes in order to create 
spaces for positive conflict.  
Several of the actors are the same in both river basins. There are, however, 
differences, which have their origins in history—the shadows of the past.  The cases 
illustrate how history matters.  It drives contemporary politics by forcing governments to 
face difficult choices among sets of priorities, which may appear to compromise one 
group, unmet needs, or issues over others.  History suppresses knowledge, aligns power, 
and shapes identity by framing the language of politics and power. By doing so, it 
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Chapter 1—Introduction and Theories of Conflict and Cooperation    
      
 
Introduction 
 In 2000, I was an observer at a scheduled Okavango River Basin Water 
Commission (OKACOM) meeting in Windhoek, Namibia.  After initial pleasantries were 
exchanged by all attending delegations, an interesting exchange on other matters 
dominated the conversation, which is best described as a combination of dysfunctional 
family bickering and one-upmanship. Immediately, these delegates from various states in 
southern Africa struck up a tune intricate in its phrasing but familiar to all its participants. 
 Both the Angolan and Botswanan delegates complained about having no direct 
flights to Windhoek from their respective states.  All flights go through OR Tambo 
(Johannesburg) International Airport in South Africa.  Indeed, the delegate from 
Botswana seemed to chide his Namibian host on the matter and suggested that Namibia 
should “do something about that.  Why should we (Botswanans) have to fly through 
South Africa to get to Namibia?” It was also during that same exchange that the 
Botswanan delegate boasted and teased their Namibian host about the favorable IJC 
decision giving Botswana victory and sovereignty over Sedudu (Kasikili) islands in the 
Okavango River in the Caprivi Strip region.   
 The Angolan delegation, although friendly enough toward their OKACOM 
counterparts, struggled with the language of the meeting—English—and commented on 
the absence of documents in Portuguese.  That problem has since been resolved as 
funding from international development agencies, U.S. Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA), have helped to fund translation of documents into Portuguese and contribute 
resources and technical support for the OKACOM website. 
 The first day’s agenda of that particular OKACOM meeting was to build 
consensus for a study proposal to conduct a transboundary water analysis and identify 
and obtain international support from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)1 and from 
SIDA. One of OKACOM’s objectives was to facilitate the formation and implementation 
of a joint management basin program.  OKACOM wanted a GEF-supported effort that 
would create a strategy and pathway to surmount current practices, policy, institutional, 
human resource and information barriers and constraints to coordination and joint 
management of the basin.  Previous OKACOM efforts at transboundary diagnostic 
analysis and preparation of strategic action plans to integrate into national development 
plans had failed because of conflicting national interests,  national interests, that one 
could discern using the day’s earlier conversations and interactions as a metaphor. 
Portuguese is Angola’s official language.  However, the use of English and the lack of 
documents available in Portuguese ignored that fact.  Botswanan claims of sovereignty 
and territorial control over Sedudu had prevailed over Namibia, once part of South 
Africa, now independent. Still, to get to Namibia one must still fly through South 
Africa—the former political administrator of Botswana as a British Protectorate.   
Issues of sovereignty, transboundary conflict, national interests, and identity, and 
history were all front and center that day, in the conversation before the OKACOM 
                                                 
1 The GEF provides grants to developing countries for projects that benefit the global environment and 




meeting officially began, though OKACOM had assumed that with the aid of an 
international donor, GEF, providing funding to support data collection necessary to 
consensus building on shared management of the Okavango River, national interests, 
sovereignty, and the like would recede to background levels of noise.  This assumption 
was patently incorrect; managing the water did nothing to manage the histories or 
personalities of the players involved. 
 In this dissertation I am:  (a) resurrecting and reinterpreting LeMarquand’s early 
analytical framework on transboundary water cooperation to order and rank state 
priorities and cooperation barriers into a hierarchy cooperation; (b) exploring how geo-
political interests and the historical-colonial legacy (shadows of the past) condition the 
types of environmental cooperation that are possible around internationally shared river 
basins; and (c) explaining why the classic environmental conflict and cooperation 
literature is incomplete.  My research purpose is to establish the hierarchy of 
transboundary water cooperation and positive conflict2 and identify and explain the 
variables missing from the classic conflict and cooperation literature.  
 Water issues have been discussed and analyzed from many different perspectives.  
Here, I’d like to suggest that there are two voices speaking in this conversation. The first 
speaker considers hydro-politics as existing in a matrix free of history. The second speaks 
from the past and the present. This voice – this black voice – acknowledges the shadows 
of the past, the remnants of the colonial legacy. Moreover, this black voice insists that the 
conversation occurring deals with more than just water. Why do all the planes have to fly 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this research, positive conflict is generative tension, open dialogue, and dynamic 
politics absent the threat of war and violence.  The absence of war is not necessarily peaceful cooperation.  
At the same time, there can be peace absent positive conflict.  
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through Johannesburg? What continues to foster the underlying tensions at OKACOM 
meetings?   
 As water scarcity increases, states feel pressure to do more than recognize the 
need for and implications of transboundary water cooperation.  Under such 
circumstances, riparians may willingly agree to surrender their hydrological freedom, and 
yield authority to a basin-wide entity, such as a river basin commission, in order to reap 
the full benefits of water cooperation. Riparians may seek to establish cooperation on a 
basin-wide scale.  Despite this laudable goal, they may be unable to conduct 
transboundary water cooperation using positive conflict as a conflict resolution 
mechanism, or to reach a definitive agreement able to tackle the combinations of spatial 
and hydrological interdependence. Such an agreement would need to negotiate the 
accompanying political and economic costs of such cooperation, as well as its potential 
benefits.  All too frequently, basin-wide commissions or other similar arrangements lack 
the financial resources to maintain themselves3, the authority to act, or the capacity to 
address the objections of their riparians.   
 Many scholars4 assert a connection between an increased demand for limited 
shared resources and conflict. According to the 1987 Bruntland report by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development statement, “nations have often fought to 
assert or resist control over war materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea 
                                                 
3 Falkenmark and Lundqvist, “Looming Water Crisis.” 
4 This includes Galtung, Ehrlich and Ehrlich, Bächler (particularly Environmental Degradation as a Cause 
of War), Turton, Ohlsson, Ashton (particularly “Southern African Water Conflicts: Are They Inevitable or 
Preventable?” in Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality?,) Peter Gleick, and Homer-Dixon 
(“On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict” and “Environmental Scarcities 




passages and other key environmental resources”5. Freshwater resources are vital to the 
global ecosystem, global economics, local development, local freshwater ecosystems, 
local food security, and national security.  “Scarcity and misuse of freshwater pose a 
serious and growing threat to sustainable development and the protection of the 
environment”6. Water is a material resource, as well as a substance imbued with various 
socially constructed meanings.  Water has an economic value, and is a multipurpose 
resource useful to many consumers. Moreover, water can become a rallying point for 
local identities7. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Chapter one of this dissertation introduces the subject of transboundary water 
cooperation, briefly discusses trends and issues surrounding the doomsday rhetoric of the 
global water crisis, and the implications of this rhetoric for a water-scarce southern 
African region. Additionally, Chapter 1 reviews and critiques the separate literatures on 
environmental scarcity and conflict and environmental cooperation.   
Considerable national, regional, and international resources are going into 
establishing and supporting river-basin organizations.  New political institutions are 
being developed in order to establish peaceful venues where issues around shared water 
resources can be negotiated and resolved.  We can consider these recently constructed 
hydro-political regimes a success. However, their sustainability and cooperative success 
may rely, in their ability to differentiate between friends and enemies.  The histories 
                                                 
5 Bruntland, Our Common Future, 290. 
6 International Conference on Water and Environment. 
7 Blatter and Ingram's anthology, Reflections on Water, goes more in-depth about this issue. 
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necessary to determine these types of allegiances are fairly recent; with the exception of 
South Africa, the oldest of the states in my case studies have only been post-colonial 
independent states for 42 years. The youngest of these states is only 14 years old.8
 Chapter two broadens the theoretical framework through a discussion of 
LeMarquand, the shadows of the past, and hydro-hegemony. I begin with LeMarquand’s 
foundation of key factors shaping river-basin cooperation and posit a ranked hierarchy of 
importance for these factors. I then supplement this framework with additional 
conceptual lenses—a focus on the shadow of history, and attention to basin-based 
hegemonic power or ‘hydro-hegemony.’ These three lenses are conceptually linked. The 
first, the shadow of history, involves incorporating colonial histories into an analysis of 
present-day politics. Hydro-hegemony builds off this analysis of historical legacies by 
suggesting that the research needs to focus on historical aftermaths – what groups or 
nations are now disproportionately underdeveloped due to resource allocation during 
colonialism? More importantly, what issues of sovereignty and economic dominance are 
specifically created through hydro-politics?  
 Both the shadows of the past and hydro-hegemony are discussed in depth, and are 
used to examine what we know from the literature about basin cooperation.  Finally, 
chapter two sets the theme for chapters three and four—the case studies.  The case studies 
in Chapter three, the Orange-Senqu River Basin (OSRB), and Chapter four, the 
Okavango River Basin, are the vehicles through which we may examine the details of the 
theoretical framework explored in the preceding chapters.  There is a richness of detail, 
history, and hydro-politics for both river basins well beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
                                                 
8 Botswana and Lesotho received their independence from Britain in 1966, Angola from Portugal in 1975, 
Namibia from South Africa in 1990, with 1994, marking the end of apartheid in South Africa. 
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No one research effort could adequately cover all the material and perspectives available 
for either basin.  My intent is to use these case studies in order to explore the specific 
issues associated with hydro-hegemony, cooperation, and history.    
 This dissertation’s goal is to capture some of the discrete characteristics of each 
basin as they exemplify the limitations in the basic assumptions of many transboundary 
water cooperative arguments.  The most fundamental assumption in need of questioning 
is that transboundary water agreements (TWAs), cooperative efforts, and regimes are 
necessarily about shared fresh water resources, including their apportionment, 
management, and sustainability.   Another flaw in the literature is the idea that TWAs 
inevitably lead to less conflict.  Neither may be the case.  Treaties do not guarantee 
cooperation, and the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict as conflicts 
range in intensity.    
 According to a 1963 United Nations (U.N.) report, the large number of 
international river agreements signed after major domestic and international political 
upheavals were less concerned with hydro-political issues and more with territorial ones. 
As a consequence, “the hydrologic sequence of the countries within a basin and the 
present or potential demands on the river by the basin countries creates different patterns 
of incentives for cooperation”.9  Thirty-two years after the study, the 1995 violent 
conflict between Ecuador and Peru regarding the source of the Cenepa River reinforces 
the report’s message.  The conflict was about which actor would have dominion over the 
Cenepa River source. This dominion would grant its holder control over valuable mineral 
                                                 
9LeMarquand, International Rivers, 8.    
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resources.   The OSRB and Okavango case studies in my research exemplify in more 
detail a comparable situation.   
Chapter five concludes the dissertation research, summarizes the key issues, 
revisits briefly the arguments, interprets what the case studies tell us about the expanded 
theoretical framework explored in chapter two, identifies the theoretical and policy 
implications of this research, and recommends future areas of research.  I begin chapter 
five by summarizing the arguments of this research and, in the section on theoretical and 
policy implications have included an update-commentary on the environmental security 
theoretical debate.   
 
Methodology
This analysis is based on archival materials, contemporary documents, qualitative 
studies and regional planning material.  In two different field visits to the region, I 
conducted interviews with officials in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Water Sector, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), local non-
governmental (NGO) stakeholder groups, African government officials in ministries in 
each of the riparian states, technical experts, scholars from regional universities 
(including the Universities of  Cape Town, Pretoria, and the Western Cape in South 
Africa, as well as the Universities of Namibia and Botswana) and other intellectuals 
involved in transboundary research and cooperation efforts throughout SADC states, 
specifically the Republics of South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Lesotho. 
Additionally, I interviewed scholars, researchers, and government officials from the 
respective Orange and Okavango basin-states during the 2000 World Water Forum at The 
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Hague.  As an invited observer, I attended local community-based catchment and basin 
workshops. I was also an invited guest at an Okavango River Basin Commission 
(OKACOM) meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, a SADC water sector meeting in Maseru, 
Lesotho, and an IUCN (World Conservation Union) donor-supported Community Based 
Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) program meeting in Gaborone, Botswana. 
Drawing on these different sources helped me to develop an understanding of the 
multiple voices at play in this discussion. There are white colonial voices, whose echoes 
can be heard in the archives and the older treaties. However, there are now newer voices, 
working to defend and define the sovereignty of the newly independent African states 
from which they emerge. These voices occasionally share the same perspective when 
speaking of hydro-politics and transboundary water cooperation in the region, but most of 
the time they clash vividly.   
 
What are the Politics of Cooperation? 
In the politics of cooperation, regime formation is a useful approach to bring 
states that share resources to the point of negotiating with one another.  However, a 
central determinant of the effectiveness of the cooperative agreements must begin with 
knowing what the issues to be resolved are in the beginning, prior to the formation of the 
cooperative regime.  In short, what is the problem in need of resolution? Who is expected 
to resolve that problem?  
When nations decide to address the threat of water scarcity, assure their own 
hydro-security, and calm subsequent tensions emergent from such negotiations, they may 
enter into an agreement.  However, achieving cooperation in international politics is 
 9 
 
difficult, especially when the dominant principle in international politics is the territorial 
sovereignty of states.  The implication of this principle is that there is no political unit 
above and beyond the national state that may impose behavioral change on to states.  As 
Karen Litfin10 observes, most of the environmental literature does little to address the 
question of sovereignty directly.  The focus is usually on ‘environmental problems’.  She 
argues further that the sovereignty bargains characterizing global ecopolitics are likely to 
vary according to the nature of the problem.  Questions of transboundary pollution, 
internal natural resource degradation, and global commons (i.e. global warming, 
Antarctica, outer space, oceans) each have different implications for traditional norms of 
nonintervention11. 
Veronica Ward12 suggests that ecosystem management approaches to 
environmental concerns shift the focus to processes operating at different scales below 
and above the territorial state.  Because of this shift, the state as a spatial unit becomes 
“irrelevant”13. Additionally, Ward argues that ecosystem management challenges the 
principal dimensions of state sovereignty – autonomy, control, and authority – because 
such a management system requires not only authority-sharing, but may result in a “loss 
of legal and political control over flora and fauna previously considered either an integral 
part of the territorial state or available for taking.”14.  Where water is scarce, territorial 
claims and sovereign water demands regarding transboundary watercourses at the 
regional and local level have resulted in the formation of numerous agreements, river 
                                                 
10 Litfin, “Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics.”   
11 Ibid., 179. 
12 Ward, “Sovereignty and Ecosystem Management.” 
13 Ibid., 79.   
14 Ibid., 81. 
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basin organizations, and other cooperative efforts, all of which suggest that the sovereign 
states have agreed to engage in something akin to “limited territorial sovereignty”.15   
Reaching agreement about this sovereignty is usually difficult, and there is a 
significant difference between ownership and control. For example, the headwaters of the 
Nile and of the Orange-Senqu Rivers are found in countries that have minimal control 
over those resources.  Egypt is the basin hegemon in the Nile case, and South Africa is 
the basin hegemon of the Orange. In both cases, there is an obvious need to focus on the 
processes of hegemony, as well as the apparent power asymmetry.  
The Nile River is 4,160 miles long, starting at its remotest headstream, the 
Luvironea River in Burundi, and flows to its delta on the Mediterranean Sea in northeast 
Egypt. Although the river starts in central Africa, approximately 80% of the water comes 
from Ethiopia.   The Orange-Senqu River has its origins in the Lesotho Highlands in the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, a small land-locked country, surrounded completely by South 
Africa. Lesotho is considerably less developed than its Orange-Senqu River co-riparians, 
South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia.   
While sovereign state of Burundi16 and Lesotho, respectively, “own” the 
headwaters of two very large watercourses, neither is exercising any substantive control 
over how those resources are used or being developed.  Nor is either state sufficiently 
powerful to make a decision about the water’s use, or capable of countering the riparian 
hydro-hegemon’s control over the river’s resources.  Neither of these sovereign states is 
able to exercise absolute control over its physical environment.   
                                                 
15 Johnston, “The Environmental Law of the Sea:  Historical Development,” 22. 
16 Even if one considered Ethiopia, instead of Burundi, as the principal source for major water flow into 
Egypt, the result is very much the same. That is, Ethiopia is not exercising any substantive control over the 
Nile River within its borders.  
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In both of these instances there is a significant difference between riparians 
exercising control over the water, and riparian ownership. Attention to these power 
dynamics is necessary both to understand the forces that produce (or inhibit) cooperation 
and to understand its prospects for effectiveness. Lesotho has entered into several 
cooperative agreements and treaties with the riparians with which it shares the Orange 
River. Lesotho is a signatory in The Orange-Senqu River Basin Commission, and the key 
treaty partner in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project17, which would normally suggest 
that it is recognized by its co-riparians as having some sort of sovereignty over the river. 
However, it is South Africa that aggressively pursued the LHWP Treaty in an effort to 
secure the water supply necessary to its economy and population.  Water drunk in 
Gauteng province, South Africa’s industrial and financial heartland, comes from Lesotho.  
Under a liberalist system of international relations, mutual self-interested 
rationality becomes the basis of cooperation and interdependence.  If, however, liberalists 
are correct regarding resolving transboundary water disputes or conflicts, the present 
challenge is to explain why states should pursue cooperative relationships when such 
relationships are difficult to achieve, difficult to enforce, and not obviously mutually 
beneficial. Both realists and liberalist presume self-interested, purposive, and calculated 
behavior.  National self-interest is particularly critical if one intends to engage in 
cooperative agreements or protocols whose ends results rely on changed behavior on the 
part of the riparian state.  According to the pessimists, the “water wars” are imminent. 
                                                 
17 The treaty in question is the Treaty on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project between the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, signed in Maseru on 
October 24, 1986. One source for information about the treaty’s goal, contents, etc. can be found at 
http://www.africanwaterlaw.org/html/treatyprofile.asp?treatyid=113. At this time, there is no electronic 




Optimists suggest that, not only are the transboundary agreements positive actions to 
address water management, but that they are also potential pathways to peace, regional 
stability, and institutional change.  Further, optimists believe that action taken now will 
help countries avert water shortages and other related water crises in the future  
 
Cooperation Politics 
In this section, I will outline the environmental cooperation-conflict literature, 
identify its weaknesses, and briefly explore the nature of transboundary water agreements 
(TWAs) and the importance and application to southern Africa.  This discussion focused 
attention on the cooperation-barriers scenario.  In the presence of uncertainty, where there 
are many possible strategies and outcomes possible from national policies, some effort to 
clearly outline the obstacles or barriers to agreements is the first step.  The second step is 
to order these considerations based on their relative importance and relevancy. The third 
step is to situate these considerations as steps toward full quality cooperation over shared 
transboundary water resources. 
In any basin where multiple states share transboundary watercourses, differences 
among riparians should be expected.  The differences in country characteristics are likely 
to include population densities, geography, national income per capita, water per capita, 
military might, economic power, access to and control of natural resources, the size of the 
basin countries, and levels of development. These differences influence each riparian’s 
ability to bargain over its share of water in a particular basin.  Additionally, these 
differences may impact a riparian’s ability to either make or withstand threats. Power 
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asymmetry may manifest itself differently under different circumstances, but is most 
recognizable in the politics of hydro-hegemony.   
The ability of any riparian state to cooperate is complicated by its riparian 
position, and its ability to contend with all the issues that will need to be addressed.  
Because there are so few multilateral or international water treaties, Just and Netanyahu18 
assert “they are limited in scope of cooperation”,  mostly because the issues that need to 
be addressed in such agreements “are simply too complex to consider all the possible 
state contingencies or to get agreement on all such contingencies among countries”19. 
Because of this, the persistent ability of any signatory riparian state to continue to act 
unilaterally on issues having a direct impact on co-riparian countries is frequently 
permitted, albeit tacitly, by the failure of those same multilateral agreements to enforce 
the terms of those agreements. Basically, the agreements themselves lack teeth. 
The establishment of an agreement or treaty is the end-result of a lengthy process 
involving some level of cooperation between sovereign states involved in the treaty 
negotiation process.  Indeed, cooperation can represent a broad range of state-to-state 
relationships, and as well as the dynamics between states, states’ shared and unshared 
resources, and other states’ desire for these resources. According to Philip Allott20, there 
are many relationships between states on all different types of matters.  He considers 
ownership of many different degrees: possession, constructive possession, custody, 
control, and so forth.21 The implication is that the agreement reflects the issues of 
concern, and that its organizational framework, text, and related institutional 
                                                 
18 Just and Netanyahu, “International Water Resource Conflict: Experience and Potential,” 12. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Allot, “Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea.” 
21 Ibid., 9. 
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arrangements are organized to tackle a specific set of priorities or problems.  
Environmental regimes or cooperation regimes are one way to understand these 
agreements. 
Keohane defined regimes as “institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by 
governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations”22.  
Krasner’s definition is more complex and elaborate; he argues that regimes are “implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”23 Krasner goes further 
and clarifies what he means by principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
by linking them relationally. While there is no universally agreed-upon definition of 
international regimes, some version of both Keohane and Krasner’s theories are generally 
accepted.  However, Keohane’s definition is very brief, and surprisingly spare on the 
nature of the formation of the ‘agreed upon rules’. 
The general intent of these agreements is to move nations into a position where 
they can negotiate the conditions that require them to coordinate their actions and 
politically self-enforce practices that assure fairness, efficiency of use, access and 
environmental protection of the natural resource under negotiation.  It is possible that the 
behavioral model for regimes does not adequately address power dynamics; it is possible 
that differences in relative power (military-, economic-, knowledge-based) between 
actors create obstacles for effective cooperation.   
 
                                                 
22 Keohane is one of the many prominent theorists analyzed in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger’s 
Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  “International 
Institutions and State Power,” the article from which this quote was drawn, lays out some of the 
foundations to his critical framework.  
23 Krasner, International Regimes, 2.  
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Environmental Change, Scarcity and Conflict 
Over the last fifteen years, a sizeable body of research examining the connections 
between environmental change and violent conflict has posited that violent consequences 
result from environmental resource scarcity, failing states, and existing internecine 
tensions24. The existing literature on conflict has explored the links between environment 
(resource) scarcity, population growth, political instability, and violent conflict.  One 
recurring theory is that environmental scarcity causes violent conflict and that the 
probability of violent conflict is more likely to increase when resources are not only 
scarce but cross political boundaries, as is the case with shared transboundary freshwater 
river resources.25   
Elhance writes:  “This multiple-use potential of freshwater, especially 
transboundary water resources, combined with the certainty of growing water scarcities 
in many arid and semi-arid regions of the Third World makes hydro-politics between 
riparian states that share international river basins one of the most urgent, complex, and 
contentious issues that the developing countries and the international community will 
have to face and resolve in the next century.” 26
According to L. Susskind, E. Siskind, and J. W.Breslin27, the prospects of 
environmental treaties are not encouraging.  In their study of ten environmental treaty 
making efforts, they determined  “ . . .that the best that can be said about the agreements 
reached in recent years is that they may slow the rate of environmental degradation, but 
                                                 
24  Homer-Dixon, Gleditsch, Bächler, and Spillmann have all written extensively on this topic.  
25 Not all scholars agree that transboundary conditions make conflict more rather than less likely; see, for 
example Homer-Dixon’s “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflicts.”   





they will not reverse the destructive processes that triggered the need for action, nor 
repair the damage already done.”28  Their measures of success focused not on how many 
agreements were signed or signed and ratified, but on the speed and effectiveness with 
which the signatories were likely to produce tangible environmental improvements.  
Benvenisti29 contends that many of the legal frameworks used by states damaged by 
water pollution are considered weak at the international level.  Further, the weakness of 
these agreements and their related legal frameworks are exacerbated because they offer 
little guidance in resolving transboundary river management problems.30  
Some suggest that water is a touchstone for conflict31.  The environmental 
scarcity-violent conflict lens, however, is a rather narrow one from which to view violent 
conflict.  By the same token, it is an equally narrow lens through which to view peace-
making.  Ted Gurr32 determined that while ecological and demographic stresses are 
contributing factors to conflict, these factors are declining in significance as primary 
factors.  Instead, Gurr33 asserts that the chief factors revolve around contention for state 
power and territorial control.34 Hydro-hegemonists, others, and research presented in 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation agrees:  resource scarcity, per se, is not 
responsible for violent conflict.  There are always other contributing causal factors.  In 
many cases, however, increasing resource scarcities or rising demand may become 
contributing factors to a pre-existing conflict.     
                                                 
28 Susskind, Siskind, and Breslin, Nine Case Studies of International Environmental Negotiation. 
29 Benvenisti, Sharing Transboundary Resources. 
30 Frederiksen, Wolf, and Marty, particularly Marty’s International River Management – the Political 
Determinants of Success and Failure (Zurich: University of Zurich, 1997), all deal with these issues. 
31 Ashton, “Southern African Water Conflicts,” and Gleick’s biennial water reports discuss the relationship 
between water and conflict. 
32Gurr, Minorities at Risk, 1993. 
33 Ibid.   
34 Ibid.   
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Rising demand can be a source of both conflictual and cooperative interactions 
between actors, stakeholders, and resource users.  There is an expectation expressed via 
the rhetoric that conflict over international (transboundary) water resources exceeds 
cooperation, and that, in the future, water wars are more likely than water cooperation.  
The idea of water wars as a trend in the 21st Century was first seriously argued by Ismail 
Serageldin, a former World Bank Vice President.  His perspective is quoted often, 
including the views he expressed in a 1995 New York Times article and his speeches as 
Chairman (1998-2000) of the World Commission for Water in the 21st Century.  
There is evidence to support both water cooperation and conflict.  After a 2003 
study of 1,831 interactions, Wolf and other researchers at Oregon State University found 
only 37 disputes involving violence over a 50-year period. Thirty were between Israel 
and one or another of its neighbors-- the violence in these disputes ended in 1970. One 
hundred fifty seven treaties were negotiated and signed during this same time period.35  
However, the Oregon State researchers excluded events where water was incidental to the 
dispute, such as those concerning fishing rights, access to ports, transportation, or river 
boundaries, as well as those where water was a tool, target, or victim of armed conflict. 
Because of those exclusions, I suggest that the quantitative analysis offered by Wolf and 
associates fails to capture the issue-linkages surrounding water cooperation and conflict, 
and therefore only provides a very general picture with limited usefulness.    
                                                 
35 Wolf, Shared Waters: Conflict and Cooperation. 
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In the case of violent conflict, in order to register on an international scale, each 
must generate at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year.36 The Collier-Hoeffler model37  
determined that such conflicts are the result of a complex set of events and factors, 
including political corruption, unstable governments, ethnic tensions, religious 
grievances, and poverty.  They argue that the level of income per capita, rate of economic 
growth, and the structure of the economy—specifically the level of dependence on 
primary commodity exports—are three significant predictors of violent conflict. Thus, 
doubling the per capita income halves the risk of civil war.  The effect of primary 
commodity exports is non-linear, peaking with exports at about 30%.  A country with 
primary exports of 25% of its GDP has a 33% risk of conflict.   
Ethnic and religious composition also matters, especially when ethnic dominance 
accounts for 45-90% of the population.  Alternatively, greater “ethnic and religious 
diversity reduces the risk of rebellion”38.   According to Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, 
resource conflicts must be financed, and “violent secessionists movements are 
statistically more likely if a country has valuable natural resources: oil, in particular”39 
and diamonds seemingly rank high, as both can be used to finance and sustain the 
violence.  They contend that violent conflicts or civil war conflicts in Africa demonstrate 
the more worrisome trends.  
In support of their position Collier-Hoeffler noted that two-thirds of Africa’s 
intrastate conflicts in the 1990s were civil wars and at least two, between Sierra Leone 
                                                 
36 A civil war is defined by Gleditsch and colleagues as a violent conflict that generates at least 1,000 
battle-related deaths per year. For more information on this definition, see “Causal Pathways to Conflict” 
by Wench Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen in Diehl and Gleditsch’s Environmental Conflict. 
37 Model referenced in Bannon and Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict. 
38 Collier-Hoeffler in Bannon and Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, 3. 
39 Bannon and Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict, 5. 
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and Sudan, involve specific resource capture and control.  From 1991 to 2002, the 
Revolutionary United Front rebel forces in Sierra Leone fought the government for 
control over diamond resources.  In Sudan, the continuing conflict between Arabs 
(mostly herdsmen) and non-Arabs (mostly farmers) centers on the control of land and oil 
resources.  Additionally, Bannon and Collier cite the Angolan conflict, Africa’s longest 
civil war, which went on from 1974-2002.  
According to the 2000, 2001, and 2002 SIPRI Yearbooks, Africa is and remains 
the most conflict-ridden region of the world.  According to SIPRI, there were seven wars 
in the 1970s, eight in the 1980s, and fourteen in the 1990s.  Acknowledging the civil wars 
in African states is important; they frequently spill over into bordering states by involving 
the military and civilian populations of neighboring countries, and can bring instability to 
an entire region or group of actors.  For example, the civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo eventually involved nine countries, including Namibia, Angola, and 
Zimbabwe, who all willingly contributed of troops in support of President Laurent 
Kabila.  The estimated death toll exceeds four million lives.  A truce has been in place 
since 2002 -- however, at the time of this research, there has been no disarmament and 
peace remains elusive.   
One important limitation in the Collier-Hoeffler argument is that they only 
considered civil wars or internecine violent conflicts. This limits the applicability of 
Collier’s argument to environmental resources conflicts, especially in cases where the 
resources cross political boundaries, as in the case of shared transboundary water 
resources.   
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Other challenges to existing conflict literature involve assumptions surrounding 
future conflicts and-potential scarcities. Nils Petter Gleditsch “. . . questions the very idea 
that humanity is facing increasing environmental scarcities”.40  At present, there is a lack 
of the necessary systematic research, empirical evidence, or large numerical studies 
needed to support the causal links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict.41 
Gleditsch, in particular, offers a strong and coherent argument based on nine common 
problems in this regard.  Also, the existing case-study-based research might have been 
biased toward cases disproportionately determined for conflict, which makes it difficult 
to separate the causal role of environmental factors for conflict.42
There are many conditions that interfere with the development of TWAs or have 
an effect upon their relative success. However it is not clear if these conditions are 
actually obstacles to successful TWAs or if they only help to explain the relationship 
between states engaged in transboundary river cooperative efforts. This research makes it 
clear that there are obstacles which must be overcome in order to achieve cooperation 
The relative success of TWAs depends upon obtaining conditions that include: 
cooperation between basin riparian states in a manner that assures equitable access to 
water resources; sustains the freshwater ecosystem; provides ample and continuous 
opportunity for information exchange; establishes an enforcement mechanism to assure 
agreement compliance and resolve disputes; and, most importantly, creates a venue for 
shared and co-equal power among basin riparians. 
                                                 
40 Diehl and Gleditsch, Environmental Conflict, 276. 
41 Diehl, Gleditsch, Levy all point out the gap in this branch of the research.  
42 This was confirmed in my 2000 interview with Kenneth Conca Interview, and in my research. Hauge and 
Ellingsen’s 1998 article “Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict” is also a useful 




Among co-riparians within a basin are power relationships. Aspects of this 
hierarchy may be attributed to riparian position, regional hegemony, and military force.  
One might argue that it is the perspective of coercive power43 in the hands of a riparian 
hegemon that drives the formation of TWAs, and ultimately TWA cooperation.   
Rather than a direct causal link between environmental scarcity and violent 
conflict, the research now considers environmental scarcity or resource scarcity as a 
contributing factor to conflict.   Even with that, there are other weaknesses in the conflict 
literature research.  The environment-conflict causal link literature is weak in its 
explanation of the dynamics of conflict, the definition of the term conflict, and the 
methods through which non-violent conflict is waged.  Moreover, the literature makes 
little distinction between armed conflict, threats of military violence, and more abstract 
tactics of coercion.  Robert Keohane refers to such tactics as “coercive resources”.44
 Under those circumstances, the conflicts over the delineation of hydrologic 
boundaries may be less about the water resource, and more about maintaining sovereign 
territorial integrity.  It is important to recognize that the negotiation, development, and 
content of transboundary water agreements may have little to do with water conflicts, 
except as a means to generate an alternative platform for boundary or resource control 
discussions which have more to do with territorial integrity.  This is especially the case 
when the transboundary watercourse also happens to involve a boundary-forming 
                                                 
43 Michel Foucault suggests that all power is coercive. Here, I’m referring to power that is used to compel 
certain types of behavior, as opposed to collaborative or soft power, which operates to persuade other 
actors.   
44 Keohane, After Hegemony, 44. 
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(contiguous) river.45  Thus, it may be more politically useful to acknowledge TWAs as a 
means to help explain and define relationships between riparians.  
Large complex systems, like multilateral transboundary watercourse agreements 
and their impacts among water-scarce nations, are very difficult to understand, 
particularly in a region where states are politically, geographically, and economically 
dissimilar.  Further, trying to deconstruct them may not yield the desired knowledge 
about causal relations of environmental scarcity, water securitization, and conflict 
generally for which one is searching. The lineages of these complex systems are mired in 
an inherited past incorporating the histories of past conflict, colonization, and 
contemporary industrial needs.  
The upstream/downstream considerations coupled with the asymmetrical nature 
of riparian states are serious obstacles to the deep level of cooperation necessary for 
effective transboundary watercourse agreements.  Given this, Lowi46 argues that 
behavioral change and acceptance on the part of dominant riparians is necessary.  Just 
and Netanyahu47 conclude that the formation of a coalition and its size are influenced by 
the various countries’ abilities to provide incentives or disincentives to other riparians, 
either to bring them closer to or further from the negotiation table.   Further, they assert 
that there are considerably fewer multilateral transboundary water agreements; that 
multilateral agreements (or treaties) by their very nature, translate into limited 
cooperation; and that multilateral agreements are “too complex” to adequately address all 
the issues, various contingencies, and individual riparian concerns and interests. 
                                                 
 
46 Lowi, Water and Power. 
47 Just and Netanyahu, “International Water Resource Conflict.” 
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There are more political issues for states to consider.  Conflict is usually seen as 
the threat, while cooperation is the goal. The goals are specific to each river basin and 
may include, for example, equitable use, pollution management and mitigation, equitable 
shares, or sustainable management.  Conflict may contribute to solving a problem, 
breaking a stalemate or improve on mismanagement, while cooperation often may help 
perpetuate a bad state of affairs. There are others, in addition to Homer-Dixon, who 
continue to counter the challengers’ positions and have continued to support even the 
most tenuous relationship between resource scarcity and conflict.   
The “environmentally-induced conflict” literature appears to make a persuasive 
case. However, other scholars have voiced opposition to the resource scarcity and violent 
conflict thesis.  According to Levy, “the most important implication [of this research] is a 
need to explore the causes of regional conflict as an important end in itself, and to 
abandon the current fad of merely demonstrating links to environmental deterioration”48.  
Levy suggests that direct causal links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict 
are weak at best, and difficult to prove.  By arguing environmental cooperation is 
fundamental to peacemaking, it may be easier to neglect countries vulnerable to conflict 
and to the links between conflict and natural resources.  Countries engaged in conflict 
over water, however, may be the exception to this rule.49    
While the causal link between environmental change and violent conflict is weak, 
the theoretical framework used to examine how environmental scarcity operates as an 
intervening variable contributing to state capacity to manage environmental problems, 
                                                 
48 Levy, “Is the environment a national security issue?”.  
49 Several authors, including Peter Gleick (“Environment and Security:  The Clear Connections” and 
“Climate Change”) and Malin Falkenmark (“Freshwaters as a Factor in Strategic Policy and Action,” in 
Westing’s Global Resources), describe this politically tense scenario.  
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ethnic tensions, or social and political transition is extremely relevant to an analysis of 
hydro-politics.  In his environmental scarcity and violent conflict arguments, Homer-
Dixon50 identified three types of environmental scarcity:   
(1) supply-induced scarcity caused by degradation and depletion of an environmental 
resource, e.g. the erosion of cropland;  
(2) demand-induced scarcity as a result of population growth within a region or 
increased per capita consumption; and  
(3) structural scarcity, the result of an unequal social distribution of a resource that 
concentrates it in the hands of a relatively few people while the remaining 
population experiences serious shortages.    
Essentially, there is an eternal conflict between these two theoretical perspectives: 
that ‘environmental scarcity leads to conflict’ (Malthusian-Hobbesian theory) and that 
‘technology plus virtual water solves everything’ (Cornucopian-Lockeian theory).  This 
research is not an attempt to re-debate this theoretical conflict, but to suggest that the 
debate lacks a systematic analysis of response or the strategies used by states to cope with 
environmental scarcity and insecurity.  However, since the research presented here is 
more aligned with theories of Political Realism than any other, its starting point assumes 
that scarcity-induced conflict and environmental security are high politics.  Even when 
water scarcity or shared water resources are not the issue around which conflict and 
cooperation are discussed and negotiated, it may be politically advantageous to present 
water as being scarce.   
                                                 




With the proliferation of international and environmental agreements frequently 
taken for granted, it is important to recognize that reaching agreements is difficult.  
Several factors, including imposition of political boundaries, the degree of water 
interdependence, the degree of water scarcity, and the availability of alternative water 
resources, create varied geographical and political dynamics between the basin states.  
This complexity is exacerbated by the linkage of issues that may or may not be related to 
the issue of transboundary water resources management, such as defining borders, 
redressing past grievances and relationships between actors, exercising or asserting 
sovereignty over other natural resources, or seeking concessions on issues that are 
politically or economically important to one or more riparians. A deeper level of 
cooperation involves the actual implementation of the content of the agreement.   
Deciding whether to link or de-link issues can become challenging.  One 
approach toward agreement-making and enhancing cooperation is to link issues to a set 
of mutually advantageous concerns that normally would not be available under 
alternative circumstances.51As a result, it is posited that actors would make concessions 
on those issues about which they care little, and agree on those that are important.  In this 
way, riparians can expand the potential benefits of cooperation and agreement formation 
beyond water issues.  As is evident from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database, as many as 43 percent of treaties include linkages to non-water issues.  Still, 
the complexity of many issues may not lend themselves to a basin-wide scale where the 
operating assumption is that water is supposed to be the central issue. 
                                                 
51 Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements. 
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Transboundary rivers are managed with various degrees of cooperation, including 
(1) full coordination of policies; (2) continuous joint decision making and policy 
coordination;52 (3) a rule-based framework; (4) shared expenditures; and (5) continuous 
willingness to exchange information.  Those degrees of cooperation may be driven by 
non-water related incentives, such as economy and trade, or indirect water-related 
incentives such as flood management or river navigability, or direct water-related issues 
of water sharing or water supply.  The level of cooperation, particularly as related to 
items 4 and 5, may require continuous communication among actors. On prestige 
projects, this communication is likely to occur between patrons and national elites who 
may ignore local stakeholder and environmental interest groups. In some respects, these 
networks have their origins in the historical legacy of colonial political exclusivity and 
benefits, where a few held and continue to hold privileged positions within distinct 
networks not easily accessed by either outsiders or outside influence. 
 As the case studies in chapters 3 and 4 will show, neither hydro-politics nor 
hydro-security issues can be reduced easily into an either-or narrative.  Multiple scenarios 
are possible.  For example, transboundary water development may be a strategic 
bargaining tool to attract international resources; protect a particular resource and thereby 
become a mechanism for exercising control over neighboring riparian states; eliminate a 
trade barrier; increase trade of a specific product; inhibit economic growth, for fear of the 
competition, or development more generally; prevent control of mineral resources; or 
detract attention from water development plans or diversion strategies not covered by any 
agreements.  As a result, a transboundary water agreement designed to institute certain 
                                                 
52 A. K. Biswas develops this political process further in “Management of International Waters: Problems 
and Perspective.” Lowi’s Water and Power also analyzes this step.  
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behaviors might also lead riparians to abandon or restrict other behaviors having to do 
with hydro-security.  Moreover, as stated previously, issues of shared transboundary 
water resources cannot be separated easily from national security concerns and statehood.  
The connection between water and energy, as in the case of huge hydro-power 
infrastructure development, is an example of the latter.  There is a need for a more 
nuanced approach. 
 This research maintains an emphasis on state actors by using the Political 
Realist53 international relations perspective.  It deviates somewhat from traditional 
realism in that it recognizes the transboundary nature of environmental problems.  
However, this research takes as its base assumption the idea that environmental issues are 
a central part of the concepts of the state, sovereignty, territory, national interest, and, to a 
great extent, the international balance of power.   
 
Southern Africa  
Southern Africa is a critical research area for examining these issues because they 
are all coming to the forefront simultaneously. The shifting dynamics between the 
region’s hydro-geography; the ongoing national, regional, and global environmental 
change; and the political transformations of the post-colonial, post-apartheid, and post-
Cold War era all create the new world order in which the southern African states now 
find themselves.  Further, institutional arrangements for cooperative resource 
                                                 
53 Realism as introduced by Kenneth Waltz, where the focus is on states as rational, which maximizes state 
power in an anarchic system. In this scenario, state behavior is mainly a function of the structure of power 
relations in such a system.  See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:  
Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
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management are on the increase in Southern Africa.54  In the mainstream literature, 
hydro-politics is not only a relatively new discipline, but has been integrated, rather 
successfully into literature on environmental scarcity and conflict and regime 
cooperation. However, this has not necessarily been the case in southern Africa, and 
particularly in the Okavango and Orange-Senqu River Basins where, according to Turton, 
there is a long history of cooperation. These cases were selected as representative of a 
larger political dynamic occurring in the riparian states which constitute these shared 
freshwater river basins.  
Exploring strengths and possible weaknesses in current hydro-political theory 
makes sense in these two river basins because most of the countries (South Africa, 
Namibia, Botswana, and Lesotho) are dry, water scarce, and likely to become more so in 
the future. This is due in part to low and variable seasonal rainfall and high rates of 
evaporation55 and what is likely to be an increasing growth-related demand. The regions 
investigated in this project have distinct, but shared histories. Colonialism lasted longer 
than any place else in this part of Africa. The liberation movements were armed and 
violent struggles in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. Although none of the basin 
riparians have had a military coup post-independence, the civil war in Angola and 
apartheid further exacerbated regional and local politics, and in many respects extended 
colonialism. Cold War politics played out in several of these riparian basin states, and the 
region overall. Now China has become a major international donor actor in the region. 
While there has been something that approximates democratic elections in all of the 
                                                 
54 Conca and Dabelko’s anthology, Environmental Peacemaking, provides a brilliant introduction to this 
issue.  
55 Heyns, “Cooperation in the Okavango River basin: The OKACOM Experience.” 
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riparians, in many respects domestic politics remain dominated by first generation 
liberation movements cum governments. As a result, for countries in the Okavango and 
Orange-Senqu River basins, this mutual experience has enabled political leadership to 
share history and a mutual interest in retaining power. This shared interest is a possible 
common ground, especially regarding cooperation over shared water resources. Further, 
for the riparians in each of the case studies, cooperation over shared freshwater resources 
enable each respective government to attract international donor resources, sustain the 
status quo, and offers a place on the international environmental stage in the political and 
environmental sustainability discourse.  
There are also differences amongst the riparians. Chief among these differences is 
the almost 30-year post-independence civil war in Angola, the non-violent independence 
of Botswana, the large white settler populations which remained in South Africa, 
Namibia, and to a lesser extent, Botswana. Paradoxically, the long-term-permanent (and 
current) presence of white settler-ruled regimes created an economic and structural 
infrastructure developmental advantage and firm control over resources which has 
contributed to the economic advantages enjoyed particularly by Namibia and South 
Africa.  
Unlike those in the Middle East, particularly those basins located in Israel, Jordon 
or Turkey, these are non-securitized basins. The hydro-politics and water concerns easily 
transcend multiple areas, including water for meeting the basic needs of human 
consumption supply and sanitation, the hydro-geo political aspects of national security, 
energy supply and development. At the same time, these water concerns legitimate 
worries over the accessibility of sustainable freshwater supplies and the diminishing 
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supply for freshwater ecosystems of considerable local value and global interest. These 
cases provide useful examples of (a) the environmental scarcity-environmental security 
nexus, and (b) water as a potential flash-point and cross cutting issues. In terms of the 
latter, water cuts across issues of health, security, environmental sustainability, political 
economy, hydro-geography, international relations, history and hydro-hegemony. The 
Okavango and Orange-Senqu River basins were selected for comparison to explore their 
respective similarities across multiple variables as well as on one or a few key variables. 
These are good cases because they offer the potential to examine obstacles to and 
opportunities for transboundary water cooperation on several levels and explore the very 
nature of that cooperation. 
In order to investigate the politics of water, it is crucial to examine its physicality. 
Water is unevenly distributed across southern Africa as expressed in both spatial and 
temporal (seasonal and inter-annual) terms.  The major causes of this uneven distribution 
are the steep east-west and north-south gradients in rainfall and evaporation.56  
Essentially, the region goes from wet in the north and east to extremely dry in the 
southwest.  The unequal distribution of rainfall and associated runoff is reflected in the 
absence of perennial rivers and lakes in some parts of the sub-continent.  Namibia, 
Botswana, and some parts of South Africa are strikingly water-poor.57  Also, due to 
extreme temporal and spatial rainfall variability, endemic drought and periodic floods 
characterize this region.  The maldistribution of water means that where water is scarce, 
                                                 
56 Falkenmark (“The massive water scarcity now threatening Africa”) and Conley (“A Synoptic View of 
Water Resources in Southern Africa”) both describe the water/weather connection more deeply.  
57 Heyns and Pallet both discuss this in Namibia’s Water: A Decision-Maker’s Guide.  
 31 
 
shared, and subject to increasing demand, riparian state control of such a limited resource 
becomes central to regional and state politics.   
The Southern African region occupies a unique position with regards to the 
world’s river basins: the highest density of international river basins on Earth can be 
found in this poorly developed area.58  Of the 300 or more freshwater basins, an 
estimated 260 or more are shared by two or more countries.  Shared basins comprise 
more than 47% of global land area:  the majority of such areas are found on the 
continents of Africa, Asia, and South America—the Global South.  The southern 
African59 region is, by and large, arid and semi-arid. All its major rivers are shared by 
two or more countries. The drainage areas of the fifteen major river basins cover as much 
as 70% of the region’s land surface.  By way of example, the Zambezi River is shared by 
eight countries.  Mozambique is downstream in nine different river basins (Table 1).  
With the exception of the island nation-states of Mauritius and Seychelles, all the other 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries share river basins with 
one or more neighboring states.   
                                                 
58Granit, “Swedish Experiences from Transboundary Water Management in Southern Africa.” 
59 For the purpose of this paper, Southern Africa is defined as the mainland countries making up the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The treaty establishing SADC was signed in 
Windhoek, Namibia, 1992 and builds on the former SADC that was established in Lusaka in 1980. Member 
states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Each member State has a 
responsibility to coordinate a sector or several sectors on behalf of the others member states. SADC’s goal 
is to achieve an integrated regional economy on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit. 
 32 
 
Figure 1.  Major Southern African River Basins map redrawn by author,   Source.  Original image from 
combined sources; Water in Southern Africa (1996) Cited Source:  USAID, SARP (Southern African 
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Basin Population in Millions 
Ruvuma Eastern 2002 Census = 1,919,829 
Limpopo/Save = 11 million (Zim and Moz) 
Incomati = 1,122,000 
Cunene = 1,092,828 (Does not include Luanda 4.5 million) 
Okavango = 1,406,453 












Scientists and engineers have been at the forefront in applying technological 
innovation to international fresh water resource problems and management.  These efforts 
have been accompanied by a wealth of research on the subject of water and its 
importance.  The net result has been interbasin transfers, dams, diversion and retention 
schemes, flood control management infrastructure development, and a growing emphasis 
on integrated water resources management (IWRM)60.  Some argue the emergence of 
IWRM is not only significant, but that it also engages a network of experts, interested 
parties and influential decision makers into a process where previously scientists and 
engineers were dominant.61    
Table 1.Overview of basins shared by continental SADC member countries**  
**Based on Munyaradzi Chenje and Phyllis Johnson 1996, Water in Southern Africa; and John Pallet 1997, 








Basins shared with other SADC countries 
   Angola 5    Congo, Cunene, Cuvelai, Okavango, Zambezi 
   Botswana 4    Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, Zambezi 
   DR Congo 2    Congo, Nile 
   Lesotho 1    Orange 
   Malawi 1    Zambezi 
 
   Mozambique 
 
9 
   Buzi, Incomati, Limpopo, Maputo, Pungwe, Ruvuma, Save,    
Umbeluzi, Zambezi 
   Namibia 5    Cunene, Cuvelai, Okavango, Orange, Zambezi 
   South Africa 5    Incomati, Limpopo, Maputo, Orange, Umbeluzi 
   Swaziland 3    Incomati, Maputo, Umbeluzi 
   Tanzania 3    Congo, Ruvuma, Zambezi 
   Zambia 2    Congo, Zambezi 
   Zimbabwe 6    Buzi, Limpopo, Okavango, Pungwe, Save, Zambezi 
 
                                                 
60 According to the Global Water Partnership (GWP, 2000) IWRM “aims to ensure the coordinated 
development and management of water, land, and related resources by maximizing economic and social 
welfare without compromising the sustainability of vital environmental ecosystems 
61 Conca, Governing Water. 
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A functionalist (neo and otherwise) would claim that negotiations over low-
politics issues, like the environmental problems surrounding a transboundary 
watercourse, can spill over into the high politics of security and wealth.  The functionalist 
promise would stand behind negotiations over water, where the hope that agreement over 
water usage and sharing would create relations between negotiators that could support 
greater agreement on other issues.62  This research suggests that there are no easy 
technical issues associated with the high politics of these environmental concerns, and 
that the mere appearance of a technical issue is much more fundamental to state politics 
and economics.    
While little of the science regarding freshwater resources is in dispute, the most 
serious issues surrounding transboundary freshwater resources are political, such as rising 
concerns over resource allocation, power, and influence.  “Who gets what, when, and 
how?”63  This is especially the case for shared transboundary (international) 
watercourses. The agreements—resource regimes—must not only be technically feasible 
and practicable, but also politically possible.  However, the politics in southern Africa 
may depend entirely upon who is doing the politics.  While doing my fieldwork, I 
observed differences in perception, which I believe may have been influenced by skin 
color (white and black Africans), personal life experience, and class. I want to emphasize 
that this was not always the case, but it is important to remember how profoundly divided 
southern African states were, and, to an extent, still are along social, economic, political, 
and racial lines.  As a result, these states face severe development challenges. 
                                                 
62 Conca and Dabelko, Environmental Peacemaking. 
63 Lasswell, Who Gets What. 
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Responses from an interview with Mr. Abraham Nehemia, a black Namibian 
African board member of NamWater,64 were most revealing.  When asked about 
Namibia’s efforts to meets its water needs and the development of new water policy, he 
responded by saying that “there are many issues of concern, but history interferes with 
Namibia fulfilling harmonization with its neighbors as it is attempting to build its own 
identity and asserting independence, but the country (Namibia) is taking dramatic steps.”  
He offered some detail about what those steps would include, such as an examination of 
colonial-era laws; establishing a cabinet level committee on water issues to determine 
more clearly the issues and studying thematic areas, equity, stakeholders, and economic 
water-related reforms, such as going from paying nothing to full cost recovery. Finally, 
he strongly suggested that “the political leadership must prove to the people that the 
previous way, which was so detrimental to them, not only no longer exists, but that the 
replacement political systems would do things differently.”  He willingly recognized the 
economic and hydrologic links Namibia has with its riparian neighbors, Angola, 
Botswana, and South Africa, but was very clear in expressing that Namibia wanted 
“some political distance”. He further suggested that “Namibia’s water interests were not 
being adequately represented” by the then water elites, in reference to the mostly white 
Namibian government officials.  It was clear that he recognized that one could not 
separate politics from water, and because of that relationship, “the government must have 
the ‘right’ people to represent Namibia’s interests”, a mantra that would be repeated from 
many that I interviewed, and imbued with different meaning each time. 
                                                 
64 Mr. Abraham Nehemia is a board member of NamWater.  NamWater is the commercial parastatal entity 
supplying water in bulk to industries, municipalities and the Directorates of Rural Water Supply in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry (DAWF).  The Namibian government is the sole shareholder 
for NamWater and is represented by the Minister of DAWF who in turn appoints the Board of Directors.  
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In this dissertation, the use or reference to ‘water elites’ is not intended to convey 
a negative perspective.  These water elites are knowledgeable, dedicated professionals 
who combine a passion for and dedication to understanding and researching the regions’ 
water issues, stakeholder needs, and institutional capacity building.  They are committed 
individuals, as well as regional citizens with specific racialized and gendered 
experiences.  These experiences have impacted who received (and receives) access to 
what education, who that education benefits, and what benefits that educations grants, 
particularly in terms of using one’s knowledge to advance the issue of cooperation 
around shared freshwater resources. Never during my interviews did I come to suspect or 
conclude anything less than a sincere, rigorous regard for the regions’ hydro-political 
challenges. However, the dominance and influence these individuals wield should not be 
discounted. They are individuals using their education to benefit both themselves and 
their country’s national interests. They are significant actors in the hydro-political 
discourse. Others refer to these individuals as the “discursive elite” and define them as 
“those persons who are in a dominant position within bureaucratic entities and who can 
determine the nature, form and content of the prevailing discourse, also known as the 
sanctioned discourse”.65 I use “water elite” in order to highlight the arena in which these 
actors work.    
The SADC region is undergoing increasing political change. These changes 
include democratization; stabilization; destabilization; urbanization; population growth; 
environmental cognizance; environmental degradation; and modernization.  Southern 
Africa is, however, a water-poor region.  Under these circumstances, the potential for 
                                                 
65 Turton and Meissner, Hydropolitics in the Developing World, 37. 
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conflicts over shared water resources exists and is expanding. There are growing and 
increasing demands on water in the SADC region, including population growth and rapid 
urbanization.  When combined with the pre-existing water demands of agriculture, 
mining and other industrial uses, the larger demand in likely to result in a decrease in 
available freshwater per capita, an increase in providing water, and water stress and water 
scarcity.66  Increased demand is also likely to contribute to increased competition, 
conflict and disputes among countries vying for a greater apportionment of water from 
their shared rivers.  However, as demand rises, the numbers of water agreements 
increases.   
In the context of this research, quality cooperation is reached when the strategic 
actions of rational actors at the macro level result in (a) systemic and measurable 
outcomes at the micro level; (b) the use of hydrology rather than territorial 
administrative, economic, or cultural boundaries to dictate the issues facing the resource, 
thus forcing states to work together across political boundaries; and (c) cooperative 
regimes and institutions capable of sustaining positive conflict.  Successful, quality 
cooperation necessitates a new deal between public, private, and civil society sectors and 
an acceptance that the status quo may not be acceptable, or the status quo has its roots 
planted firmly in the past, a past that must be reconciled either through cooperation or 
through conflict negotiation.   Thus, how states perceive, protect, or parlay their 
hydrological interests (and needs) as national interests, in regions where water is scarce 
                                                 
66 In The Management of Shared River Basins, (Hubert H.G. Savenije and Pieter van der Zaag, eds. 1998), 
water scarcity is considered as per capita water availability of less than 1000 cubic meters per annum and 
water stress is per capita water availability of less than 1700 cubic meters per annum.  Consistent with their 
definition is that of Malin Falkenmark’s, whose accepted figure for water stress is 1,700 cubic meters per 
person per year is widely accepted and is used by most hydrologists.  Water scarcity occurs with 1000 
cubic meters or less per person per year.   
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and shared, becomes increasingly important to the exercise of state power in the 
negotiation of TRA, their effectiveness, and the resulting quality of cooperation.   
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Without a clear understanding of the problem needing resolution, conflicts over 
water or transboundary watercourse agreements may be proxies for a set of underlying 
political issues, such as territorial integrity, asymmetry of power, resistance to hegemonic 
riparian domination (hydro-hegemony), or competition for development. These conflicts 
are rationalized using rhetoric based around resource control, but really bring out much 
larger concerns. The measurement for assessing the effectiveness of conflict resolution 
rhetoric should be based on how the cooperative regime, i.e. transboundary watercourse 
agreement, contributes to the solving the whole problem.   
In many instances, countries that depend on water originating outside of their 
respective sovereign borders or territory may be equally dependent upon effective treaties 
and the goodwill of upstream countries.  Alternatively, countries dependent upon water 
originating outside their sovereign boundary may rely on the politics, strategic 
generosity, or self-interests of the basin hydro-hegemon. The country that controls the 
water supply/resources of its co-riparians can exert formidable power. If water 
cooperation is to last, water allocation will need to be addressed.  In instances where 
stronger nations, i.e. hegemons such as South Africa in the SADC region, the potential to 
exploit power advantages may explain, in part, the high level of involvement in bilateral 
and multilateral agreements.67  
                                                 
67 In Africa, there are three states considered regional and, to some extent, continental hegemons-Egypt, 
Nigeria, and South Africa.  Independently, at least one of those states is involved in more than 55 percent 
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The hydro-political and geo-sovereign dynamics where water is scarce, and likely 
to become scarcer, make international (basin riparian) disputes inevitable, and thereby 
increase the likelihood of conflict.  When compounded by strong political pressure, 
unilateral action urging a riparian country to aggressively secure and protect its water 
rights within shared transboundary watercourses can exacerbate tensions between 
riparians.  Resource conflicts become inevitable when multilateral agreements combine 
with multiple state agendas and water needs. The concerns of the individual states 
involved overshadow any attempt towards unilateral action.   
Although political historians and scholars have suggested strongly that states are 
more likely to cooperate rather than resort to violent conflict in situations of water 
scarcity, transboundary water cooperation requires a more politically nuanced approach. 
Because of this, it must address the differential power relations that exist between 
riparian states.  There are numerous instances where conflicts about water have acted as a 
military target or political tool.68  Additionally, a serious engagement with the literature 
must address the differential power relationships that exist among stakeholders, 
communities of interest, and riparian states as well as the role power plays in 
transboundary water cooperation and conflict. This engagement should begin with an 
examination of the role of sovereignty in creating and continuing transboundary water 
conflicts. 
Sinai Netanyahu and Richard Just identify sovereignty as an obstacle to 
transboundary watercourse cooperation.  Because protection of absolute sovereignty is in 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Africa’s substantive transboundary water agreements.  South Africa is signatory to almost 30 percent of 
the continent’s transboundary water agreements. 
68 Gleick includes this chronology in his biannual reports on freshwater resources.   
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a country’s best interest, it is not likely “to accept a decision made by a third party from 
outside a basin or (my emphasis) dictated by a basin-wide planning commission 
whenever the decision would decrease that country’s rights in the river basin.” 69
In some situations, geographical position of a riparian becomes an important 
factor for contested water issues.  However, if an upstream riparian can enforce its status 
through economic and military power, its interests may take precedence.   Riparian 
position does not necessarily give an upstream riparian hydrological advantage with 
respect to either water diversion or domination of water allocation.  Water domination 
that threatens other riparians must be perceived as a credible threat, capable of being 
“backed up with, among other things, financial and technical abilities.”70 Upstream 
riparians tend to argue for “absolute territorial sovereignty,” based upon the concept that 
a state has the right to utilize its resources, especially water, within its boundaries and 
without regard to downstream water needs. 
 
LeMarquand 
 In his seminal work, LeMarquand71 developed a conceptual framework to analyze 
international river cooperation. This framework incorporated hydrologic, economic, and 
political aspects. LeMarquand identifies three major sets of factors: hydrologic-
economic, foreign policy, and domestic policy-making. Each condition includes several 
variables establishing general patterns shaping the incentives and disincentives of 
cooperation.  
                                                 
69 Just and Netanyahu, 10. 
70 Ibid., 11. 
71 LeMarquand, International Rivers:  The Politics of Cooperation, 1977. 
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 To support his fundamental position, that economic incentives greatly explains 
and underlies the basis for transboundary watercourse cooperation, LeMarquand offers 
two dominant themes as a basis for cooperation analysis:  hydrologic-economic 
incentives and foreign policy incentives.  The hydrologic and economic sets are a 
necessary condition for cooperation. The foreign policy aspect, which is affected by 
domestic policy and consensus, will either corrode or enhance cooperation. Within each 
of these major sets, LeMarquand identifies several sub-factor sets. Several of these sub-
factors are germane to this discussion.  He makes clear what factors he considers 
important, but doesn’t depend upon them to argue the larger argument about how these 
factors shape water cooperation or conflict, only that they are considerations. 
LeMarquand argues that the pattern of riparian relationships are defined most 
usefully in terms of common property resources, wherein the river is the medium by 
which the actions of one country, such as water abstraction, flow regulation, or pollution, 
take effect in other basin countries.  He writes that, “all international rivers can be 
regarded as common property resources.”72  While a discussion of common pool 
resources theory is of growing importance to the field, neither this nor a discussion of 
transboundary (international) river resources as common property resources fall within 
the scope of this discussion. Here, I want to address the weaknesses in LeMarquand’s 
framework. 
It is inconceivable to expect quality cooperation or a venue where positive 
conflict may occur if riparian states are unable to reconcile those issues about which they 
can exercise restraint, negotiate, or compromise.  To some extent, any agreement to 
                                                 
72 See Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resources.   
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which a nation concurs imposes some limits on sovereignty and restricts a state’s ability 
to act unilaterally.   All things being equal, a riparian state would be expected to choose 
to retain its independence and resist transboundary water cooperation, unless its riparian 
position or asymmetry acts as motivation for participation in a cooperation agreement.  In 
short, the costs of cooperation must exceed the cost of not cooperating.  However, there 
are often other unknown motivating factors, such as the shadows of the past or hydro-
hegemony.   
In the context of this research, quality cooperation is reached when the strategic 
actions of rational actors at the macro level result in: (a) systemic and measurable 
outcomes at the micro level, (b) hydrology rather than territorial administrative, 
economic, or cultural boundaries dictating the manage-scale of the resource, thus forcing 
states to work together across political boundaries, and (c) cooperation regimes and 
institutions capable of sustaining positive conflict.  Successful, quality cooperation 
necessitates a new deal between public, private, and civil society sectors, a reconciled 
past, and an acceptance that the status quo may not be acceptable.   
LeMarquand does not consider the presence of a hydro-hegemon or the power of 
a riparian willing to cooperate but also willing to prevent the establishment of other 
coalitions. More importantly, he neither incorporates the significant impact that history 
(shadows of the past) may have on cooperation and conflict, nor orders his framework 
into a hierarchy of factors. Certain factors may pose a greater barrier than others to 
cooperation.  According to Dinar,73 another potential drawback of LeMarquand’s 
                                                 
73Dinar in Saleth and Dinar, The Institutional Economics of Water. 
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framework is its lack of quantitative measurements for the various factor sets and 
variables used. 
 Under the hydrologic-economic conditions influencing transboundary river 
cooperation, LeMarquand identifies four issue areas:  (1) public goods; (2) common pool 
resources; (3) integrated development opportunities; and (4) upstream-downstream 
conflict.  According to LeMarquand, each issue area has several economic-based 
incentives and varying degrees of benefits resulting from cooperation. There are also 
shared political incentives and benefits for the riparian states involved in the agreement.  
Axelrod refers to such mutual incentives as reciprocity.74    
 LeMarquand’s sub-issues for both the hydrologic-economic and foreign policy 
categories offer a practical approach to organizing a discussion on benefits or incentives 
for cooperation among countries that have agreed to multilateral environmental 
agreements, and in particular transboundary watercourse agreements. If the benefits or 
incentives to cooperation can be disaggregated in some useful form, they might become 
an indicator of measuring success.   
An important subset of LeMarquand’s hydrologic-economic issue area is 
Upstream-Downstream Conflict.  This type of conflict is particularly relevant to 
discussions of hydro-politics, due to the primacy of geography and hydrology in framing 
the boundaries of the issues involved. When an upstream country intentionally uses an 
international river to the detriment of the downstream riparian, and the downstream 
riparian has no political, economic, military, or other reciprocal power over the upstream 
country, the incentives to cooperate are greatly diminished.  Under this scenario, 
                                                 
74 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
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LeMarquand posits that:  “A state that takes advantage of its favored position on a river 
has no real economic incentive to alter its behavior. Consumptive use of the river’s 
waters, flow regulation, and waste disposal by an upstream riparian are examples of 
water use that lead to upstream-downstream conflicts.”75 While LeMarquand primarily 
focuses on economics, an economic perspective is only one approach of several possible 
interpretation; politics, power, and even water scarcity all may influence cooperation.  If 
basin states are viewed as an economic unit so that the physical effects generated in one 
country can be passed on via the river to a neighboring country, the aftermath of these 
effects can be regarded as an economic externalities.76 Under this scenario, controversies 
over shared international watercourses arise from questions concerning the distribution of 
externalities. This type of controversy often involves conflicting national interests, but the 
rhetoric surrounding it is, by necessity, based around the geographies of sovereignty.   
Regardless of the incentives, one irrefutable elemental issue regarding the success 
or failure of agreements, of course, is related directly to the types of controversies (or 
types of behavior) over shared transboundary watercourses that cooperation agreements 
are attempting to address.  What are the problems, and for which riparian state does the 
problem create the most difficulty?   
LeMarquand strongly asserts that geographic position, i.e. being upstream, is an 
important advantageous factor, especially when an upstream riparian can take advantage 
of its upstream position.  However, there are situations where an upstream country may 
not be able to take advantage of its favored riparian position, which might also lead to 
upstream-downstream conflict.  In the case of the Nile and in the Orange-Senqu River 
                                                 
75 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 10. 
76 Ibid., 8.     
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basins, the upstream states of Burundi and Lesotho have neither the position nor the 
capacity to exploit their respective rivers. 
 Geographical configurations are important, as they may be perceived as part of 
either the solution or problem.  In some instances, however, the geographical territorial 
configuration may be intertwined, or even undecided. In these cases, the hydrologic 
configuration may take on greater importance. Under those circumstances, the hydrologic 
configuration may not be as much about the water resource, as it is about sovereign 
territorial integrity or access to resources.  Again, it is important to recognize that the 
negotiation, development, and content of transboundary water agreements may have little 
to do with water conflicts, except as a means to generate an alternative platform for 
resource control discussions which have more to do with territorial integrity.   
 The Orange-Senqu River in southern Africa is one example of a river conflict 
where the riparians conflate a water conflict with issues of territorial integrity.  The basic 
hydrologic configurations of up-stream and down-stream and boundary relations of the 
Orange-Senqu River are quite apparent. The river itself begins in Lesotho, a 
geographically small landlocked country surrounded completely by South Africa. 
Lesotho is considerably less developed than its Orange-Senqu River co-riparians of South 
Africa, Botswana, and Namibia.  From Lesotho, the river flows into and through South 
Africa.  However, before it empties into the Atlantic Ocean, the Orange River is a 
boundary river between Namibia and South Africa.  
Each of the riparians in the Okavango and Orange River basins understands the 
importance of hydrological security to their respective states, and the need to engage in 
bilateral negotiations and arrangements both within existing multilateral frameworks.  
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Namibia, the most arid and water scarce of all the riparians in both river basins, is 
aggressively sharpening its hydro-political skills and negotiating within the multilateral 
river accords and agreements. It is also negotiating independently with Angola on hydro-
developments along the Kunene (Cunene) River and making efforts to increase its market 
share of exports (bilateral trade).  This economic push is especially apparent in the 
southern provinces of Angola that border Namibia, where there are cultural and historical 
ties. 
LeMarquand cites five sub-factors regarding foreign policy.  They are image, 
international law, linkage, reciprocity, and sovereignty.  Sovereignty is a critical sub-
factor within LeMarquand’s international relations conditions.  Ecological politics 
challenge the concept of state boundaries, on the most obvious level, as environmental 
concerns in such forms as acid rain, hazardous wastes, polluted waterways, move 
effortlessly across terra firma-based state boundaries.77  However, sovereignty remains a 
primary obstacle to deep quality cooperation and successfully implemented multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) and, more importantly, transboundary water 
agreements (TWAs).   
Basically, LeMarquand78 posits that sovereignty is an obstacle that is most likely 
to give a country pause when considering an international agreement, to the extent that 
such an agreement may place limitations on a nation’s ability to act independently, 
without consideration of its downstream riparians.  By entering into an agreement, a 
                                                 
77 Khuels, Beyond Sovereign Territory. 
78 There are others who agree with LeMarquand’s position regarding sovereignty, including Just, 
Netanyahu, Warner, and Susskind. 
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country may experience what Ruggie refers to as an “independence cost”, “the general 
loss of independence or loss of control over one’s own activities . . .”79  
This is of particular importance in the context of shared watercourses as it goes to 
the fundamental debate:  to what extent can a country use its waters as it pleases and to 
what extent must an upstream country make provisions for equitable distribution of 
shared waters?80 This question arises in issues of general use, international law, and 
conflict resolution over shared water resources. More importantly, this question neatly 
combines issues of water with issues of sovereignty. Water allocation is often at the 
center of water conflicts and cooperation debates. 
States have more than a marginal interest in controlling what crosses their 
borders, legally or illegally.  Thus, claims of sovereignty and the ability to exploit 
localized resources are the prevailing positions of states when it comes to shared natural 
resources.  Nonetheless, governments have moved to create numerous formal interstate 
regimes to protect and manage transboundary localized environmental resources like 
transboundary rivers.  This has been particularly the case among states in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).  While international institutions promote 
greater concern for the environment in developing countries, such agreements should also 
seek to improve the capacity of governments.   
 Image is important as each state wants to be seen as a good neighbor and as 
projecting a model of cooperation.  Equally important is the desire on the part of the state 
to be accepted and considered a member of the global community of states.  Therefore, 
                                                 
79 Ruggie, quoted in LeMarquand’s, International Rivers. 
80 This long standing debate continues despite the principles contained in many UN Conventions, the 
Helsinki Rules, Agenda 21, Chapter 18, and so forth.   
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accepting and ratifying a set of international principles governing the use of international 
rivers suggests a positive attitude toward international law principles applicable to 
transboundary watercourses, even if they are disinclined to abide by certain principles in 
basin specific agreements on terms other co-riparians would consider favorable.  Lastly, 
agreeing with a co-riparian on a matter related to shared water resources may be an 
attempt to woo that riparian in an effort to gain concessions for some other multilateral or 
bilateral agreement, such as favorable trade terms or support for an international coalition 
organized to take an action against a third party.  While each of these factors may seem 
independent of one another, there is considerable overlap among them.  
With regard to image, Morgenthau81 states that the desire of one country to make 
a favorable impression on another “may be an important or even decisive weight, as 
compared with all the other factors to be considered in the formation of foreign policy.”  
LeMarquand82  suggests that the image a country wishes to project can be important in 
part because national attitudes may positively or negatively influence a country’s 
willingness to cooperate with its riparian neighbor.  It has also been suggested, especially 
with regard to relatively new states (developing states in particular), that entering into 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) may also be related to image.  In this 
instance, the “image” is one of perception, where developing states engage in MEAs, in 
part because such behavior is an indicator of a “mature” state and is therefore exemplary 
of how states are supposed to behave.83  Alternatively, these states may be acting in 
response to extra-state pressures, enticements (financial aid or supported academic or 
                                                 
81 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 
82 LeMarquand, International Rivers. 
83 Swatuk and Chayes and Chayes have all discussed the impact of image on state actions. Swatuk and 
Black’s anthology Bridging the Rift:  The New South Africa in Africa and Chayes and Chayes’ The New 
Sovereignty both develop this issue more thoroughly. 
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research interests) to enter such agreements, or as the result of increased global economic 
and ecological interdependence.   Therefore, SADC member states are sensitive to 
changes in others and more vulnerable to external pressure, like all global actors to a 
greater or lesser degree.84  
 LeMarquand also discusses the importance of linkages, which enable agreements 
on one issue, such as favorable trade conditions, in exchange for cooperation on other 
issues, such as an international river scheme.  However, whether to link or de-link issues 
can become challenging.  One approach toward agreement making and enhancing 
cooperation is to link issues to a set of mutually advantageous concerns that normally 
would not be available under alternative circumstances.85 As a result, it is posited that 
actors would make concessions on those issues about which they care little, and agree to 
agree on those that are important.  In this way, the riparians have expanded the number 
and types of trade-offs and potential benefits of cooperation and agreement formation 
beyond water issues.  As is evident from the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database, as many as 43 percent of treaties include linkages to non-water issues.  Still, 
the complexity of many issues may not lend themselves to a basin-wide scale, especially 
where the operating assumption is that water is the central issue. 
 LeMarquand’s case studies and framework are applied exclusively to Europe and 
North America, specifically the United States and the United States and Canada, and do 
not involve an internationalized river system.  In this research, I am attempting to apply 
his theoretical framework to transboundary river cooperation in the African Continent 
                                                 
84 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 
85 Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy. 
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with particular emphasis on multilateral cooperation agreements for the Orange-Senqu 
and Okavango Rivers.   
LeMarquand suggests that economic and psychological motivation for reciprocity 
is important.  In the SADC region, however, transboundary water pollution is not yet a 
deciding factor in industrial competitiveness.  Water quantity, however, is a factor 
influencing the types of agricultural production, especially production of so-called 
“designer crops”, such as grapes for export to Europe and wine-making. These high-end 
agricultural investments might influence economic development and trade among several 
SADC nations, in particular Namibia and South Africa.   
According to LeMarquand, the economic incentive for integrated development 
increases benefits to several basin countries because such development often results in 
economies of scale over the benefits of an individual national state development action.  
Construction of dams for flood control, power production projects and other 
infrastructure forms of river management are examples of development actions (other 
integrated development examples not discussed by LeMarquand might be expanded to 
include wetland restoration or pollution mitigation measures.).  While these types of 
actions often result in benefits and willingness to cooperate, the net benefits either 
country can achieve through independent action must be less than those achieved through 
a cooperative effort. Basically, the costs of cooperation must be considerably less than 
the costs of not cooperating, and the net benefits of cooperation must exceed any benefits 
each riparian might otherwise achieve independently in the absence of a cooperation 
regime. Even when these conditions are met, LeMarquand is quick to point out that there 
are frequently “difficulties in working out an equitable division of costs and benefits.  
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This problem is further complicated by the wide range of alternative schemes of 
development that can be drawn up for most rivers, each of which entails a different 
distribution of benefits and costs.”86  
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) appears to demonstrate what 
LeMarquand would define as an integrated development opportunity. The LHWP is a 
phased hydroelectric dam-power-water supply assembly of construction projects being 
constructed in the Kingdom of Lesotho, in the highlands of Lesotho on the Orange-Senqu 
River.  Calculated and funded by South Africa, the LHWP was designed almost 
exclusively for the benefit of South Africa.  For Lesotho, the principle cooperation 
incentive is financial compensation, as well as electric power that it might not otherwise 
be able to produce for itself.   
LeMarquand focuses on a development undertaking financed by an upstream 
country that results in the provision of accidental external benefits for a downstream 
state.  Under his scenario, dam construction for flood control provides benefits for 
downstream countries for which the upstream country will not receive compensation 
unless there is an agreement.  In such an instance, an upstream country might be reluctant 
to go forward with its project if it cannot obtain reasonable and fair compensation for the 
benefits that would be received by downstream riparians.   In contrast to LeMarquand’s 
example, the LHWP dam system in Lesotho is designed almost exclusively for the 
benefit of the downstream country—South Africa.  Lesotho eagerly participated because, 
in this instance, the principal incentive for cooperation is the payment that Lesotho 
receives from South Africa.  
                                                 
86 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 10.   
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While LeMarquand’s work is flawed and does not engage with water issues in 
Africa, a review of his oeuvre is useful; the broad issue categories he identifies not only 
provide a useful lens for analysis but also act as a foundational text for many other 
authors.87  Further, even though his treatment is flawed, LeMarquand did argue that 
economic incentives exercise considerable influence in hydro-political cooperation.  This 
research recognizes that states are more likely to cooperate only if the cost of cooperation 
is significantly less than the cost of not cooperating. Here, I’m merely expanding 
LeMarquand’s definition of costs to encompass a range of effects considerably broader 
than simple economic incentives.  In this analysis, costs may include a loss of sovereignty 
or a state having to sublimate its state water development plans to a schema orchestrated 
through a regional river basin organization. 
 Under those circumstances, economic externalities form an important underlying 
basis for all incentives for transboundary watercourse agreements and cooperation, but 
factors influencing one country’s willingness to cooperate will be different than 
another’s, and are not limited to the economic.  Moreover, agreements may not lead to 
improvements among riparian relations. 
 Although discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 (“The Case of the Okavango 
River Basin”), Namibia’s purported water diversion of the Okavango River upstream 
from the downstream Okavango Delta in Botswana is an example of conflicting national 
and international interests.  Conservation of the Okavango Delta has become an 
international cause, as well as one of national economic and environmental importance to 
Botswana.  However, over time, the national water interests and needs of Botswana, an 
                                                 
87 See, for example, Just and Netanyahu, Wolf, and Dinar. 
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arid state, and those of Namibia, an extremely arid state, may override any international 
interests to preserve and protect the Delta, notwithstanding its importance to the national 
economy of Botswana as part of its tourism industry. 
 Attitudes about and recognition of international law are, according to 
LeMarquand, closely related to image, as described above.  Image is established through 
states appearing to play nicely while on the international field. For example, the 
international image of SADC states is assured if one counts the number of agreements to 
which they are signatories.  In addition to regional specific watercourse agreements, the 
SADC states modified the 2000 Protocol to recognize the international water law 
principles, including the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Water of International 
Rivers and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses .   
Those international conventions significantly affected the content and wording of 
the regional agreements.  As will be described in Chapter 3, the Law on the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses was one of the factors that resulted in the 
Original Protocol being revised.  Such evidence suggests that there is a consensus on the 
principles of international water law among countries in the SADC region.  Another 
indicator of recognition of international law is the example of Botswana and Namibia 
agreeing to appeal to the International Court of Justice in 1999 on a dispute involving 
territorial claims and ownership, of Sedudu/Kasikili Island in the Zambezi-Chobe River 
and access to water.    
 Linkage can be beneficial to multiple sides of a watercourse it wishes to protect 
or, as previously discussed, a mechanism to satisfy some other domestic, social, 
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economic, or national objectives.  As LeMarquand noted, agreements that provide for 
recognition of a river as a boundary or even make provision for future cooperative use of 
a shared resource may have little to do with the river and more to do with a “. . . nation’s 
attitude toward international law”.88  As a result, nations may establish an international 
law or new boundary, which may help to meet “core objectives” regarding a country’s 
territorial integrity or international reputation.89  This is especially common after wars.  
Under more stable conditions, however, international river agreements are generally more 
concerned with substantive solutions to problems associated with a shared resource rather 
than with using the agreement as a vehicle to reinforce territorial claims”.90  
However, for many postcolonial states, sovereignty is problematised. In these 
developing states, particularly those in Africa, administrative structures are weak, states 
lack capacity, and often the development agenda originates outside the state.  Further, 
there may be economic incentives, including foreign investment or other pressures that 
often coerce these states to behave in a certain way.  In short, “International organizations 
may mediate state interaction by providing rules of the game, supplying information, 
monitoring behavior, or creating transparency; ultimately, however, they are understood 
to be creations of states and servants of state interests”.91  While LeMarquand argues that 
there are both incentives and barriers, his definition of the barriers lacks a hierarchy in 
order to better understand cooperative dynamics and possibilities. LeMarquand 
recognizes the difficulties of achieving international river basin cooperation, identifies 
                                                 
88 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 12. 
89 LeMarquand cites the United States’ 1971 agreement to build a desalting plant to treat irrigation waters 
flowing from the United States (U.S.) into Mexico as an example where the U.S. action demonstrated its 
willingness to protect its relations with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. 
90 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 11. 
91 Finnemore, National Interests In International Society, 23 
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multiple factors that condition agreements, and attempts to provide an understanding of 
the process with his case studies.  However, in the list of factors he discusses, he 
attributes no values as to which ones are more important than others.  He merely lays-out 
“taxonomy of conditions”92 and concludes that some conditions either enable or hinder 
cooperation.  He doesn’t make a case for which conditions are more important than 
others or even if there is such a relationship between factors.  
When a state agrees to enter into negotiations or agrees to a TWA, there must be a 
reason.  Even after agreeing to negotiate, a riparian state may then have to agree to 
political trade-offs, such as conceding part of its sovereignty for greater access to shared 
water resources.  Given how difficult multistate transboundary water cooperation is to 
achieve, it becomes even more critical to know what factors states consider important, or 
are less likely to compromise when agreements are being negotiated. It is not just enough 
to accept that there are conditions or factors, as LeMarquand asserts, without an 
understanding of which of the conditions are more important than others.  My research 
considers LeMarquand’s conditions or factors and places them into a hierarchy doing just 
that—explaining which factors are more important and why. If these factors are not 
addressed TWAs are but modest accomplishments, and fail to achieve a state of quality 
cooperation where positive conflict is possible.  
 
                                                 
92 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 3. 
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The Pyramid - Hierarchy of Cooperation and Positive Conflict  
My research argues that there is a hierarchy to the impediments and achievements 
necessary for quality cooperation.  This hierarchy is organized around recognition and 
resolution of the various obstacles as actors proceed toward TWAs and meaningful 
cooperation.  Figure 2 identifies and organizes the obstacles to TWAs and transboundary 
river cooperation, which is modeled after Maslow’s hierarchy of needs93. Like Maslow, I 
place the fundamental issues at the base of pyramid.  These essentials must be addressed 
first.  
I use Maslow’s triangle to illustrate this from a TWA cooperative perspective 
(Figure 2). I use this figure to demonstrate the hierarchy of obstacles facing practitioners 
of quality cooperation. I argue that until the barriers on the first level (sovereignty, hydro-
hegemony, etc.) are minimally addressed, meaningful cooperation is substantially less 
likely. For example, issues of Sovereignty are not insurmountable barriers to 
cooperation, but present a fundamental challenge to successful TWAs.  Likewise, the 
Number of Countries sharing a particular basin may be fixed within a particular basin -- 
however, the more countries, the more challenging it will be to work through the issues 
and move to the next level and set of challenges.  As will be seen, a triangle was 
insufficient, a pyramid was needed.  
The pyramid’s design summarizes the similarities and differences among the 
various research perspectives cited earlier.  It organizes the obstacles to quality 
transboundary water cooperation and suggests, by design, one approach to cooperation 
                                                 
93 Abraham Maslow developed a theoretical framework for the hierarchy of human needs, which placed 
essential physiological needs such as water, food and shelter at the bottom of the hierarchy as the 
foundation of daily life which must be addressed before self-actualization was possible. 
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and positive conflict for transboundary watercourses.  It illustrates a particular ranking of 
the obstacles to cooperation and proposes that each obstacle must be addressed state can 
address other issues on other levels before quality cooperation is to be achieved.   
I created this pyramid in order to vividly illustrate what is missing in the 
literature—a specific hierarchy demonstrating the barriers to cooperation and positive 
conflict that incorporates an understanding of how history’s (the shadows of the past 
glimpsed in the pyramid’s backdrop) influence changes as states move toward positive 
conflict and cooperation.  That is, “the past is never past,” but may be negotiated in such 
a way that it ceases to directly influence cooperation efforts over time.   
Securing multilateral riparian state cooperation over transboundary rivers involves 
overcoming obstacles to cooperation.  This research suggests that there is a hierarchy to 
the obstacles that must be addressed. The most significant obstacles are:  sovereignty, 
number of countries, existing upstream-downstream conflict, and hydro-hegemony.  This 
hierarchy conditions the political atmosphere; acknowledging its existence creates a 
space where positive conflict can take place without compromising cooperation 
institutions or threatening riparian actors. Because of its importance to the overall 
discussion of transboundary water conflict and cooperation and development of TWAs, a 




Figure 2. The Pyramid - Hierarchy of Obstacles to Cooperation 
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It should be recognized that, with few exceptions, the distinctions between obstacles is 
sometimes blurred, the concepts are interrelated, and overlap between levels is to be 
expected.    
Beginning at the pyramid’s base, the levels reflect the conditions that must be 
overcome before full deep quality cooperation and positive conflict can be reached. 
Maslow placed basic needs—water, food, and shelter -- at the bottom, and argued that 
basic needs at the lower levels must be met before higher needs (physical security, social 
needs, and finally self-actualization) can be attained.  This research argues a similar 
approach for assessing the prospects of full quality cooperation and positive conflict. In A 
Theory of Human Motivation, Maslow argues that “human needs arrange themselves in 
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hierarchies of prepotency,”94 meaning that the satisfaction of one need usually relies upon 
the satisfaction of another, more “pre-potent” need.   He further hypothesized that the 
desires, wants, and needs of humans are neither discrete nor isolated. This is particularly 
true of human needs. Each one of these needs is in fact related to the state of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction of each one of the others.  Most importantly, just listing the ‘needs’ 
does not sufficiently address either the needs in question or the “specificity or 
generalizations of the motives to be classified.”95 These needs have to be organized into a 
progressive hierarchy, so that one is able to ‘check off’ the more basic needs as they are 
met in the journey towards addressing the more abstract wants.  
In the construct of my pyramid, I have applied the Maslow’s principles to the 
politics of hydro-cooperation. I argue that there is a similar political hierarchy in place, 
and that the ability to advance toward meaningful and quality cooperation is based on the 
satisfaction of the factors at the bottom level of the pyramid.  It would appear, because of 
the heavy lines and compartmentalization of the factors in the pyramid that the hierarchy 
of obstacles is fixed and rigid. They are not.  There is overlap, as the factors are not 
nearly as compartmentalized or the lines as impenetrable as they would appear.  
However, without addressing the factors at the base, reaching sustained quality 
cooperation is unlikely.  Because actors that have enjoyed stability, sovereignty, 
advantageous riparian position, or hydro-hegemony have experienced that position-
condition for such a long time, they may undervalue its impact on other actors seeking 
the same. These less powerful actors may be acutely more aware of their need to resolve 
                                                 
94 Maslow’s “Theory of Human Motivation” was published originally in Psychological Review in 1943.  It 
was reprinted in a book by Philip Lawrence Harriman, Twentieth Century Psychology:  Recent 
Developments in 1946. This line can be found on page 23 of Harriman’s text.  
95 Ibid., 23. 
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or redress issues they may consider a priority higher than quality transboundary water 
cooperation. 
Below, I list the fundamental issues facing states interested in quality cooperation. 
I describe these as fundamental issues because these concerns impact whether or not 
states are even interested in coming the bargaining table. Each of the lower levels of the 
pyramid must be addressed before the next higher level can come into play.  
Number of Countries.  Just and Netanyahu96 as well as Turton97 argue that the 
performance and potential success of multilateral cooperation is negatively correlated 
with the number of actors.  The higher the number of actors involved, the more difficult it 
is to negotiate multilateral agreements or achieve cooperation. Thus, bilateral TWAs are 
likely to occur at a higher frequency than multilateral arrangements.  Accordingly, 
multilateral agreements on non-trivial matters for transboundary river basins are the rare 
exception rather than the rule.98  Even in Hardin’s classic case of the “tragedy of the 
commons” he argues that incentives to reach agreement are more difficult if the number 
of herders is large.  Because the number of signatories to an agreement impacts whether 
or not that agreement will even be signed, the number of actors involved is a fundamental 
issue needing to be addressed.  
Sovereignty.  Protecting a nation’s absolute sovereignty is always considered in a 
country’s best interest.  Few states are likely to accept arbitrary decisions made by an 
actor or actors (either another state or international institution) outside the state that may 
                                                 
96 Just and Netanyahu, “International Water Resource Conflict.” 
97 Turton, Meissner, Mampane, and Seremo, “A Hydropolitical History of South Africa's International 
River Basins.” 
98 An empirical work on large regional multilateral organizations by Russett and Sullivan, cited in Just and 
Netanyahu, showed that the performance of twenty multilateral organizations correlates negatively with the 
number of states being members. 
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prescribe behavior reducing a state’s rights in a river basin, especially if doing so is 
contrary to that state’s national interests. Unless a state believes its sovereignty will be 
respected, it is unlikely to even enter negotiations regarding water rights.   
Upstream-Downstream Considerations and Conflict.  Cooperation becomes 
increasingly difficult when upstream riparians unilaterally determine to use their position 
to divert or pollute, or otherwise significantly reduce the quality or quantity of water 
resources available to downstream riparians.  Over-consumption of water resources by an 
upstream riparian is also likely to cause conflict and make cooperation more challenging. 
The immediate travails of geography, and the rhetoric of sovereignty surrounding these 
issues, can impact whether states are willing to actually negotiate about these issues.   
As noted previously, LeMarquand theorizes that upstream states are willing to 
take advantage of their favored position on a river if there is no economic incentive to 
alter their behavior, unless there are other intervening considerations such as image.  
Generally a country that controls the source of water, potentially, controls the negotiation 
process, except when that country is, for whatever reason, incapable of doing so, as in the 
cases of the Nile or Orange-Senqu.  An upstream country, i.e. the headwater riparian 
state, must have not only the ‘power’ to back-up its control, but the technical and 
financial abilities as well.  The Nile River Basin is a classic example of such a scenario; 
the upstream riparian lacks power and the respective resources necessary to exercise 
control.  Egypt, the furthermost downstream riparian, actually contributes no water flow 
to the Nile, and uses in excess of 66 percent  of the water, while Ethiopia contributes 
approximately eighty-six percent of the flow, but is unable to either control or capture the 
Nile rivers’ water to meet its needs.   
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Cooperation becomes increasingly difficult when upstream riparians unilaterally 
determine to use their position to divert or pollute, or otherwise significantly reduce the 
quality or quantity of water resources available to downstream riparians.  Over 
consumption of water resources by an upstream riparian is also likely to cause conflict 
and make cooperation more challenging. 
Asymmetry.  Of the several factors in the next tier up from the base of the 
pyramid, asymmetry is one of the most critical obstacles in the hierarchy of cooperation. 
This concept refers not only to asymmetry of power, but to the ability of a riparian to take 
advantage of such an asymmetry to advance its objectives and interests.  Although not all 
inclusive, the principal types of asymmetry are asymmetric power, like economic, 
military, or both; asymmetric technical capacity, data resources and reliability; 
asymmetric ability to anticipate co-riparian’s positions, strengths, weaknesses, or 
strategic shifts; asymmetric ability to corral international resources or form within basin 
coalitions to its advantage; and geographic asymmetry (upstream-downstream location).  
Other types of asymmetry recognize that countries have different population densities, 
national income per capita, water needs and available allocation, and levels of 
development.  
Conflicting National or International Interests.  Changing environmental, 
economic, and political conditions; international pressure or actions from international 
donors (international financial institutions (IFIs); international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs); local or regional stakeholders and institutions; or a country’s 
nationalistic agenda, which may include reconciliation (or retribution) for historical 
relationships, all reflect potential conflicting national and international interests.  As will 
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be revealed in the cases of the Orange-Senqu and Okavango River basins, South Africa is 
under pressure, much of which is self-induced, to respond to both national interests, such 
as protecting its current and future water supply, and international and regional pressure 
to be a ‘good’ neighbor – or at least a better neighbor than it was during the apartheid era. 
Part of this historical legacy involves remittance for its past behavior towards its co-
riparians.  
Erosion of domestic support or political will for TWAs by riparian nations can 
undermine cooperation efforts.  Additionally, IFI support for a particular activity, e.g. 
water infrastructure, to one riparian over others in the same basin, may result in 
facilitating national objectives, but erode transboundary cooperation efforts. 
Riparian position.  Similar to upstream-downstream conflict-related issues, 
riparian position concerns not only geography, but hydro-politics.  Botswana is an 
example where it has both in two different basins.  Riparian position is strengthened if a 
particular country has several rivers or other water resources to draw from and meet its 
water needs.  Alternatively, riparian position is important if a state can use its position in 
one river basin to leverage favorable conditions in another.  A third scenario where 
riparian position becomes an obstacle to cooperation is when one riparian considers the 
river central to its economic dominance, history, water, and energy supply but is not the 
river’s headwaters or source and is dependent upon an upstream country of lesser power 
(military and economic) and capability with sovereignty over the river. 
Water allocation.  According to some scholars, equitable water allocation is the 
basis of all transboundary water conflict.99  Water allocation is generally included as part 
                                                 
99 Wolf, “Water and Human Security.” 
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of transboundary water agreements.  Accordingly, of the 145 treaties in the 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database compiled by Oregon State University, 49 of 
those treaties specify water allocations.  At the time of this research, however, it was less 
clear if any of the forty-nine treaties had been challenged, monitored, or contained 
enforcement mechanisms in regard to water allocation.   
 Every attempt has been made to treat these factors as discrete; however, it is clear 
that by their very nature they will bleed into one another.  The first two tiers of the 
pyramid, beginning at the base, are the most critical and difficult obstacles to overcome if 
transboundary water cooperation of to be successful, and ensure quality cooperation and 
room for positive conflict.  Unless the factors identified in these two tiers are successfully 
negotiated, adequately accommodated within the text of the actual agreement, reasonably 
enforced, and allow for the distribution of externalities among all basin riparians, 
cooperation is not likely to occur.  Also critical is the need to include a mechanism for 
conflict resolution to which all signatory riparian states will agree to abide.  That is an 
essential component of the treaty-agreement process, its enforcement, and its negotiation-
conflict resolution methods—issues listed on tiers three, four, and five (above the heavy 
dark line).  As mentioned previously, the concerns at the base of the pyramid must be 
addressed before quality cooperation and positive conflict is possible. 
 Reciprocity, Cost of Cooperation, Treaty-Agreement Process.  To assure success, 
the benefits and costs for negotiating a transboundary watercourse treaty or cooperation 
agreement will need to be worked-out to each riparian’s satisfaction.  Assuming that the 
sole issue is shared concerns about water allocation and that no one riparian will bear 
excessive cost due to the conflict resolution process, a process for cooperation is possible.  
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Long-standing riparian tensions, failure to share technology and data, and failure to take 
into account competing water interests will quickly perhaps undermine the treaty 
agreement process, thereby increasing the cost (economic and political)  of cooperation.   
Axelrod100 and LeMarquand101 both agree on the importance of reciprocity. 
Cooperation works best for those in reciprocal relationships, or where benefits are passed 
on to downstream riparians at no cost or obligation to the downstream country. The 
upstream country, however, may be a reluctant participant or unwilling to make a 
cooperation commitment without reciprocity.   
Multiple conditions and factors must come together, including the legal principles 
for water sharing. At this stage, international or regional actors may function as prime 
facilitators or mediators in support of the development of the relevant TWA or 
cooperation treaty.  Indeed, this research submits that incentives to cooperate may be 
forced or forged by multiple factors, such as international norms, expectations, or 
hydrological interdependence.  While this research maintains an emphasis on state actors, 
such as the Political Realist102 international relations perspective, it deviates only 
moderately from traditional realism in that it recognizes the transboundary nature of 
environmental problems.  However, fundamental to this research is that environmental 
issues are a central part of the concepts of the state, sovereignty, territory, national 
interest, and, to a great extent, the balance of power.  Thus, how states perceive, protect, 
or parlay their hydrological interests (and needs) as national interests in regions where 
                                                 
100 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. 
101 LeMarquand, International Rivers. 
102 Again, I am drawing on the definition of realist developed by Kenneth Waltz.  See Kenneth Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:  Addison-Wesley, 1979), and Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981) for a more in-depth definition 
of this concept.  
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water is shared and scarce becomes increasingly important to the exercise of state power 
in the negotiation of TWAs, their effectiveness, and quality of cooperation.  Many natural 
resources span political boundaries.  The development of international environmental 
regimes (IERs) represents a particular response by states as an appropriate mechanism to 
cooperate on the management of transboundary natural resources.  However, securing 
quality cooperation can be difficult, as there are numerous obstacles, including the 
shadows of the past, and assessing the prospects for successful quality cooperation in a 
particular context may be more difficult. 
By the same token, it is possible that contentious transboundary water relations 
may weaken in their significance when states develop viable, diverse, and strong political 
economies, since the lack of a sustainable and reliable water supply can threaten even the 
most economically viable and diverse states.  Having a strong political economy may be 
a way of addressing that; states with ample financial resources can augment their water 
supplies indefinitely, at least theoretically.   
Technical Uncertainties, Scientific Gaps, Enforcement Limits or Enforcement 
Capacity.103  Agreements cannot be effective if they lack a specific means to be enforced 
or if monitoring is not included in the language of the cooperation agreement. Monitoring 
is an essential part of enforcement. However, it can be expensive, technically unfeasible, 
and impinge on sovereignty.  Therefore, as part of the enforcement capability, monitoring 
must be acceptable to all parties, and have available results that are neither the subject of 
                                                 
103 In LeMarquand’s International Rivers, the comparable factor is “Information Uncertainty.” 
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manipulation or considered generally irrelevant.  The present language surrounding water 
negations in the basin offer little in the way of effective enforcement power.104   
Technical uncertainties and scientific gaps contribute to breaches in verifiable 
data, especially uncertainties with respect to quality and quantity of water. This makes 
setting set policy and determining best practices difficult.   Questionable scientific 
information raises questions about the reliability of shared data and information.  Of 
course, closing the scientific gaps and resolving technical uncertainties can be expensive, 
particularly if riparians lack the financial and academic capacity to undertake such tasks.  
Further, “higher levels of uncertainty”105 contribute to higher decision costs and 
jeopardizes opportunities for building trust.   It is here that IFIs and INGOs can make a 
contribution by providing the skills, knowledge, and equipment necessary to build 
capacity by reducing technical uncertainties.  However, it is less certain if their 
involvement will abate concerns about sovereignty when it comes to providing access to 
freshwater ecosystems with national boundaries or developing systems where 
information can be verified and shared. 
Negotiation, Conflict Resolution Methods.  From an analytical point of view 
there are several courses of action that may constitute how negotiation frameworks and 
conflict resolution can be taken into consideration.  They become obstacles when one or 
all of the riparians engaged in the cooperation agreement or treaty process fails to 
recognize the accepted established conditions for resolving conflict.  Again, provided the 
conflict between riparians is one of water, conflict resolution methods should be specific 
and contained in the language of the agreement or treaty.  If, however, the conflicts and 
                                                 
104 Just and Netanyahu, “International Water Resource Conflict.” 
105 LeMarquand, International Rivers, 22. 
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disputes are not about water, but instead the agreement is a proxy for some other dispute, 
its resolution becomes more difficult. The dispute then remains an obstacle to quality 
cooperation, and reduces the states’ ability to engage in positive conflict, as transparency 
of intent is now absent. 
Nonetheless, if the cooperation treaty or agreement offers an inadequate for 
conflict resolution, regional, continental, and international venues may exist.  In the case 
of southern Africa, there are options at each level.  On the regional level is the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) which by design has included a tribunal and 
language for conflict resolution.  At the continent level there is the African Union (AU). 
For riparians wanting an international venue, there is the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) at The Hague.   
Of course, conflict is expected, as basin riparians will have differing priorities 
with respect to water supply, management, and development plans.  Managing 
transboundary freshwater resources effectively requires all riparian states to consider all 
the riparian states and the potential impacts of unilateral decisions.  On the other hand, 
how the conflict is resolved and which is the appropriate venue will depend on the nature 
of the dispute.  If the riparian actors have agreed to accept limited sovereignty, vis-à-vis 
ratification of the formal TWA, resolving conflicts may be easier, especially if there is a 
hydro-hegemon that perceives it in the interest of its basin riparians to resolve the 
conflict.  We should understand the hierarchy (Figure 2-The Pyramid) as illustrative of 
that the first tier as more important than the next, and that each tier implicitly includes 




Shadows of The Past 
“The past is never dead. It's not even past.”  From Requiem for a Nun by William 
Faulkner, 1951. 
 
The review of the literature presented supports multiple types of barriers to 
conflict resolution; the scholars I have drawn on (LeMarquand, Morgenthau, Keohane, 
Nye, Just and Netanyahu, Marty, Gleditsch, Susskind, and others) argue that there are 
economic, international relations, and legislative actions that either encourage or 
discourage multilateral transboundary water agreements. Even the number of signatories 
to a treaty can impact its effectiveness.  
In addition to sovereignty, Just and Netanyahu put forward a comprehensive list 
of “obstacles” (quite similar to LeMarquand’s original list) to water resource 
cooperation106. Their newer list includes:  asymmetric information; scientific gaps and 
technical uncertainties; enforcement limitations; conflicting national and international 
interests; asymmetric country characteristics; and upstream-downstream considerations.   
Each of these limitations has its own corollary; however, neither LeMarquand nor Just 
and Netanyahu have posited a hierarchy indicating how each must be addressed within a 
hydro-political cooperation framework.  In this section, I intend to identify some specific 
issues pointing to weaknesses in the previous arguments; chief among them is that 
history, as manifested in the shadows of the past, influences cooperative and conflicted 
water cooperation. The literature has traditionally treated states as ahistorical entities. 
This, however, lacks explanatory power when examined using the SADC countries as the 
                                                 
106 Just and Netanyahu, “International Water Resource Conflict.” 
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basis for critique.  After all, water agreements are often not about water; they are about 
history, power, and politics. Understanding the strategic interaction among riparian states 
as signatories to transboundary watercourse (river) agreements requires a contextual 
framework.  Fundamental to that contextual framework is recognizing and understanding 
when and under what circumstances the past, hydrological problems, and politics may 
interfere with the prospects of quality cooperation.  
Reasoning behind the shadows of the past—history matters. 
Sovereignty, upstream-downstream positioning, asymmetry, and the cost of 
cooperation are always consistently cited amongst the top five barriers to water 
cooperation.  Although shared history is cited infrequently, the shadows of the past are 
frequently an obstacle to water cooperation because of politics, policies, attitudes, and 
events whose origins can be traced to colonial rule over now independent states.   
LeMarquand fails to give adequate attention to the shadows of the past and others 
ignore it entirely.  History is important.  This is especially the case in Africa, where many 
states continue to argue whether ‘colonial’ decisions should be taken into consideration in 
postcolonial political decision-making, especially regarding shared watercourses.  The 
weight of colonial treaties usually depends on what a particular state gains in terms of 
water access and control, assuming that water is the issue of concern.    
Although only a few of these are illustrated in the case studies, there are a several 
important ways that history impacts present political processes by framing the discourse 
surrounding knowledge and power. The shadows of the past conditions the factors 
described thus far in ways that can deeply affect the potential for quality cooperation. 
This conditioning manifests through: 
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■ the suppression or the democratization of knowledge;  
■ the realignment of power (where, for example, chiefdoms in pre-
colonial non-Westphalian states or specific group of peoples exercised 
power or control over resources, which is stripped away with colonial 
rule);  
■ the devaluing of indigenous knowledge and practices, thereby restricting 
access, shaping interests and defining stakeholders;  
■ limits the imagination; 
■ frames the language of politics;  
■ enabling or tolerating cooperation (if circumstances were fixed in the 
past under securitized or imperial/colonial conditions, a hegemonic power, 
even a hydro-hegemon, can afford to be both forthcoming and 
cooperative) 
■ the structuring of identity, knowledge107, and academic institutions in a 
particular way (since independence, some of these institutions are being 
restructured); 
These manifestations can create weak states where power is based often on hidden 
political and economic relationships. When post-colonial states are weak, they are often 
vulnerable, often struggling with switching from liberation politics and civil warfare to a 
more stable form of government. Ultimately, a colonial history establishes a geo-political 
legacy that structures geography, political boundaries, natural resources, and mineral 
                                                 
107 The ratios of skilled to semi-skilled and unskilled workers, especially in the fields of engineering and 
science and public sector administration (government) is difficult to explain, except with reference to 
historical circumstances and, particularly in the southern African region, apartheid.   
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resource assets. This makes some actors more powerful than others, leading to 
hegemony, and, in the case of water dominance, hydro-hegemony.108 The flux of history 
sometimes requires reordering juridical system and authority in ways that provide for 
transparency and creating local governing systems where none existed by acknowledging 
the sovereignty of some states (e.g. Lesotho and Namibia), while at the same denying the 
sovereignty of other identity groups (e.g. the Caprivi separatists). Even recent history has 
an impact, as states begin reconstructing civil societies after the large-scale political 
turmoil. 
Generally, weak post-colonial states often resemble their colonial predecessor109 
because national political elites (frequently liberators and revolutionaries turned 
bureaucrats) adopt Western values regarding modernization, environment, and 
development, no matter how inappropriate.  The hasty struggle to normalize the state and 
preserve national security frequently results in the construction of single-party or military 
regimes in order to bring about economic and social change.  While there are no military 
regimes for any of the actors in either of these case studies, Botswana has had a dominant 
party in power, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), since 1965.  The BDP was also 
the party that led the country to its independence.  Its leadership resorts to achieving 
newly established, post-colonial objectives using the old means of operation. In the case 
of securing water, this means repeating large-scale infrastructure development relying on 
dams, pipelines, water transfers, and groundwater extraction. 
                                                 
108 Namibia’s capital city Windhoek received formal city status in 1965, and remains the only major city in 
Namibia, more than three times the size of the country’s second largest urban center, Walvis Bay.  This is a 
situation not unusual in African states, as it correlates to the manner in which colonies were settled –   
usually around resource extraction or coastal areas (shipping ports) or a combination of both. 
109 Josephson, Resources under Regimes. 
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Also, consider the example of the Nile River Basin. Many of the contentious 
issues concerning the Nile Basin River have their origins in a 1959 treaty agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan, which was made when most of the Nile Basin states were still 
British colonies. Under the terms of that treaty Egypt holds the rights to 87% of the Nile, 
with Sudan holding the remaining 13%.  The Nile Basin contains all or part of 10 states, 
with the arid downstream countries depending upon the Nile for almost all their water 
needs.  At the same time, the several upstream countries have been denied use of the 
river’s resources, and are now demanding a more equitable agreement, as well as greater 
access and use for their development.  
LeMarquand also argues that transboundary water cooperation only concerns 
water and the long-standing debates surrounding the principles of apportionment and 
sovereignty contained in many United Nations (UN) conventions.   In the sovereignty of 
transboundary river arguments, four doctrines are invoked to describe sovereignty and 
control over international rivers.  These are the doctrines of:   
(1) Absolute territorial integrity—this establishes that countries cannot induce 
significant changes affecting other countries because these changes would 
affect the integrity of downstream countries;  
(2) Limited territorial sovereignty -- this recognizes the rights of downstream 
countries, and simultaneously guarantees the right of reasonable utilization by 
the upstream country in the framework of equitable usage by all interested 
parties;  
(3) The establishment of a community of co-riparian states—this establishes that 
the integrated river basin development transcends national interest;  
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(4) Absolute territorial sovereignty -- this doctrine is sometimes referred to at the 
Harmon Doctrine of Absolute territorial sovereignty.110  Finally, the doctrine 
of 
(5) Limited territorial integrity – this doctrine establishes that every nation 
bordering a watercourse has the right to use the water flowing in its territory, 
provided that the use does not harm the territory or interests of other nations. 
The doctrine recognizes the reciprocal rights and obligations of nations in the 
use of water.  Equitable use means that each riparian in a river basin is entitled 
to a reasonable and equitable share of water   consumption and disposal of 
pollution.111 States downstream have a right to an uninterrupted flow of a 
fixed quantity of useable water from and upstream state. 
In the example of Botswana and the BDP, territorial sovereignty with its geo-
political colonial legacy was the actual cause of the conflict between the two countries, 
not apportionment or access to water.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling 
came after a long period of debate, intermittent threats of military action, and formal 
military occupation by the Botswana Defense Force.  In the Caprivi sector, there are three 
islands in the Chobe River and two in the Zambezi whose territorial sovereignty remains 
contested.  By taking this matter to the ICJ, these actors agreed to accept the ICJ ruling.  
                                                 
110The Harmon Doctrine is named for U.S. Attorney General Harmon, who rendered the 1895 decision 
regarding the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) river shared between the United States and Mexico, where he 
determined that the U.S. was neither responsible nor obligated to consider the adverse effects on Mexico 
when it (U.S.) used and diverted water from the river.  As a result the Harmon Doctrine has come to mean 
that an upstream nation may use any amount of water flowing into its territory with no regard to adversely 
affected downstream nations. 
111 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the International Law 
Association at the 52 conference, held at Helsinki in August 1966.  From the Report of the Committee on 
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, specifically Chapter 2, “Equitable Utilization of the Waters 
of an International Drainage Basin,” where Article V describes a contextual framework for what constitutes 




In this instance, international water law may be less of a factor than a recognition that this 
dispute was about territory and interpretation of an existing treaty. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) would lack precedence in such a conversation; no regional or local 
institution would be able to address this type of territorial dispute.  Importantly, this 
conflict also indicates that Botswana and Namibia lack access to a formal regional 
protocol to address this type of situation—at least, that is the case if this conflict is 
understood as one of territorial sovereignty.  This dispute is water-related, in that the 
islands are the result of dynamic changes in the river systems that form the territorial 
boundaries, but water is not this dispute’s defining factor.  The Orange River dispute 
between Namibia and South Africa shares many of the same elements as the 
Sedudu/Kasikili Island dispute between Namibia and Botswana--one of territorial 
sovereignty and water. These factors further complicate the water-war, water conflict, 
and water cooperation debates. 
An indispensable underlying theory of this research is that for African post-
colonial states, the territorial configurations, riparian advantages, physical and governing 
infrastructure, and institutional arrangements of the present have been shaped almost 
exclusively by colonial affiliations and the shadows of the past. The colonial past (and 
the move to independence) may have structured things in such a way that some riparian 
actors will be more powerful or powerless than others.  In this case, as Lowi112 observes, 
the unequal distribution of power between the riparians may prevent or promote shared 
actions.  I contend that there is hierarchy to river cooperation, and that no deep quality 
cooperation of shared resources is likely while the core objectives of riparian actors 
                                                 
112 Lowi, Water and Power. 
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remain outstanding, especially if these involve water-related sovereign territorial 
disputes, which upon resolution would result in shifting power among riparians. 
Finnemore113 suggests that states evolve in an international social context that 
shapes the direction of change in coordinated and consequential ways, and are 
reorganized, redirected, and expanded at least in part according to shared normative 
understandings about what “the state” as a political form is supposed to do114.  However, 
it is highly unlikely that the emergence of transboundary watercourse agreements in the 
SADC region is merely responses to an international social context as an effort to 
improve their image.  There are many other international demand driven “image” 
behaviors and issues that SADC states might undertake if image and perceived maturity 
were the key driving factors for transboundary water cooperation in the region.  
In an era of global warming and drought as a result of climatic variation, 
diminished fresh water supply sources may prove to be a serious problem. This almost 
certainly will create economic turmoil, mass migration, potential court battles, and 
environmental conflict.  Under these circumstances, hegemony (individual state power) 
becomes more essential to transboundary water cooperation, conflict, or dominance over 
available supply.  The problems of increased demand are but one part of the equation. 
Distribution of the available supply is another, as in the case of Namibia and other 
Orange and Okavango basin states.  As the water history of South Africa (and that of 
many other states and nations) posits, Namibia is operating under the assumption that it 
can engineer its way to water supply. 
                                                 
113 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. 
114 Ibid, 35. 
 78 
 
Although water-related in both its conflict with South Africa and its dispute with 
Botswana, Namibia wants its territorial demands adjudicated and its water rights secure.   
For post-colonial states, building infrastructure, providing public services, supplying 
housing, jobs, and education, reducing poverty, defending territorial sovereignty and 
establishing an international reputation, may be more important than a river agreement.  
This is particularly the case in Africa where colonial treaties for shared river resources 
and boundaries were superimposed to meet the political and economic objectives of 
former colonial powers.   
Research indicates that the ratification of the SADC Protocol has been an 
important regional accomplishment, and that it has encouraged scientific and academic 
inquiry on a broad scale.  Generally speaking, obtaining signatures to an agreement is no 
small undertaking. While signing a treaty, protocol, or convention can “take the heat” off 
the backs of political leaders without requiring them to actually take action, the 
importance of obtaining all signatories to an environmental agreement should not be 
undervalued.  Although discussed in more detail later, it is important to note that most of 
the multilateral and bilateral transboundary water agreements in the SADC region and 
river basin commissions pre-date the SADC Protocol on Shared Water Course Systems.   
Democracy, gender equality, education, privatizations, political corruption, 
transparency, economic stabilization, internecine conflict, poverty, and law enforcement 
are all issues that SADC states could aggressively pursue to obtain a favorable 
international impression.  However, the SADC chose water as a ‘first’ issue around 
which to convene, in part because the issue of water among SADC member states is so 
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important since these states are so water interdependent.115 With so many transboundary 
water agreements and even with various levels of mistrust,116 the initial impression is that 
no state within the SADC region is willing to take unilateral actions that may be 
interpreted as hostile, unilateral, or in violation of international rules117 about shared 
watercourses and water.   
Governments jealously maintain sovereignty over their own stretches of rivers 
and freshwater resources, especially where water resources are scarce. In such cases, the 
state draws on the discourse of “national interest” in order to legitimize development of a 
basin’s resources.  In the case of South Africa, there is a gap between the discourse of 
water-based cooperation and the state’s actions in defense of its self-interest.  While its 
behavior as a riparian is largely supportive of the joint commissions of which it is an 
active member, national interest dominates South Africa’s position in the Orange River 
Basin. In addition, the LHWP Treaty contains language that assures SA water interests 
are actualized and sustained.  Meanwhile, Namibia, too, is declaring its ‘national 
interests’ in not only seeking resolution in the Orange River boundary question with SA, 
but also in citing established internationally accepted standards for its resolution. 
There are also asymmetries that extend to factors beyond upstream –downstream 
geography and riparian position.   Such asymmetric concerns include differences in 
predisposition for international cooperation among riparian actors, country-specific 
                                                 
115 Based on a 2002 interview with Mr. Phera Ramoeli, then SADC Water Sector Coordination Unit Sector 
Coordinator.   
116 Ashton, 2002 Interview. 
117 Developed under the auspices of the United Nations, several principles regarding shared water resources 
have emerged. These are: the prevention of conflict, thorough information sharing, avoidance of harming 
one’s neighbors, notions of equality, and reasonableness.  These guiding “rules” are detailed in the Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Water of International Rivers (1966), the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (1992), and 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses (1997). 
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factors such as political-institutional capacities, and international considerations such as 
the state of bilateral relations between regime members or susceptibility of actors to 
influence of international organizations and non-state issue networks. Consider again the 
upstream/downstream dynamic involving Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile River.  As 
mentioned earlier, Ethiopia contributes 86 percent of the Nile water that flows into Egypt.  
However, downstream Egypt, the most militarily and politically powerful of all Nile 
River basin riparians, contributes nothing to water flow but uses 66 percent of the annual 
84 billion cubic meters of Nile waters.118
The hydro-hegemons in both the Nile River Basin and the Orange River Basin are 
downstream riparians.  In the case of the Nile, it is not only the hydro-hegemon, but has 
had its Nile-water benefits assured by treaties.  In Southern Africa, again using the 
LHWP as an example, South Africa is not only the regional hegemon, but is also larger in 
land-mass, population, more developed economically, and more powerful than Lesotho.  
But, much of what makes South Africa a regional hegemon is owed to history.   It was 
history that endowed and enabled both South Africa to dominate, manage and control 
water resources and, to a lesser extent, neighboring riparian states. When negotiating the 
treaties for the LHWP, one might argue that South Africa was forced to approach 
Lesotho as an equal, since states become empowered politically when agreements are 
crafted and signed to address transboundary river basin issues.   
 
                                                 






One of the other issues facing the pyramid as it has been described thus far is that 
it takes as its base assumption that a nation’s power can be seen in its ability cause a 
particular political event. However, this does not take into account the mechanics of 
hegemony. 
The hydro-hegemony framework, being developed by the London Water Issues 
Group staff and students of Kings’ College, offers a perspective beyond the discourse of 
behavior change and regime cooperation and shifts the focus to examining the role of the 
riparian hegemon. With the exercise of hegemonic power, riparian behavior is not the 
result of an agreement, but directed in ways that have nothing to do with riparian 
position.  Instead, the hegemon can make others do what they would otherwise not do, 
even though the way to get others to comply may vary from hegemon to hegemon.   
Hegemony has both a hard and soft dimension. According to J. Warner, “Insights 
from the work of Lukes (1974) tell us that the ideational, non-coercive aspect of power is 
an important one to realize the consent and compliance of hegemonized actors.  A basin 
treaty or contract, based on an enticing vision, can be an attractor, creating a more 
coherent basin community than a coercive strategy could.”119 At the same time by itself, 
ideology, a soft power, cannot sustain control, as it needs to be strengthened by hard 
power, such as military might.  It is the exercise of different forms of power that enables 
                                                 
119 Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony.” 
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the hegemonic state to continue and retain its primacy among riparians and in basin 
politics.120   
According to Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-hegemony is hegemony at the river 
basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, 
integration and containment.  The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (like 
coercion, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of 
existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context.”121 
According to its theoretical framework, hydro-hegemony “consists of narrowing the 
weaker state’s alternatives to compliance, when confronted by the stronger party’s 
demands.”122  Therefore, cooperation among many transboundary watercourse 
relationships results from the disproportionate exercise of soft power by a powerful co-
riparian, the regional hydro-hegemon.  In the Orange River Basin, with its riparians of 
Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa, South Africa exercises that role.   South 
Africa exercises soft power in the Okavango River Basin as well, through South African 
water elites working in concert with Botswanan government support, and its ability to 
attract international interests and resources. The Okavango River basin riparians are 
Botswana, Angola, and Namibia, but South Africa has a powerful role.  
Transboundary water cooperation relies not only on weaker states having limited 
alternatives, but also upon the opportunity for those states to having the ability to develop 
economically, politically, and, in some instances, militarily, in order to improve their 
water supply options. The general intent of these agreements is to move nations into a 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.  
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position where they can coordinate their actions and politically self-enforce policies and 
practices that assure fairness, efficiency of use, access to, and the environmental 
protection of the natural resource.  It is possible that the behavioral model for regimes 
does not adequately address power dynamics by assuming that differences in relative 
types of power (military-, economic-, and knowledge-based) between actors creates 
obstacles for effective cooperation.  However, hydro-hegemony fills much of that 
theoretical breach; it is directly applicable to situations where there is “considerable 
asymmetry of power, control of the water flows is consolidated by the hydro-hegemon; 
and competition over water is stifled”.123  
 Neither hydro-politics nor hydro-security issues can be reduced easily into an 
either-or narrative.  Multiple scenarios are possible.  For example, transboundary water 
development may be a strategic bargaining tool to attract international resources, protect 
another resource, or otherwise exercise control over neighboring riparian states. 
Transboundary water agreements may also be a strategic ploy to elicit a particular 
response by a riparian state, like the elimination of a trade barrier or derailing the 
economic growth of another co-riparian. As a result, one might surmise, that a 
transboundary water agreement designed to institute or govern certain behaviors might 
also lead riparians to abandon or restrict other behaviors having to do with hydro-
security.  Moreover, as stated previously, issues of shared transboundary water resources 
cannot be separated easily from national security concerns and statehood.  The 
connection between water and energy, as in the case of huge hydro-power infrastructure 
development is an example of the latter. 
                                                 
123 This is from a pre-publication version of Zeitoun’s 2006 article, “Hydro-Hegemony – a Framework for 
Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflicts.” 
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In a scenario where sovereign states are the prime actors, water regime 
development will depend mostly upon the distribution of power and the respective 
strategic interests of the regional hegemon.  Upstream hegemons may exhibit little 
interest in the development of water regimes that may result in limiting the upstream 
hegemon’s sovereignty and freedom to act.  In contrast, a powerful downstream hydro-
hegemon may aggressively support the development of a water regime as part of its effort 
to secure and stabilize water supply.  Thus, the power asymmetry among riparians has the 
potential to both encourage and impede water cooperation, especially if it coincides with 
the interests of the basin hegemon.124  As will be explained in more detail in the case 
studies, South Africa functions as the hydro-hegemon in one basin where it is a 
downstream riparian, and another where it is not a riparian at all.  However, in both 
instances, South Africa exerts pressure and power in shaping basin and regional water 
cooperation efforts. 
Reciprocal trade-offs that act as an incentive to cooperate, however, may translate 
into high stakes hydro-political gamesmanship. Invariably, states want to demonstrate the 
extent of their political power.  They may choose to demonstrate the extent to their power 
by cultivating and control over natural resources, i.e. the technological mastery over 
water, for example, and their ability to link such control to national economic 
development.125  Very simply, water is life.  It is also power, economy, development, and 
security.  Control over water, especially in water-scarce states, can become an effective 
means of consolidating power over others.  
                                                 
124 Lowi, Water and Power. 
125 Worster, Rivers of Empire. 
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National interest can be understood in several different ways.  Hans Morgenthau 
defines ‘power’ as the ultimate national interest of the state, but other authors suggest that 
national interest can include: 
 
1.  Riparian specific interests where objectives are geographically based. These 
interests are derived from its location on the river, the country’s topography and the 
benefits sought from the river and its resources;  
2.   An array of internal political and social interests and ‘needs and priorities.’ 
These interests are specific to each country, where each interest manifests itself in a 
different way; and  
3. Legislative, including formal cooperation structures, treaties, and protocols 
benefiting the state.  
Countries tend to develop, utilize, and exploit water resources based only upon 
national priorities.  With such an approach, even with an overload of transboundary water 
cooperation agreements and history of cooperation, it is important to recognize that:   
(a) Cooperation can be a coercive force;  
(b) Cooperation is not the absence of conflict;   
(c) Cooperation under duress is not peace;  
(d) Cooperation is often explained as a reciprocal relationship the result of which is 
prosperity of all involved, and ‘community’; and 
(e) Cooperation requires positive conflict. 
Basically, some actors may sustain high costs if there is no cooperation, at the same time 
others are paying (or sacrificing) for cooperation with little benefit. These circumstances 
could escalate into conflict or result in not reaching an agreement.   
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LeMarquand and others suggest that sovereignty is an obstacle likely to give a 
country pause when considering an international agreement, because to that agreement 
may place limitations on a nation’s ability to act independently.  By entering into an 
agreement, a country may experience what Ruggie refers to as an “independence cost”, 
which he defines as “the general loss of independence or loss of control over one’s own 
activities . . .”126 This is of particular importance in the context of shared watercourses, as 
it brings out the fundamental debate: to what extent can a country use its waters as it 
pleases and to what extent must an upstream country make provisions for equitable 
distribution of shared waters?127  
Hydro-hegemony is neither a negative nor positive    
The issue of sovereignty might result in one or more riparian nations not wanting 
to be subject to the scrutiny of other riparians, third-party nations, perhaps an 
international body, like the International Court of Justice at The Hague.  If, however, the 
riparians have entered into a regional, multilateral, or international agreement that 
establishes monitoring conditions, sovereignty and other concerns may become less of a 
limitation. 
If the basic concerns of sovereignty, conflicting national interests, riparian 
position, cost of cooperation, asymmetry, water dependency, upstream-downstream 
conflict, and issues of hydro-hegemony can be adequately resolved, then other factors can 
be addressed.   Overcoming these basic concerns is a complex challenge; they are not so 
                                                 
126 Ruggie, quoted in LeMarquand, International Rivers.  
127 This long standing debate continues despite the principles contained in many UN Conventions, the 
Helsinki Rules, and Agenda 21, Chapter 18.  Each of these documents recognizes the reciprocal rights and 
obligations of nations in the use of shared water resources.  For example, according to the Helsinki Rules, 
equitable use means that each riparian in a river basin is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share of 
water consumption and disposal of pollution. 
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easily dismissed, even in the face of cooperation regimes, basin commissions, treaties, 
protocols, or international agreements to which riparians are willing signatories. 
In the Southern Africa region, numerous multilateral treaties, multilateral river 
basin commissions, and a multilateral protocol have all been created to address shared 
transboundary watercourses.  The situation only grows more complex when, as in the 
case of Sub-Saharan Africa, a number of countries are co-riparians on as few as four and 
as many as twelve basins at a single time.  Ten of the major river basins have four or 
more riparians each.  For example, Mozambique is co-riparian in nine different river 
basins (Table 1). So, while Mozambique may be inclined to act in its own interests, the 
extent to which it can truly cooperate with any of these other states is likely to severely 
limited. Its multiple riparian relationships leave it little room for negotiation.  
An effective cooperation regime needs a clearly delineated structure in order to 
facilitate transboundary watercourse agreement and to mediate between the various 
manifestations of national interest.  There seems to be reluctance on the part of most 
SADC members generally, and the Orange and Okavango riparians more specifically, to 
agree to set rules on regional shared transboundary watercourse matters. As signatories to 
international agreements, a more general consensus emerges amongst these riparians, but 
this consensus is still untested.  The reluctance on the part of these riparians to agree to 
set rules may have important implications for determining the ultimate levels and quality 
of cooperation.  During my fieldwork, I observed that sovereignty (and national interests) 
was the most frequently cited obstacle to successful agreements, but I believe other 
factors need to be considered.  Asymmetry, technical uncertainties, enforcement 
limitations, scientific gaps, reciprocity, and the treaty and agreement making process are 
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factors that must be addressed in some manner if cooperation is to be reached.  The 
preceding discussion and Pyramid 1 represent an effort to organize the obstacles to 
transboundary watercourse cooperation identified by in a systematic manner. Each of 




Chapter 3 - The Orange-Senqu River Basin     
 
We've seen conflicts over water throughout history . . . We fight over water. We fight with 
water resources during wars that start for other reasons. The Middle East is a classic 
place where water is scarce and the political competition is, as we know, very fierce. So I 
think that we will see growing disputes over water. Whether or not it's a full-blown war 
over water, I think there are some serious political difficulties ahead of us.  
Gleick told CNBC Morning Call's Liz Claman 2006. 
 
What we call man’s power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men 
over other men with nature as its instrument. C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 1947 
 
Introduction   
This chapter explains the hydro-political dynamics of the Orange-Senqu River 
Basin (OSRB), and how its riparians interact with one another while simultaneously 
asserting their sovereignty, guarding their water resources, securing their territorial 
integrity, and finding opportunities to alter their political behavior in ways that will 
neither compromise nor jeopardize their national interests, but will instead reconcile their 
common and individual past histories.  Additionally, it will discuss how history 
influences and dominates the politics of cooperation with the basin and influences the 
actions of the hydro-hegemon—South Africa (SA).  The OSRB story illustrates that the 
political dialogue about water is often less about water and more about politics, power, 
and the past. 
I will talk about briefly the strategic and economic importance of the Orange 
River to South Africa; South Africa’s hydro-hegemonic dominance over the regional 
headwater states, Lesotho and Namibia; South Africa’s continuing efforts to assert itself 
as a “good” riparian and regional neighboring state; and, most importantly, the continuing 
hydro-political tension between Namibia and South Africa.  I will also discuss the impact 
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the rivers have on discussions of international borders, and the history of which these 
discussions partake.  
The Orange-Senqu River is shared by three countries: Lesotho, South Africa and 
Namibia.  Based on an ancient hydrological link to the Orange River, the basin also 
includes Botswana among its riparians.  Botswana, however, contributes no flow, makes 
no water supply demands for the river water resources, and has no ability to tap into the 
river.  Like the Okavango River Basin chapter, this case study begins with an 
introduction, a brief overview of Orange-Senqu River Basin hydro-politics, and continues 
with a discussion on the physiography and history of the Orange-Senqu River Basin. That 
discussion is followed by an exploration of Namibia’s political and hydrological 
relationship with South Africa because it illustrates how history impacts cooperation 
relationships.  This chapter elaborates on the geopolitical and hydrological characteristics 
of the Republic of Namibia and provides a brief historical overview of the delineation of 
Namibia’s borders, included because that past history helps frame the country’s current 
political perspective and behavior.  
Namibia receives considerable attention in this chapter for several reasons.  First, 
it is a hydrological riparian in both the Orange and Okavango River basins with more 
than just a strategic interest in tapping additional water supply from both.  Namibia is the 
most arid state in sub-Saharan Africa and among the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) member nations, so water access and supply are important.  Second, 
prior to its independence, Namibia, then known as South West Africa (SWA), was  
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Figure 3.  Orange-Senqu River Basin by author.  Source map from the 1999 Orange River Replanning 
Study, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Directorate:  Water Resources Planning, Pretoria, South 
Africa. 
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regarded as a de facto colony of South Africa.  Like SA, its water was priced and 
allocated with little regard for equity, economic efficiency, or hydrological constraints or 
reality.   Third, Namibia has had several conflicts that complicate its interstate hydro-
politics and its sovereignty.  The intent of this chapter is to illustrate the diversity of 
meanings that Namibia, along with the other basin riparians, lends to the hydro-politics of 
the region as a way of meditating the shadows of the past.   
In the Orange-Senqu River Basin, Namibia’s Achilles’ heel is its downstream 
riparian position. This disadvantage is exacerbated further by South Africa’s regional 
economic standing, military dominance, technical capacity, bargaining power, and rarely 
challenged data-dominance and -quality. This case study begins with an overview of the 
Orange River hydro-politics, a brief discussion about the physiography and history of the 
River, and concludes with sections on each of the riparians and their Orange-Senqu River 
Basin hydro-politics perspective.  I include in my analysis some of the observations I 
garnered while doing my fieldwork in this region, where I was an invited guest at many 
hydrological conferences.  In the course of my interviews, almost all SADC or 
government officials presented transboundary water cooperation as not only high on the 
agenda, but also the clearly chosen direction for the region’s riparian states. 
 
Orange-Senqu River Basin Land-Uses 
The Orange-Senqu River Basin (OSRB) has multiple land uses that vary 
considerably depending upon which section of the river one is attempting to describe. 
Also, it is a significantly larger and a far more complex system with higher population 
densities and larger variety of land-uses than the Okavango River Basin. It includes not 
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only the entire country of Lesotho, with its population of a little more than two million, 
but also South Africa’s largest city, Johannesburg, which has a population of 3.5 to 4.5 
million, and Soweto, the provincial capital of Gauteng, the wealthiest province in South 
Africa.  
Overall the basin has a population of approximately 14.5 million people 
(According to a 2005 report by the UNDP, regionally produced research suggests the 
basin population to be closer to 11.5 million). The middle and lower stretches of the 
OSRB are the least densely populated areas within South Africa and Namibia, with a 
population density between 1-5 people per km-2, owing mostly to aridity and large areas 
of non-arable lands. The lower part of the OSRB, where Namibia and South Africa share 
a border, is incredibly sparsely populated. Diamond mining and two zinc mines are in 
operation where the river empties into the Atlantic along the coast, which is also where 
the Kudu gas fields are located. Additionally, the lower OSR basin includes a 1991 
designated Ramsar site at the downstream end of the river. The Ramsar site, where the 
river meets the Atlantic Ocean, is called the Orange River Mouth Wetland (ORMW). 
Here, freshwater marshes and de-vegetated salt marshes co-exist along the Namibia-
South Africa border region.  
Where the Vaal and Orange River flow together, population density increases (to 
approximately 100 or more people or more per km-2) since that area includes the 
Johannesburg-Pretoria urbanized area.  Also in this area of the basin is extensive 
industrial, mining, and agricultural and livestock activity.  However, the development and 
regulation of the river, the end of apartheid, and increased urbanization has influenced 
land use patters over time. One of the many changes is the shift from early non-intensive 
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live stock rearing close to the river to intensive crop production. Still, in the OSRB 
stretches of South Africa, significant agricultural activity continues to take place.  
In Lesotho, where the OSRB begins, the upper catchment is sparsely populated 
and occupied by mostly subsistence farming rural families living in villages.  The poor 
soils and hilly-mountainous terrain make the basin land unsuitable for both agricultural 
production and human habitation.  The Botswanan area of the OSRB is sparsely 
populated as well, owing to the Kalahari Desert, which places little demand on the 
basins’ water resources. As in the case of the Okavango, the Orange-Senqu River basin 
land uses include national game parks, conservation areas, and infrastructure to support 
tourism.  Like the Okavango River basin, agricultural activity continues to dominate 
freshwater withdrawal and use. 
 
Orange-Senqu River Basin Hydro-Politics 
 Several factors make the OSRB an interesting study in hydro-politics.  Its politics 
are an exercise in sovereignty, dominance, control, and securing state borders.  Because 
the Orange-Senqu River forms part of the boundary between South Africa and Namibia, 
defining this boundary has been a point of conflict between the two riparians since 
Namibia’s independence from South Africa in 1990.  For Namibia, the boundary 
question, like the hydrological one, is less about water and more about sovereignty, 
economics (mineral and fishing rights), as well as international norms versus those of the 
African Union (formerly OAS).   
 The OSRB case also includes examples of hydro-hegemony and engineering 
mastery.  The OSRB contains what is believed to be the largest international interbasin 
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(IBT) transfer in the world, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)128.  The 
LHWP was developed by South Africa to capture water that would otherwise be lost if it 
flowed unregulated across the border into South Africa.  The LHWP’s structure takes 
advantage of Lesotho’s higher altitude and lower evaporative rates.  South Africa’s 
engineering mastery is also demonstrated by the number of dams and inter-basin transfers 
(Table 2). 
 The OSRB is politically complex as well.  The multiple bilateral and multilateral 
agreements for the OSRB exemplify far-reaching water-related cooperation on the part of 
South Africa within the southern African region, post-SADC Water Protocol.129  Most 
noteworthy of the agreements is the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) 
multilateral cooperation agreement.  Botswana contributes no stream flow to the OSRB, 
and has no past or existing bilateral regimes with respect to the Orange River basin, but 
its potential political leverage could be used to influence the behavior of basin riparians 
in the Okavango to meet its own political and hydrological interests.   
 Each of the riparians, including Botswana, will have to meet increasing demands 
for water.  Namibia and South Africa both want to increase water extraction the lower 
Orange River for their own respective economic development, mining, tourism, and 
agricultural production plans.130  For Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa, the 
availability of water resources is a decisive pre-condition for agriculture. Distribution is 
also a problem; population and industrial centers tend to be located in areas incoincident 
with large quantities of accessible water supply.   
                                                 
128 DWAF, Introduction to the Orange River Basin. 
129 Earle, Malzbender, Manzungu, and Turton, “A Preliminary Basin Profile of the Orange/Senqu River.” 
130 I received this information from Mr. Piet Heyns, an important member of the water elite in Namibia.   
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Finally, water is linked directly with the energy-power sector.  Through a variety 
of complex distribution and trade mechanisms, South Africa supplies energy to each of 
the OSRB riparians.  Potentially, energy production and water requirements could have 
some bearing on energy security for of these riparian states.  This is especially true for 
South Africa, where the water-energy linkage is extensive.  Eighty percent of South 
Africa’s electricity requirements are met from Vaal-related resources.131  
According to Piet Heyns,132 water scarcity is considered one of the more 
significant and limiting natural resources when it comes to social, economic, industrial, 
and agricultural development in the southern African region.  However, before 
considering national riparian interests and perspectives, especially those concerned with 
the dynamics between Namibia and South Africa, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the geo-physical characteristics of the river basin and its history.133
 
River Physiography and History134  
The Orange-Senqu River Basin (OSRB) is shared by four riparian states: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa.  The Orange River basin has an 
                                                 
131 This data is from the Ecologic Institute for International and European Environmental Policy, and was 
published in December of 2005. 
132 I heard this during my 2000 interview with Mr. Heyns. Heyns deals with water matters in both the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin and Okavango hydro-politics, and is the former Undersecretary in the Namibian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry.  Prior to that appointment, he was the Director of Resource 
Management at the Department of Water Affairs at the Ministry.  Further, he was the official Namibian 
representative for both OKACOM (Okavango River Basin Commission) and ORASECOM (the Orange 
Senqu River Basin Commission).  
133 Turton, Interview. 
134 My information on the physiography, background, and history of this region is from multiple sources 
describing the Orange River. These include the Department of Water Affairs’ Management of the Water 
Resources of the Republic of South Africa (1986) and the second edition of Monica M. Cole’s South Africa 
(1966). Additionally, a portion of the physical description of the Orange-Senqu River Basin is based on A. 
R. Turton’s (2003) PhD dissertation:  The Political Aspects of Institutional Developments in the Water 
Sector:  South Africa and its International River Basins.   
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estimated total population of approximately 19 million people, significantly more than in 
the Okavango River Basin. It is one of the largest and longest rivers in South Africa, with 
a basin area that extends over much of the country135 and covers an area of approximately 
964,000 km2.  More than 95% of the water in the Orange-Senqu River basin originates in 
Lesotho and South Africa.  Two land-locked nations, Botswana and Lesotho, are part of 
the OSRB.  Surrounded in its totality by South Africa, the entire country of Lesotho is 
located within the basin, but only five percent of the basin area is located within Lesotho.  
Lesotho contributes over 40% of the stream flow.  Sixty-two percent of the basin area is 
located in South Africa, 25% in Namibia, and approximately 9% in Botswana.136 The 
Botswana part of the basin is covered by the Kalahari Desert. Much of that area is also 
part of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.  Together with its main tributary, the Vaal 
River, the Orange River is the main source of water for the central industrial and mining 
areas of South Africa.   
The Vaal River is an important freshwater resource in South Africa.  It begins in 
Mpumalanga Province, and forms the northern tributary of the Orange River in South 
Africa. The Vaal flows 750 miles (1,210 km) southwest to its confluence with the 
Orange.  As a plateau river occupying a shallow bed, most of the year its flow is minimal. 
However, during winter months it creates the muddy torrent for which the Vaal (“Gray-
brown”) is named. The Vaal River's flow is regulated by the Vaal Dam, 23 miles
(37 km) upstream of Vereeniging, where water is diverted into the Hartz Valley irrigation 
scheme.  The river's major tributaries—the Klip, Wilge, Vals, Vet, and Riet rivers—enter 
                                                 
135 Earle and others, “A Preliminary Basin Profile of the Orange/Senqu River,”  10. 
136 Turton and Earle, and national government reports from the South Africa Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry in South Africa all describe the river’s flow, particularly the replanning study in 1999. 
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on its left bank. With its waters used for the domestic and industrial needs of the 
Witwatersrand, the Vaal is serving at full hydro-economic capacity.  South Africa’s 
regional, economic, and hydro-hegemonic and engineering dominance provides a useful 
starting point for understanding the critical importance of the Orange River in the region.   
The Gauteng Province137 in South Africa is 100% reliant on interbasin transfers of 
water via the Vaal River System. Turton138 posits that the major developments in the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin were motivated by national interest, with the majority 
initiated and implemented during South Africa’s apartheid era. About a fifth of South 
Africa’s population lives in Gauteng.  It generates approximately 34% of the nation’s 
wealth, is the most densely populated and wealthy (on a per capita basis), and is the 
headquarters location for most of the nation’s major, state, academic, research, mining, 
financial and commercial institutions with some 60% of South Africa's research and 
development taking place in Gauteng.   
More than 95% urbanized, Gauteng Province includes the administrative capital 
Pretoria, one of the three capital cities139 of South Africa; Johannesburg, its provincial 
capital and the largest, most populous city in South Africa; and Soweto, a southwest 
black township.  In spite of its urbanization, Gauteng, which has retained a significant 
portion of its land in agriculture, continues as part of South Africa's farming heartland, 
the “maize triangle.”  These other factors further illustrate the strategic importance of the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin.  
                                                 
137 Gauteng (Sesotho for “place of gold”) is South Africa’s smallest province, about 17,000 square 
kilometers. 
138 Turton, “Hydropolitics and Security Complex Theory--an African Perspective.” 




The largest river south of the Zambezi, the Orange is a perennial river with 
seasonal runoff that varies extremely from one year to the next.  The main source of the 
Orange River is recognized officially as the Senqu River, which rises near the Maluti 
plateau's eastern edge in Lesotho. In Lesotho, the river is known as the Senqu (Sinqu) 
River. Its mean annual precipitation changes from more than 2000 mm in the Lesotho 
Highlands to less than 50 mm in the areas of the rivers end at the Atlantic Ocean.  The 
Seati (Khubedu) headwater rises near Mont-aux-Sources to the north. Still farther north is 
the lesser-known Malibamatso headwater, one of several dam sites of the Lesotho 
Highland Project.  Its headwaters140 rise at an altitude of about 10,800 feet above sea 
level on a plateau formed by the Lesotho Highlands that extends from the Drakenberg 
escarpment in the east to the Maloti (Maluti) Mountains in the West.  
Upon entering South Africa southwest of Lesotho, the river flows south and west 
through more open country.  From the Gariep (formerly Hendrik Verwoerd) Dam the 
Orange swings to the northwest to its confluence with the Vaal River. The Vaal, which 
rises in Eastern Transvaal province, flows west through the major population and 
industrial core (Gauteng Province) of South Africa before turning south and joining the 
Orange near the town of Douglas. From there, the Orange then turns southwest.  Some 20 
miles below the town of Kakamas, the Orange, traveling in several channels, forms the 
Augrabies Falls.141  The lower course of the river, from the Augrabies Falls to the sea, is 
                                                 
140 The source of the Orange River was first reached by the French Protestant missionaries Thomas 
Arbousset and François Daumas in 1836.  
141 Augrabies Falls is a series of separately channeled cataracts and rapids on the Orange River in arid 
Northern Cape Province, South Africa. The falls, which form the central feature of Augrabies Falls 
National Park, were established in 1966.  At the Augrabies Falls, the Orange River drops approximately 
191 meters.  Believed to be a place of active evil spirits by the original Hottentot (Khoi) residents, the loud 
thundering noise that resulted from the significant ‘drop’ that formed the waterfall caused the Hottentot 
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the Gorge Tract.   Some of the Orange's most rugged passages are located in the last 
section of the river, the lower Orange River (Figure 4), as it flows along the Richtersveld 
before turning west in the direction of the Namib coastal desert.    
 
 Figure 4.   Map of Namibia-South Africa Disputed Orange-Senqu River boundary, Lower OSR 
(by author) and Kudu Gas Fields.  Original source map reproduced with permission from 
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(Khoi) residents to name the waterfall Ankoerebis, "place of big noises." The Trek Boers, who settled there 
later, changed the name from Ankoerebis to Augrabies. 
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The lower Orange River flows through the southern part of the Kalahari and 
Namib deserts.  As a result, it fails to reach the sea in very dry years.  Shoals, falls 
(Augrabies Falls is 400 ft/122 m high), irregular flow, and a sandbar at its mouth limit 
navigation, but the river is used extensively for irrigation. At the mouth of the river are 
rich alluvial diamond beds.  The Orange River, the principal conduit for transportation of 
diamonds from the southern African interior to the Atlantic coast, has within its lower 
valley two recognized suites of gravel terraces into which part of the transitory diamond 
population has been concentrated in the lower Orange River deposits. 
Less than three miles wide and almost closed by sandbars, the Orange River 
reaches the sea a few miles north of the little inlet known as Alexander Bay.   A poorly 
populated and most arid region, the Lower Orange River area receives approximately 
60% of its runoff from the Fish River, an ephemeral river which originates in Namibia.142  
Throughout the 19th century, the Orange River marked the northern limit of 
British power in southern Africa. Beginning in the 1830s, the Boers crossed it in search 
of land and freedom from British rule; they named their first republic—the Orange Free 
State—for the river.  The first white man known to cross the river to the north bank was 
an Afrikaner elephant hunter, Jacobus Coetsee, who forded the Groot River, as it was 
then called, near the river mouth in 1760.  
Later expeditions across the river in the 18th century were led by the Afrikaner 
explorer Hendrik Hop; Robert Jacob Gordon, a Dutch officer; William Paterson, an 
English traveler; and the French explorer François Le Vaillant. They explored the river 
from its middle course to its mouth, and Gordon named it in honor of the Dutch house of 
                                                 
142 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 2004 Report, 27.   
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Orange in 1779.  Mission stations were established north of the Orange from the late 18th 
century.  In 1813 John Campbell of the London Missionary Society traced the Harts 
River, and from its junction with the Vaal, followed the latter stream to its confluence 
with the Orange, which he explored as far as the Augrabies Falls.  
Among the OSRB riparians, South Africa is the principal user of the Orange 
River’s water, with approximately 82% of total annual use, which includes environmental 
flows and inter-basin transfers.143 Within SA, the OSRB supports the industrial and 
commercial region around the city of Johannesburg, where irrigation by commercial 
farmers dominates most other uses, followed by industrial and municipal water supply to 
the city. 
The OSRB hosts approximately 30 dams—25 in South Africa alone, and five in 
Namibia. These dams have a collective storage capacity of more than 12 million cubic 
meters (mcm or Mm3).144  The largest of these are in South Africa: they are the Gariep 
Dam (5,600 mcm storage capacity) and the Vanderkloof Dam (3,200 mcm storage 
capacity).  
While South Africa has 25 dams with a storage capacity of more than 12-million 
cubic meters, Namibia has only five dams storing more than 12-million cubic meters.145 
This storage system makes Namibia particularly vulnerable during periods of drought, 
since much of its access to water from the Orange is limited to release from upstream 
dams controlled by South Africa.  
                                                 
143 Earle, Malzbender, Manzungu, and Turton, “A Preliminary Basin Profile of the Orange/Senqu River.” 
144 This does not include the recently completed Katse and Mohale Dams in the upper reaches of the 
Orange-Senqu in the Lesotho Highlands 
145 According to Dr. Jenny Day in “The Status of Freshwater Resources in Namibia,” the Fish River is the 
most significant tributary of the Orange River in Namibia, and is dammed by the Hardap Dam. 
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The Orange River forms the 600-kilometer border between Namibia and South 
Africa and has a catchment area of almost a million square kilometers.  The 1890 high-
water-level territorial boundary ‘demarcation’ of the Orange River was determined when 
the territory was under German colonial rule.  With Namibia’s recent independence from 
South Africa, both nations have engaged in an ongoing debate and conflict over exactly 
where, how, and under which rules or conventions the “new” hydrological boundary 
should be determined.  
 
Namibia and the Orange-Senqu River  
Namibia is a large arid country, located in southwestern continental Africa on the 
coast. Its total land area is approximately 825,418 sq km; Namibia is slightly more than 
half the size of Alaska but very sparsely populated.  Namibia has vast sand dunes that 
cover an area about the size of Switzerland, is extremely arid due mostly to the scarcity 
of water in most areas, and geologically, the absence of deep soils over much of the 
country result in low levels of nutrients.146  With a coastline of 1,572 km, Namibia shares 
land boundaries with Angola (1,376 km); Botswana (1,360 km); South Africa (855 km); 
and Zambia (233 km). Namibia has four primary geographic regions.  The great majority 
of Namibia's 2 million people live in the northern part of the country where the climate is 
less arid and more hospitable. Forty-three percent of the population of Namibia is under 
the age of 15.147  Thirty-nine percent live in urban areas, with the remaining rural 
                                                 
146 Mendlesohn, Jarvis, Roberts, and Robertson. Atlas of Namibia. 
147 Namibia’s population is 87.5% black, 6% white, and 6.5% mixed. Life expectancy in 2000 dropped to 
43 years, from a previous high of 61 years in 1991.  People in urban areas live slightly longer than those in 
rural areas, and women longer than men.  While per capita is approximately $7,400 (2006 est.), the UNDP's 
2005 Human Development Report indicated that 34.9% of the population live on $1 per day and 55.8% live 
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population residing in northern Namibia.  Although Namibia’s population is spread 
unevenly across the country, its urban centers, like that of many African nations, are 
experiencing rapid and ever-increasing population growth.  This has many causes 
including the reduction in available natural resources and an expectation on the part of 
rural residents of an overall improved quality of life in the country’s urban center.   
Along the Namibian coast lies the Namib Desert, a barren, brilliant red sand 
landscape that is divided into the Skeleton Coast (in the north) and the Diamond Coast (in 
the south). When I visited the area for my field work, I was stunned by the expanse, 
overwhelming beauty-contrast of the coastline and how arid. There are a number of 
features of this coastal desert that make it quite unlike any spot on Earth. As mentioned 
earlier, Namibia is one of the richest sources of diamonds in the world.  Its center is 
occupied by a high escarpment plain.  Windhoek, the capital and only city of any size, is 
centrally located in the middle of the country. In the northern part of the central plain is 
the Waterberg Plateau, a 150 sq. mi. (400 sq. km) shelf that rises 150 meters straight from 
the surrounding plain. The plateau is a well-watered home to several rare and endangered 
species. At Namibia's southern tip is yet another geological site--the Fish River Canyon, 
considered second only to the Grand Canyon in size.   The Country’s climate is desert; 
hot, dry with sparse and erratic rainfall and very limited natural fresh water resources.  It 
is subject to prolonged periods of drought and further desertification.   
Namibia has very little surface water, as what little rain it has either evaporates, 
seeps into the ground, or becomes part of the ephemeral river system—essentially dry 
                                                                                                                                                 
on $2 per day.   The World Bank considers Namibia a lower-middle-income country, where the traditional 




rivers with flows lasting any where from a few hours to a few days.  The perennial 
river—the Kavango—along Namibia’s northern border flows from catchment (basin) 
areas outside its borders located primarily in Angola.  In fact, several major rivers of 
Namibia form significant parts of Namibia’s borders, mostly in the north and northeast 
far from population centers and along boundaries of its neighboring countries.  These 
rivers include the Zambezi, Kwando-Linyanti, Kunene, Orange and Okavango.  Only the 
Kavango (Okavango River) crosses into Namibian sovereign territory.  Within both the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin, Okavango River basin, and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) region, Namibia is the driest, most water scarce of all riparians of 
all SADC member states and in sub-Saharan Africa.148 With South African, it shares that 
country’s most developed and important river—the Orange-Senqu River Basin.149 It also 
shares one of the least developed in the SADC region—the Okavango River Basin.150
                                                 
148 This is from my interview with Dr. Jenny Day, an Associate Professor and the Head of Department of 
Zoology at University of Cape Town. Dr. Day is also the Director of Freshwater Research Unit (FRU). 
FRU is one of South Africa’s leading centers of research and teaching on the ecology and management of 
southern Africa’s inland waters. FRU comprises academic staff members, contract researchers, 
postgraduate students and technical assistants. Associates of FRU include members of other university 
departments and individuals working elsewhere in the field of freshwater biology. 
149 I learned this during my 2000 interview with Dr. Anthony Turton. At present, Turton serves on a 
strategic think tank in Washington and Spain, and is on the editorial board of the Springer-Verlag Water 
Resource Management series of textbooks. He is an executive director of the International Water Resource 
Association (IWRA); and is the African editor for Water Policy, the official journal of the World Water 
Council, being a CSIR representative to that body.  At CSIR, Dr. Turton occupies the GIBB-Sera Chair and 
is the Research Group Leader for Water Resource Governance Systems.  At the time of my initial 
interviews, Turton, founder of the African Waters Issues Research Unit (AWIRU), was based at the 
University of Pretoria, South Africa and professor at the University.  AWIRU--The African Water Issues 
Research Unit (AWIRU) is a not-for-profit applied research organization based at the University of 
Pretoria, established to develop an African capacity to understand the complexity of African water 
management and development issues. AWIRU's objective is to generate water management solutions that 
are politically, socially, economically, environmentally and culturally sustainable in Africa.  
150 This is from my 2000 interview with Dr. Ashton. Ashton is an aquatic ecologist specializing in the 
impacts and implications of water quality issues on aquatic biodiversity in African river and lake 
ecosystems, and the role of aquatic ecological issues in decision-making in shared river basins. He has 
more than thirty-six years of experience of limnological studies, water research and environmental 
assessment projects in southern and central Africa, with a particular emphasis on water quality assessments 
and integrated catchment management approaches. He has considerable experience in the deployment, co-
ordination and management of multi-disciplinary project teams in various water-related fields.   He is a 
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Access to water is the single, dominant, limiting factor in Namibia.  As a result, 
the country’s economic sustainability will become increasingly dependent upon long 
distance interbasin transfers,151 which may include the development of coastal 
desalination plants. These plants would still require in transferring water from coastal 
regions inland to population centers.  The need to capture water from its only perennial 
river, the Kavango (Okavango) and the possible development of a hydropower station at 
the Popa Falls Rapids in the Caprivi Strip remains a source of hydro-political conflict for 
Namibia and Botswana.  Nonetheless, Namibia is a member of SADC, a signatory to 
several transboundary water agreements and river basin organizations, and has 
aggressively pursued its hydrological interests. Presently, Namibia depends upon South 
Africa as its main source of electrical power.  A hydro-power dependency the 
government would like to reduce.  As a result, it appears that Namibia considers river 
basin access as a central part of its national water development and economic strategy for 
growth.  
 
Namibia’s Borders:  A Historical Perspective 
Namibia’s borders are the result of a long series of events predating its 
independence, and are the direct result of colonial era negotiations and multiple treaties 
(and the delimitation and geodesic commissions).  The first stage of boundary 
negotiations, treaties, and agreements occurred during the period when German, British, 
                                                                                                                                                 
professor of Water Resources Management at the University of Pretoria and currently works for the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). CSIR (http://www.csir.co.za/index.html) is one of 
the leading scientific and technology research, development and implementation organizations in Africa. It 
undertakes directed research and development for socio-economic growth on multiple matters of the 
environment, technology, etc.   
151Byers, “Environmental Threats and Opportunities in Namibia,”14. 
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and Portuguese governments competed for colonial influence and territory in the 19th 
century.  More recently, however, Namibia’s boundary negotiations involve the 
sovereign states of South Africa and Botswana, as well as the Organization of African 
Union (OAU).152   
This boundary dispute represents a direct challenge to the fundamental OAU 
principle that has guided African boundary affairs for the past forty years—that is, 
independent African states would respect and therefore accept their colonial boundaries.  
The stakes for each riparian, Namibia and South Africa are high both hydrologically and 
economically.  Namibia is considered a richer source of diamonds than South Africa and 
is considered one of the world's largest diamond producer-exporter.  This is important, 
since where the border demarcation occurs will give Namibia control over an area rich in 
diamond resources, which is currently claimed by South Africa. Because of the non-water 
boundary-related interests, bilateral agreements aimed at reaching agreement for 
boundary relocation cascaded into a range of unanticipated disputes related to fishing, 
mining, and grazing rights in between the two nations.153  As a result, this has led the 
South African government to retreat from negotiations over the precise location of the 
international river border between Namibia and South Africa.  Thus the Orange River 
                                                 
152 The Organization of African Union was established in 1963 to promote self-government, respect for 
territorial boundaries, unity, social progress, and respect for territorial throughout the African Continent.  It 
provided political support for the black nationalist movements in southern Africa in the frontline states 
(Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania), which all mobilized against 
apartheid.  More recently, after 40 years the OAU has become the African Union (AU), which has as its 
purpose to promote “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance.”  
As a continental organization, the African Union (AU) had its Constitutive Act of the AU adopted at the 
Lome Summit in 2000:  With its first Assembly of the African heads of states convened in Durban, South 
Africa in 2002. In addition to its general purpose, among its many objectives is to defend the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of its member states.   The precise objectives and purposes of the OAU are stated in 
Article II of the Charter, which was adopted in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
153 Ashton, “Southern African Water Conflicts,” 79. 
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boundary dispute has been a long standing and consequential one in the individual and 
collective politics of both nations and the region, historically and currently.   
An 1886 Treaty negotiated between Germany and Portugal determined Namibia’s 
northern border between Namibia and Angola.  The northern border was defined as a 
straight line from Andara to the rapids at Katima Mulilo, at the intersect of the Zambezi 
River.  In addition, the 1886 Treaty formed the negotiation platform for the idea of the 
Caprivi Strip. The uncertainty and disagreement that followed the 1886 Treaty resulted in 
an 1891 designation of an 8-mile neutral zone.  By 1928, the neutral zone no longer 
existed.  The area around today’s Caprivi (Strip) region came under British control and 
influence.154   
At the 1890 Berlin Conference, Britain gave the strip of land, part of what was 
then the Bechuanaland protectorate (now Botswana), together with the North Sea island 
of Heligoland, to Germany.  At the time, the Germans wanted the land to connect their 
colony of South West Africa (now Namibia) with the Zambezi River, which they saw as 
a potential trade route from the interior to the coast, though later investigations showed 
that that route was not feasible.  In exchange for Germany’s access to that route, Britain 
would receive Zanzibar.  Once again, controversy and differing interpretations about 
                                                 
154 Caprivi is a narrow 400 km-long strip of land stretching from the Northeast of Namibia across to the 
Zambezi River, bounded by Angola and Zambia in the North and Botswana in the South.   For several 
years there has been a secessionist-civil war-conflict in the Caprivi Strip being waged between the CLA 
(Caprivi Liberation Army) and the Government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN).  Much of the past 
fighting centered in the Caprivi regional capital city of Katima Mulilo, with periods where the CLA would 
cross into Botswana and Angola.  The conflict was believed to have peaked in 1999, and, against the 
wishes of the GRN, an agreement was made with the United Nations to provide political asylum for many 
of the CLA leaders of the movement to be exiled to other countries.      
     Not unlike the claims of others throughout the African conflict, the CLA's secessionist claims are based 
on the fact that the arbitrarily drawn borders of the Caprivi region cut through the Lozi-speaking area of 
Barotseland, a kingdom in pre-colonial times. There are Lozi speakers in neighboring Botswana, Angola 
and Zambia.  From the perspective of the GRN, the secessionist movement has been terminated, and 
Caprivi political parties seeking secession have been banned.  According to a UNDP Poverty Profile Report 
of Namibia, Caprivi is the poorest region in Namibia. 
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boundary locations followed the 1890 Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty.  As a result, it was 
not until 1930, some 40 years later, that the southern part of the northwestern border was 
fixed.  
For Namibia, the Chobe, Kwando, Linyanti, and Zambezi River borders have 
been subject to various treaties, which generally determined their respective borders as 
the center lines of the deepest river channels (thalwegs155).  However, within the Chobe 
River, and after Namibian independence in 1990, a dispute between Namibia and 
Botswana regarding the subjugation and territorial status of a river island erupted, and has 
since been resolved.  The island in question, known as Kasikili in Namibia, and in 
Botswana as Sedudu, is approximately 3.5 square kilometers in area, and is located in the 
Chobe River.  In an effort to resolve that dispute and at great expense, both Namibia and 
Botswana agreed to take their case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague.  On December 13, 1999, the ICJ found that: 
. . . the boundary between the Republic of Botswana and the Republic of Namibia 
follows the line of the deepest soundings in the northern channel of the Chobe 
River around Kasikili/Sedudu Island" and, that “ . . . Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
forms part of the territory of the Republic of Botswana. 
In making its decision, interestingly, the ICJ used the 1890 treaty language, which 
in many respects resorted to the treaties and intent of colonial occupation of territorial 
decisions that established territorial sovereignty for European states as opposed to a non-
European entity—territorial sovereignty expressions and potential decisions of 
                                                 
155 “Thalweg” is from the German phrase “Thalweg des Hauptlaufes,” which refers to the English term 
referring to the “centre” of the main channel.  “Thalweg” is the term used by all the southern African 
interviewees during the course of this research.  Both are used by the ICJ in reference to the court case. 
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independent African states.  By relying on the 1890 Treaty, the ICJ decision ‘muddied the 
water’ of international law, in that reliance on such treaties as part of international law 
furthers the colonial notion that treaties between colonial powers in the 19th century, can 
eclipse pre-existing title to territory based on African use and occupation.  Further, by its 
decision, the ICJ may have unwittingly added its support to the OAU resolution that 
African states must live with their colonial established borders, and by inference, the 
related colonial treaties. Additionally, the ICJ may have further complicated the pending 
Orange River border dispute between Namibia and South Africa, since the court did not 
consider South Africa’s predecessory territorial control of the Caprivi Strip when 
Namibian territory was under territorial control of South Africa. While well beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, the Kasikili/Sedudu conflict between Namibia and Botswana, 
and its resolution are worth noting as it demonstrates clearly the connection between past 
and present transboundary resource conflicts and disputes and how such interests and 
relationships carry over into the future.156   
                                                 
156 Kasikili/Sedudu Island conflict between Namibia and Botswana concerned the sovereign ownership of 
a small island located in the Chobe River, which flows between the two countries.  The island is known as 
“Sedudu” in Botswana and “Kasikili” in Namibia.   In May 1996, after protracted, continuous, and 
sometimes localized violent conflict between Namibia and Botswana, both countries decided to present the 
case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for resolution. Prior to that joint decision, 
Botswana has stationed troops on the island, as well as others in the area. Among others, this conflict 
demonstrates the legacy of German and British colonial territorial negotiations, which resulted in the 
creation of the Caprivi Zipfel (Strip) through the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty Agreement, which defined 
their respective areas of influence in Africa.   
     The ICJ was tasked with reviewing the language of 1890 Treaty, examining current and early historical 
maps prepared in the 1880s and 1890s, considering scientific, hydrologic, and geomorphic analysis, 
reports, and other relevant information, such as the Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, as appropriate to determine whether the northern channel or the southern channel is the 
‘main channel’ of the Chobe River. It would appear that one of the central issues between the parties was 
always the definition and identification of the main channel itself and the consequences of such 
identification for the determination of the sovereignty over Kasikili Island. With its December 13 1999 
judgment in favor of Botswana, the ICJ had adjudicated an intra-Commonwealth territorial dispute for the 
first time.   
     The ICJ 1999/53 press release stated that, “In its Judgment, the Court finds, by eleven votes to four, that 
the ‘boundary between the Republic of Botswana and the Republic of Namibia follows the line of the 
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Other unresolved conflicts for Namibia involve Botswana and the Situngu 
marshlands along the Linyanti River also in the Caprivi Strip and Namibia's planned 
construction of the Okavango hydroelectric dam on Popa Falls which has been met with 
protest by Botswana residents.  Then, there is the historical, continued, and current 
dispute between Namibia and South Africa over the boundary location in the Orange 
River.    
A fourth, but resolved, conflict for Namibia and South Africa involved Namibia’s 
support for construction of a bridge over the Zambezi River, “. . . which by its 
construction would establish a short, but not clearly delimited Botswana-Zambia 
boundary in the river.”157  Construction discussions about the bridge began in the late 
1980s, 10 years before Namibia’s independence, were dismissed by the South African 
government. Opened officially in 2004, the bridge represents a symbolic nuance for 
Namibia in light of its history and recent independence.158  The bridge establishes a trade 
route for Namibia to its land-locked neighbouring states (Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) and lessens its economic dependence upon South Africa for trade and 
markets. In 2004, Zimbabwe dropped objections to the plans.   
The ‘shadows of the past’ cannot be separated either from territorial integrity and 
statehood or from interpreting the consequences of “effective” cooperation between states 
                                                                                                                                                 
deepest soundings in the northern channel of the Chobe River around Kasikili/Sedudu Island’ and, by 
eleven votes to four again, that ‘Kasikili/Sedudu Island forms part of the territory of the Republic of 
Botswana’.”   
157 U.S. Department of State, The CIA World Factbook. 
158 Ironically, according to Dr. Klause Dierks’ “The History of the Zambezi Bridge from Namibia to 
Zambia: 1982 – 2004,” the most suitable bridge site was just a few metres within Zambia and on the basalt 
rocks of the Katima Rapids, just five metres from the old border beacon of 1927 between the then South 
West Africa and Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia), still visible today just at the western abutment 
of the bridge.  Such a bridge between Namibia and “Black Africa” was regarded as high treason in those 




on transboundary water issues.  In each of the above instances, Namibia’s past, its former 
identity as SWA and its old borders are intertwined with the discussion on the Orange 
and Okavango River Basins, along with those of the river’s riparians.  As this case study 
evolves, this research will further illustrate how inextricably the past and present are 
linked and how those linkages complicate hydro-politics for Namibia, as well as other 
African states within the Orange and Okavango River basins, and influence prospects for 
transboundary cooperation.   
During the boundary dispute between Namibia and South Africa, the ‘shadows of 
the past’, along with Namibia’s continuous efforts to demonstrate its sovereign 
independence in the presence of South Africa’s regional and riparian hegemony, further 
effects significant influence on the degree, importance, and consequence of cooperation 
and conflict among riparians.  Cooperation regimes, whose building blocks would 
include trust building, information data sharing, and other joint actions necessary to 
support transboundary watercourse efforts, are less likely to realize their desired 
outcomes or influence behavioral change by riparians if questions of basic sovereignty 
remain in dispute. Are such disputes subject to violent conflict?  Not necessarily, 
although some states have been known to engage in violent conflict over territorial 
boundaries.  Consider, for example, the current boundary conflict between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea159, where factions from both countries have been engaged in armed conflict which 
                                                 
159 A BBC article, “Border: A Geographer’s Nightmare,” describes some of the issues surrounding national 
boundaries here. Much of the border is defined by rivers; however, around the area of Badme the treaty 
stipulates an imaginary line linking two rivers. In the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, however, the border 
issue became confused when Eritrea was ruled as a province of Ethiopia. The old colonial boundary 
disappeared for several decades within the territory of a single state. In the late 1980s a de facto line of 
control was established between the two groups to the west of the colonial boundary, which granted the 
Tigreans (People's Liberation front) control of an area which had been part of Eritrea in colonial days. 
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has its origins in the colonial past and current geopolitical objectives.  However not all 
asymmetric, self-interested strategic disputes result in violent conflict.  Nonetheless, 
Zeitoun reminds us that, “. . . tensions relating to the uglier faces of cooperation do not 
disappear with time.”160  
Contemporary theories typically explain cooperative and reciprocal relationships 
by framing them as structures through which prosperity is gained and community built.161 
162However, cooperation can be asymmetric and can become, either through a strong 
actor or by itself, a coercive force. The first approach fails to recognize the place of 
coercion in the construction of social order. Mark Zeitoun, a Canadian scholar at the 
London School of Economics, argues that rivers provide a perfect case of “asymmetrical 
co-operation” between countries that are forced to work together on terms dictated by the 
strongest (the hydro-hegemon, or regional hegemon).  An alternative approach argues 
that when there is a future involving an infinite number of interactions between actors, 
the levels of cooperation are higher163 in part because the actors gain experience.  They 
learn to cooperate.  Axelrod argues further that cooperation does in fact work for those 
involved in reciprocal relationships, if the ‘shadow of the future’ is long enough. 
Axelrod’s cooperation analysis was based on “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (game theory)164 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Eritrea’s political position is to return to the colonial boundary that was in force before Eritrea was 
incorporated into Ethiopia.  
160 Zeitoun, “Not All Water Cooperation is Pretty.”  
161 Fukuyama’sTrust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti’s  Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy both provide further information on 
the theoretical work surrounding community development.  
162 Portes and Landolt, “The Downside of Social Capital,” 20.    
163 Both Bo’s “Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future” and Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation 
elaborate on this theme.  
164 The “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” the basis of Axelrod’s cooperation analysis and discussed in The Evolution 
of Cooperation, represents a situation where two allied suspects are separated and their ability to cooperate 
is tested by their captors.  Both are given the same opportunity with four possible outcomes and rewards: 
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does not consider the presence of a central authority, such as a hydro-hegemon, able to 
force actors or individuals to cooperate with one another.   
 
The Orange River Conflict--Namibia, South Africa and Orange-Senqu River Basin 
Hydro-politics--the River has Two Sides 
 
 
“Water is the true wealth in a dry land; without it, land is worthless or nearly so.   And if 
you control water, you control the land that depends on it.”  Wallace Stegner, 1954. 
 
 
When Namibia won its independence from South Africa in 1990, one of the 
expectations was that South Africa would end its claim of sovereignty over the entire 
Orange River (and Walvis Bay).  Additionally, it was anticipated that Pretoria would 
release the mineral rights ceded to mining companies, and to land rights to communities 
on the other side of the Namibian border.  According to numerous reports,165 in 1994, the 
former South African President, Nelson Mandela, and his cabinet agreed that the South 
African and Namibian Orange River borders should be relocated to the middle of the 
river, as indicated by international law.  However, South Africa has been reluctant and 
slow to give up these rights.  Thus, a long-running dispute has delayed the finalization of 
the boundary between the two countries.  The Lower Orange River, the area where South 
Africa and Namibia share the border, is controlled by South Africa and it is South Africa 
that also controls the mineral resources on the land that depends upon the water. 
 Albert Kawana, Namibia’s deputy justice minister, said the two governments 
agreed to a formal treaty stating the border was in the middle of the river in February 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1) Both remain silent; (2) Both squeal (3) One testifies against the other; or (4) one testifies first against 
the other.  The rewards or punishments are meted accordingly.    
165 This topic has been the focus of discussion in many articles by Christof Maletsky, some of which have 
been published in The Namibian and in Business Day. 
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1993.  According to Mr. Kawana, the two countries’ survey departments were to produce 
photomaps and place beacons linked to satellites in an effort to approximately identify 
the middle of the river.  As a result, more than seventy maps were generated. About that 
same time, however, South Africa introduced a private property rights agreement relating 
to the border’s shift from the northern bank along the Namibian shoreline to the middle 
of the river.  There are high stakes in this hydro-boundary dispute:  mineral, land, and 
fishing rights, and grazing rights on river islands.  Also of concern in this hydro-boundary 
dispute is the lack of clarity demarcating the maritime boundary that separates South 
Africa and Namibian territorial waters.  These waters empty into the Alexander Bay and 
extend 200 miles outward into the Atlantic Ocean.   
 In Namibia, the Orange River is a shared perennial river border with South 
Africa.  As there are no dams on the common lower Orange River border running 
between Namibia and South Africa to the Atlantic Ocean, Namibia is dependent upon 
South Africa for river regulation and the release of water from upstream dams166.  The 
‘shadow of the past’ looms large in the contemporary and current relationship between 
Namibia and South Africa.  A source of conflict, frustration, and several bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, the dynamic between Namibia and South Africa over their 
shared segment of the Orange River has a history that begins in the colonial era with an 
agreement between Britain and Germany in the early 19th Century.   
In 1890, Namibia became a German colony, and the Caprivi territory becomes 
part of Namibia.  By 1906 the British Colonial Office attempted to make the German 
Government accept and comply with the 1890 Boundary Treaty which determined “ . . . 
                                                 
166 Heyns, Interview. 
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the fixed (boundary) line marked by the northern margin of the stream after the rains”. In 
the interim, the Union of South Africa was established, marking the end the British 
government’s negotiations about the boundary of the Orange River in the aftermath of the 
Boer War.  
Under several regimes and despite vast ideological changes, the government of 
South Africa has always asserted that the northern side of the river (now the Namibian 
side of the Orange River) was part of their territory and under their jurisdiction.  Indeed, 
all early conditions regarding establishing political control over or boundaries for the 
Orange River had the effect of creating a de facto subservience towards Great Britain 
(later the Union of South Africa).  Negotiations over the Orange River boundary dispute 
continued until World War I (WWI).However, all the early attempts to establish political 
control over the boundaries of the Orange River ultimately valorized colonial legislation 
extending back to British dominance.  
The outbreak of WWI suspended any final resolution of the Orange River 
boundary, political questions, and diplomatic dialogue.  With the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles and a decision by the League of Nations, the former German colonial territory 
of South West Africa (Namibia) became a “trust” to South Africa.167  The German 
Protectorate of South West Africa ceased to exist.  That territory became part of South 
Africa.  What is important is that under this new agreement, both sides of the River 
would come under the control of one political administrative power—South Africa—vis-
à-vis the responsibility of the South African Department of Water Affairs (DWAF).  
However, according to Hangula, DWAF had no authority, legally or politically, to make 
                                                 
167 Hangula, The International Boundary of Namibia. 
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decisions on matters such as river boundaries.168  Nonetheless, the Orange River 
boundary question was temporarily resolved.  
An agreement establishing the boundary between Namibia and Angola was signed 
on 22 June 1922, at the Boundary Convention in Cape Town (South Africa) by the 
Governments of the Union of SA and Republic of Portugal.  The boundary was declared 
the middle line of the Kunene River, a “line drawn equidistant from both banks, from the 
mouth of the said River up to a point at the Rua Caná Falls above the crest or lip where 
the said middle line crosses the parallel of latitude passing through the beacon placed on 
the left bank of the said river in July, 1920, by a joint Commission appointed by the 
British and Portuguese Governments”.  Article 3 of that agreement references the 
continuation of that line described in Article 2, as following “. . . the parallel of latitude 
passing through the said beacon to a point where it cuts the middle line of the Okavango 
(Cubango) River (as described in Article 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon of 30th December, 
1886)”.  The Commission continues by suggesting that “[i]n demarcating the boundary 
line from the Kunene to the Okavango (Cubango) River, the latitude of boundary marks 
shall be corrected by means of astronomical observations at distances of not more than 
fifty kilometers apart.  Except where a river forms the boundary, permanent beacons shall 
be erected.” 
Article 4 further requires that both governments, meaning the Union of South 
Africa and the Republic of Portugal, will have joint responsibility for bush and tree 
clearing and maintenance of the beacons.  Article 6 provides for islands that may be 
situated in the river, “. . . where the middle line of the river, that is to say the line lying 
                                                 
168 Hangula, The International Boundary of Namibia.  
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equidistant from both banks, cuts an island situated in the river, such middle line shall 
constitute the boundary between the Territory (SA) and Angola.   
Article 7 assures compensation for either of the parties if one or the other 
determines that deviating from the agreed upon boundary line becomes a practical matter.  
At the time of this agreement, there was a lack of detailed geographic and hydrologic 
information and the water question was not conclusively discussed.169  According to 
Hangula, there were some places where the demarcation works were met with hostility 
from the local native population and missionaries.  They argued that the demarcation 
would result in separation of families and deprive many people of their parishes, fields, 
and grazing areas.  In response, the League of Nations called on Portugal to respect the 
“customary rights” of the people of Owamboland.170
The 20th meridian of east longitude separates Namibia and South Africa, and is 
the Orange River’s the most contested feature. The Orange River, also known as the 
Garib, flows eastward to its mouth on the Atlantic Ocean Coast. It is the only river that 
flows eastward in Southern Africa.  In the 1850’s, British colonists in the Cape Colony 
considered the Orange River to be the northern boundary of the Colony. However, the 
boundary was not legalized until 1854 at the Convention of Bloemfontein.  It was not 
until July 1890 that the Anglo-German global treaty ratified the Orange River boundary 
internationally, using the following terms:   
In South West Africa, the sphere in which the exercise of the influence is reserved 
to Germany is bounded:  1. To the South by a line commencing at the mouth of the 
                                                 
169 Ibid.   
170 From The International Boundary of Namibia by Hangula. Hangula is drawing on Carlos Roma 
Machado’s  Na fronteira Sul de Angola, published in 1941 in Lisboa. Owamboland remained de facto 
independent until 1915 and was symbolized through the non-demarcation of the international boundary 
between Angola and the current Namibia. 
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Orange River, and ascending the north bank intersection by (the) 20th degree of east 
longitude. (Art. III)”171   
Arguably, the dispute (the Rahmansdrift Ferry172 question) of where exactly to 
draw the national colonial territorial boundary -- that is, “along its left bank to where it 
empties itself into the South Atlantic Ocean” or in the middle of the river –  has its 
origins in 1899.  The fixing of the boundary as either the middle of the river or on its 
northern bank is believed to have been a “protracted dispute between Great Britain and 
Germany centered firstly on the question of access to water for German subjects in 
Namaland.  It ended with the request that the medium filum fluminis aquae, i.e. the 
middle of the river, be adopted as the international boundary on the Orange River.”173  
Known once as the Rahmansdrift Ferry question, Hangula asserts the dispute as to where 
to draw the Orange River boundary is one of the “longest boundary disputes in the 
history of colonial diplomacy”.174  On the Namibian side, the Rahmansdrift question not 
only survived the German colonial period, the South African Mandate, and its colonial 
                                                 
171 From Hertslet’s The Map of Africa by Treaty, in Hangula’s The International Boundary of Namibia.   
172 According to the Cape Ministers to Governor of the Cape Colony,  as cited in research by Hangula, the 
Rahmansdrift Ferry Question began in May 1899 when a German “sheep inspector in Namaqualand, A. 
Niederheitmann, applied to the British Colonial Government in the Cape Colony for a ferry and trading 
license at Rahman’s Drift on the Orange River.” When a German subject requested permission from an 
alien (British) Government to build a ferry pontoon on the South West African side of the Garib (Orange) 
River, the boundary question was initiated.  Which colonial government-power has jurisdictional control 
and the authority to make determinations about what types of activities go on in whose territory? The Cape 
Colony government responded by informing the German Governor, that:  “in terms of the delimitation of 
the boundary of the Protectorate, the whole bed of the river belongs to the (Cape) Colony, the German 
boundary being the north bank”.  Over time, what seems to have begun with a simple request was followed 
by a misunderstanding, which then developed into a diplomatic dispute between two colonial powers—
Germany and Great Britain.  Further, the dispute came at a difficult time for both.  The Germans were pre-
occupied with anti-colonial unrest and rebellion (German-Nama War) and the British with the Anglo-Boer 
War.  Each was suspicious of the other, and concerned that the other would support the insurgents in a 
guerilla war. 
173 Hangula, International Boundary, 105. 
174 Hangula, International Boundary. 
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after effects, but has also continued to be an essential fundamental diplomatic and 
political concern since Namibia became independent in 1990.   
In defining its northern border with Angola, and disputing its OR southern border, 
the independent Namibian state has had no direct role.  South Africa has been, and 
continues to be, one of the dominant political actors in the bilateral relations between 
Namibia, and within the Orange River Basin. Upon its independence in March 1990, 
Namibia expected Pretoria (South Africa) would drop its claim of sovereignty over the 
entire Orange River.  In addition, Namibia expected that SA would release the mineral 
rights ceded to mining companies and land rights to communities on the other side of the 
Namibian border.  There was also the question of Walvis Bay.   
Located north of the Orange River, Walvis Bay is the most coveted harbor along 
the Namibian coast.  Due to its protected natural deep water harbor and notable salt pans, 
Walvis Bay has always been considered prized property. The first to take possession of it 
were the Dutch authorities in the Cape in 1793.  When Britain annexed the enclave in 
1884, and formally declared it part of the Cape Colony, Walvis Bay entered British 
hands.  Ironically, when Namibia obtained its independence in 1990, Walvis Bay, 
previously incorporated in the Cape Colony, remained under the government and 
territorial rule of South Africa. As late as 1994, South Africa continued to define and 
claim Walvis Bay as its own territory:  part of neither independent Namibia nor South 
West Africa.  It was not until the February of 1994, and then only after continuous 
negotiations during the early 1990’s, that South Africa relinquished its control over 




In 1994, SA President Nelson Mandela and his cabinet decided to move the 
border to the middle of the river—the thalweg175.  According to an article in The 
Namibian by C. Maletsky, a statement issued by Foreign Affairs, Information and 
Broadcasting Minister Theo Ben Gurirab said he was not aware of any such 
communication from Pretoria.  Gurirab's office later described the sudden change of SA's 
stance as a “memory lapse.”  “It is understandable, in any government business, that from 
time-to-time memory gaps occur that not infrequently encumber record-keeping,” the 
statement said. The government of South Africa, however, could not come to terms in 
full support of President Mandela’s decision during his term in office. 
 To date South Africa still has not agreed to relinquish its position regarding the 
current boundary demarcation, which gives it the territorial advantage. The long-running 
dispute has delayed any alternative final demarcation of the boundary between the two 
countries.  According to a report in The Namibian by Christof Maletsky in November of 
2000, South Africa argued that Namibia should respect the OAU (Organization of 
African Unity) policy of respecting colonial borders regarding the Orange River.  Under 
such circumstances, the Orange River border remains on the northern high-water mark, 
not in the middle of the river.  Maletsky also reported that Dumisani Raheleng, South 
Africa’s Foreign Affairs spokesman, understood that President Mbeki had “personally 
informed President Sam Nujoma that the Orange River border was on the northern high-
water mark, not in the middle”176 as indicated earlier under President Nelson Mandela’s 
Administration.  Rasheleng reportedly said this stance was taken by the SA Cabinet 
                                                 
175 Dr. Ashton defines the thalweg as the center and the deepest part of the river channel. 
176 Maletsky, “South Africa tells Namibia to respect colonial border.” 
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during one of its meetings in July of 2000, and that this position had been communicated 
to Namibia.   
Albert Kawana, Namibia's deputy justice minister, said the two governments 
agreed to a formal treaty stating the border was in the middle of the river in February 
1993.  He said it was decided that the two countries' survey departments should produce 
photomaps and beacons (markers) linked to satellite to identify the middle of the river.177  
Seventy-seven maps were issued, and beacons completed. Not satisfied and still 
attempting to secure its territorial dominance, SA introduced a private property rights 
agreement relating to the border's shift from the northern bank to the middle of the river. 
This covers mineral rights and land rights on the islands of the river.178  
When SA brought up the private property rights agreement, Namibia balked and 
then requested further information.  The prolonged talks have resulted in clashes over 
mineral rights in the river and grazing rights on its islands, and brouhaha for fishing 
vessels. Both governments say that without a clear-cut boundary they cannot prosecute 
fishing vessels for "trespassing" in the river.  The dispute revolves around multiple 
conflicting claims, including that as stated in Article 1:4 of the Namibian Constitution, 
1990179:
The national territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory 
recognized by the international community through the organs of the United 
Nations as Namibia, including the enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as 
well as the off-shore islands of Namibia, and its southern boundary shall extend 
to the middle of the Orange River. 
 
 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid  
179 The text of the constitution is available at http://www.orusovo.com/namcon. 
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In response, however, South Africa continues to adhere to the July 1890 Berlin 
agreement between Great Britain and Germany, which establishes the OR border on the 
northern bank of the river.180  South Africa’s position is that the border is contained in an 
agreement signed in 1890 between Germany and Britain.181  Additionally, South Africa 
endorses the OAU principle of retaining and accepting colonial established borders.  The 
OAU Resolution 16 (1) of July 1964 states that:  “. . . border problems constitute a grave 
and permanent factor of dissention . . . considering further that the borders of African 
States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality . . . solemnly 
declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their 
achievement of national independence.” 
In 2001, the ANC government of South Africa, under President Thabo Mbeki, 
repeatedly argued this principal as a rationale for leaving the Orange River boundary 
where it was established under colonial rule before Namibian independence and that it 
would not be changed.  This would leave the border on the Namibian shoreline. By 
frequently citing the OAU Resolution 16 (1), the South African Government refuses to 
compromise on its national territory and concede to either Namibia’s claims182 or 
international conventions, laws, or agreements that assert the ‘thalweg’ or ‘middle of the 
river’ as the appropriate boundary demarcation for contiguous rivers between riparian 
states.   
To reiterate, the demarcation of the Orange River border between Namibia and 
SA remains a significantly political, economic, and security matter.  If no decision is 
                                                 
180 Meissner, “Water Disputes-Drawing the Line.” 
181 The agreement states:  “In south-west Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to 
Germany is bounded – To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange River and ascending 
to the north bank of that river to the point of its intersection by twentieth degree of east longitude”. 
182 Meissner, “Water Disputes-Drawing the Line.” 
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made, the 200 nautical mile sea boundary can neither be defined, nor adequately secured.  
Even though water access is an important consideration for Namibia, overall the Orange 
River issues are more than questions about access to water, as shown by Namibia and SA 
continuing to have good diplomatic relations surrounding the use of the Okavango Basin.  
Even though there are contentious issues surrounding the Orange River, Namibia 
and South Africa continue to engage in bilateral and in multilateral agreements in the 
Okavango Basin.  Although there are no indicators at the time of this research, there is no 
reason not to consider that a continuous protracted dispute between Namibia and South 
Africa in one basin may not spill over into dispute and conflict in another, specifically the 
Okavango basin.  Such a possibility may emerge if Namibia begins to feel itself unable to 
exercise its sovereign power or is subjected to another severe drought where the matter of 
water once again dominates.   
This situation is fraught with underlying conflict and tension, especially if 
Botswana decides to flex its strategic OSRB political position for a quid pro quo on the 
part of either Namibia or South Africa as a riparian in Okavango River basin hydro-
politics.  As a land-locked country, Botswana requires the cooperation of at least a second 
country for its long-term economic growth, but is able to defend its interests through 
what state it chooses to support.  
Botswana is in a political position to form alliances with one or more basin states 
in order to manipulate the situation to its own advantage.  Botswanan support of 
Namibia’s position could leverage concessions by Namibia not to ever proceed with 
ENWC pipeline to drain water from the Okavango River that passes through Namibia. 
This river also supplies the Okavango Delta in Botswana.  Alternatively, Botswana could 
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support South Africa’s (and the OAU) OSRB boundary position to leverage access to 
water resources from the LHWP, leaving Namibia alone in political battle against 
regional hydro-hegemonic interests.   
For both Namibia and South Africa, the mouth of Orange River offers lucrative 
mineral prospects:  diamond mining, off-shore drilling, fishing grounds, control of water 
resources, farm land, river islands, and the ability to monitor or prosecute fishing vessels 
for trespassing on the river.  Both states are trying to protect their national interests, with 
one trying to protect its territorial integrity and benefits, and the other attempting to gain 
and secure territorial integrity and territorial sovereignty.   
South Africa maintains that it has never denied Namibia access to the river. This 
assertion was repeated multiple times during my interview with Mr. Leo Van Den Berg, 
Senior Specialist Engineer, International Liaison in the South Africa Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), in October of 2000   Still, if the disputes and 
conflict were only about water, potentially the position of South Africa on the matter of 
access could be sustained with bilateral agreements.  After all, it is unclear as to whether 
the government of Namibia has ever formally sought access on the basis of water need. In 
the OSRB Namibia is the downstream riparian.  Downstream states are not exclusively 
helpless, as demonstrated by the cases of Egypt in the Nile River Basin.  An upstream 
state, like South Africa, may rely on water to enhance its power; however such a position 
is not always possible, especially if the downstream state functions as the regional 
hegemonic power.  Although Namibia is not the hydro-hegemon it has the ability to 
manipulate a political position and potential alignment with Botswana to its advantage.       
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These theoretical agreements do not address the questions of Namibia’s sovereign 
claims and expectations of securing what it believes are its territorial rights.   If, however, 
South Africa adopts or accepts the principles established in the Namibian Constitution, it 
could set a precedent for other land claims from other neighboring states, Lesotho for 
example.183 Under the best scenario, one possible outcome is that South Africa and 
Namibia will agree to renegotiate the boundary, consistent with international norms. 
They would then be able to strike a deal over who will retain control over everything 
else, including mineral, gas, and diamond resources.  
Since water is not the principal focus, the question is now this:  how do non-water 
disputes affect efforts to cooperate on water?  In the case of Namibia and South Africa, 
one might conclude that the non-water disputes have not had an obvious or direct impact 
on the ability of both nations to ‘cooperate’ on water issues in either the Orange or 
Okavango River Basins or establish transboundary water cooperation regimes. In some 
respects, I would attribute the ability to transcend the conflict and engage on a 
cooperative level to their shared past, where the water elites, scholars, researchers and 
government bureaucrats in both countries have known one another, worked together on 
these and other water-related issues prior to Namibia’s independence.  In short, they 
know one another and operate at a less contentious political level.  During the apartheid 
period and when Namibia was considered South West Africa (1915 – 1989), South 
African bureaucrats controlled all water management decision-making in what would 
become the Republic of Namibia.   
                                                 




Ironically, in this case, both countries have agreed to agree only on water issues.  
In support of that stance are several basin and regional institutional frameworks that 
reflect each state’s decision to address their respective transboundary water concerns.    
In 2006, South Africa and Namibia “. . . instructed the Permanent Water Commission to 
draft an agreement on the use of water from the Orange River along the common border,” 
expressed the opinion that “users be encouraged to conserve water, and that a new dam 
be considered at Noordoewer-Vioolsdrif to regulate the flow of water.”184   From 
Namibia’s perspective, however, the boundary question remains open and unresolved.   
For Namibia, at higher political levels, the Orange River boundary question and 
water issues must be addressed within the basic politics of statehood and sovereignty.  
Past evidence to support such a position can be found in Namibia’s initial claims of 
sovereign control of Kasikili (Sedudu) island over that of Botswana and a willingness to 
pursue the matter to the ICJ.  Also, its efforts to build the Epupa dam on the Cunene 
River, a border river it shares with Angola, and support for construction of a bridge over 
the Zambezi River, opposed by South Africa, suggest that Namibia views the boundary 
issue as one of sovereignty, not one of water.  Further, the Namibian Constitution is 
explicitly clear in its assertion of the Namibian position, as it acknowledges that the 
southern boundary of Namibia is the middle of the Orange River. 
 
                                                 
184 This is from one of Christof Maletsky’s 2006 articles in The Namibian. Christof Maletsky is the 
Assistant News Editor of The Namibian, Windhoek, Namibia, which covers local politics. He has written 
many articles on the boundary debate between South Africa and Namibia. 
 128 
 
Lesotho and the Orange-Senqu River Basin 
Lesotho’s relationship with the Orange-Senqu River is as much about its 
relationship with South Africa as it is about the Senqu itself.  Lesotho, with a population 
of approximately two million, is a small mountainous country surrounded by South 
Africa.  It provides its much larger neighbor with water to fuel its industrial growth; 
Lesotho’s national economy is buoyed by the US $1.3 billion annual gross domestic 
product from the Lesotho Highlands Water (LHW) Scheme.  This six-dam project 
scheduled for completion in 2015 currently provides hydro-electricity to Lesotho and 
water and hydro-electricity to South Africa.  The LHW Project has become a divisive 
issue in Lesotho, considering that 50 percent of the population lives below the poverty 
line. The $3 million USD a month royalties from the LHW project are not distributed 
amongst the general population.  
In 1966, the British Lesotho protectorate gained its independence. However, the 
political conditions between South Africa and Lesotho were influenced significantly by 
South Africa’s apartheid policy and Lesotho’s willingness to provide sanctuary to 
African National Congress (ANC) members when the party was banned in South Africa.  
As a result, there were no written agreements between South Africa and Lesotho 
regarding a possible hydraulics project.  Periodic talks continued, but were 
undocumented. 
In 1978 the Joint Technical Committee between Lesotho and South Africa was 
created to do a full feasibility study to identify options for providing South Africa with a 
source for bulk quantities of water for extraction or transfer to counter droughts, like 
those experienced in the 1960s, and to assure water security in Gauteng Province 
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specifically. A bilateral multi-billion project financed primarily by the World Bank, the 
LHWP’s main purpose is to supply clean water to Gauteng Province in South Africa, and 
in return generate electricity to meet Lesotho’s needs. In addition to providing a major 
source of electrical power and water supply, the first phase of the LHWP transfers water 
from the upper reaches of the Orange-Senqu River to the Vaal River.  
South Africa is dependent on surface water resources for most of the urban, 
industrial, and irrigation water supplies in the country.  Groundwater, while also 
extensively utilized, particularly in the rural and more arid areas, is limited due to the 
geology of the country.  Large porous aquifers occur only in a few areas.  As in other 
SADC states, South Africa uses water from the Orange River for irrigation, accounting 
for approximately 90% of its use.   
In 1986, with a military coup d’etat in Lesotho, the government185 fell under the 
command of General Major Lekhanya.  That same year, the treaty establishing the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Commission (LHWC) was signed between South Africa and 
the Kingdom of Lesotho for work on the project to begin.186  With water transfer and 
infrastructure cooperation in mind, the 1986 treaty created two authorities: the Trans 
                                                 
185 Since its independence from Britain in 1966, Lesotho has had a volatile unstable, political history.  The 
nation has only held four elections since 1966. The first post-independence election in 1970 was annulled 
by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, which resulted in 16 years of a state of emergency.  The ‘state of 
emergency’ ended in a military coup, followed by rule of decree with an executive monarch.  A brief return 
to democracy in the early 1990s was followed by another military coup in 1994.  Democratic elections in 
1998 lead to an army mutiny, which in turn resulted in the SADF (South African Defense Force) 
intervening to put an end to the unrest.  Several have suggested that South Africa’s military protection of 
the LHWP infrastructure and assets was tantamount to a ‘water war’ of sorts; however, that was not the 
case. In my interview with Dr. Anthony Turton, a well-known South African political scientist-scholar on 
regional hydro-politics, he offered hard evidence and first-hand knowledge suggesting that South Africa’s 
military intervention was requested.   
186 Although it is not known for certain, it has been suggested that the coup may have been a deliberate 
attempt on behalf of South Africa to get rid of the Jonathan government in Lesotho in order to get the 
project going.  This is based on extensive interviews with Bryan Davies, Richard Meissner, Tony Turton, 
and Peter Ashton, which were conducted in Cape Town and Pretoria in South Africa during 2002, 2004, 
and 2005.  
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Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA)187 and the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority 
(LHDA).    
The Treaty is unique in that it allows for the disparity in economic development 
between Lesotho and South Africa and addresses the specific concerns of each partner. 
The Treaty stipulates that “all reasonable measures” should be taken, “to ensure…the 
protection of the existing quality of the environment and, in particular…the welfare of the 
persons and communities immediately affected by the Project”.   The LHWP188 treaty has 
had a significant impact on the hydro-political relations between South Africa and 
Lesotho, resulting in no less than six Protocols added to the treaty in order to resolve 
disputes between the two nations.   To assure the interests of both Lesotho and South 
Africa were adequately represented, the signatories also established the Joint Permanent 
Technical Commission (JPTC) to monitor, advise, and approve activities towards 
implementation of the project.  The JPTC was later renamed the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Commission (LHWC) and its role was also redefined in accordance with Protocol 
VI of the Treaty.  The Commission meets regularly (about once every two weeks).  For 
                                                 
187 TCTA advertises its basic “product” as bulk water (transfer) infrastructure.  According to the terms of 
Government Notice 2631 of December 12, 1986, TCTA was established for “the implementation, operation 
and maintenance of the project works within South Africa” according to the LHWP Treaty. Directed by the 
South African government, TCTA has the responsibility for liability management of the LHWP. With the 
delivery of water beginning in 1998, the implementation function on Phase 1A was fulfilled.  However, 
TCTA continues to perform the operations and maintenance function on the LHWP structures within South 
Africa as prescribed in Protocol VI. 
188 In March 2004, South African President Thabo Mbeki and King Letsie III of Lesotho inaugurated Phase 
1B of the multi-phased Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the world's largest water transfer 
operation, almost six years after construction began in 1998. The four-phased water transfer project 
involves diverting about half the water flowing down the Senqu River (known as the Orange River in South 
Africa) into the Vaal River system to meet the water demands of South Africa's Gauteng Province.  
According to the Lesotho government, by the end of the fourth phase of the proposed scheme in 2015, six 
dams will have been constructed, including a 200 km network of transfer tunnels through the Maluti 
Mountains, delivering 82 cubic metres of water per second. In return, Lesotho receives R200 Million 
(almost US $30 million) from South Africa in annual royalties. The mountain kingdom's recurrent budget is 
about R261 Million (about US $39 Million). As referred to as "white gold" by Thabo Mbeki, water in 
Lesotho is the country's largest single source of foreign exchange.  A March 16, 2004 report on IRIN News, 
“LESOTHO: Phase 1 of Highlands Water Project now fully operational,” goes into this in more detail. 
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both countries there are permanent delegates representing each country, and a large 
technical/profession staff that comprise the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. 
The LHWC189 is responsible for monitoring the activities of both the TCTA and LHDA, 
and to uphold the treaty and subsequent protocol provisions, which relate to the specifics 
of water transfer.  Additionally, the LHWC also monitors TCTA and LHDA influences 
on the hydropower element of the project.  
In 1995, South African water use was about 2,000 million m3 per year for 
irrigation and 125 million m3 per year for urban and industrial purposes.  Even after 
complete implementation of Phase 1 of the LHWP190, irrigation will continue to dominate 
as the foremost water use in South Africa, as well as in the SADC region.  Indeed, it is 
possible that the Lesotho Highlands Water Project has had the most significant impact on 
the dynamics of water politics within the Orange-Senqu River Basin.   
The Mohale and Katse dams, the first phase of the LHWP, were built on the 
Senqunyane river in the Thabaputsoa Mountain range in southern Lesotho at a cost of 
US$4 billion, to supply water to neighboring South Africa's rapidly expanding industrial 
hub in Gauteng Province.  According to Ronnie Mamoepa, South African foreign affairs 
spokesperson, "The LHWP Phase 1 solves Gauteng's water problem for the immediate 
future, rejuvenates the Vaal River, and provides Lesotho with valuable income, job 
opportunities, electricity and infrastructure, on which tourism and industrial development 
can thrive.”191 Provided funds are available and South Africa decides to go forward with 
                                                 
189 The LHWC (Lesotho Highlands Water Commission) is the bilateral commission previously known as 
the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), and was established by the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project Treaty. 
190 In March 2004, Phase I of the Lesotho Water Highland Project was determined fully operational. 
191 IRIN News, “LESOTHO: Phase 1 of Highlands Water Project now fully operational”. 
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the remaining phases of the project, it is expected that all four phases of the LHWP will 
be completed by 2015.   
For twenty years, the LHWP, the accompanying Treaty, it commissions, and its 
technical commissions represented consistent bilateral cooperation over water resources. 
Its protocols are a large part of this carefully negotiated cooperation. Generally, the 
protocols ensure a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits between Lesotho and 
South Africa as they relate to the LHWP.  For example, the signing of Protocol V ended a 
long-standing dispute over taxation matters concerning LHWP activities in Lesotho by 
minimizing any costs that may result from the levying of taxes, on project activities and 
provides a cap on project-related taxes. 
Overall, long-term hydro-political and economic relations between Lesotho and 
South Africa on the LHWP192 are indicators of a high level of collaboration and 
cooperation on the Orange-Senqu River Basin, according to several individuals with 
whom I spoke, connected to the LHWP, SA-DWAF, and the SADC water sector 
coordinator. Such a position is, however, drawing from the shadows of the past, 
asymmetry, and hydro-hegemony, as the LHWP was negotiated during SA’s apartheid 
era, and when the country was under sanctions.   
                                                 
192 According to Dor’s article, “The Privatization of Utilities is an Invitation to Bribery and Graft,” 
published in the July 29, 1999 edition of Business Day (South Africa), the following companies and 
amount of bribes were involved:  ABB (Swedish/Swiss) – Ff 250000 (US$40,410);   Acres International 
(Canadian) – C$279539 (US$185,002);   Impregilo (Italy) – US$250,000;   Spie Batignolles (French) – Ff 
738630 (US$119,393);   Sogreah (French) – Ff 84000 (US$13,578);   Dumez International (French) – Ff 
509905,62 (US$82,422).   Lahmeyer Consulting Engineers (German) – DM 16000 (US$8674);   ED Züblin 
(German) – DM 819862 (US$444,466);   Diwi Consulting (Germany) – DM 4500 (US$2439);   LHPC 
Chantiers (international consortium) – R392967 (US$63,959);   Highlands Water Venture (international 
consortium, including Impregilo, the German firm Hochtief, the French firm Bouygues, the UK firms Keir 
International and Stirling International, and South African firms Concor and Group Five) – $733,404;   
Lesotho Highlands Project Contractors (international consortium which includes Balfour Beatty, Spie 
Batignolles, LTA, Züblin) – DM 105639 (US$57,269).  According to Patrick McCully, author of Silenced 
Rivers (Zed Books, 1996), the companies cited above are the ‘who’s who’ of dam construction companies. 
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 Neither South Africa nor Lesotho, as the British Protectorate territory of 
Basutoland, considered water or water-transfer an international or transboundary water 
resources an issue in the 1950s.  Once independent, however, Lesotho was anxious to 
exploit its abundant water supply. That, combined with South Africa’s growing demand, 
helped both states realize they had the same goal—utilizing the headwaters of the Orange 
River for their own economic wellbeing.  Therefore, even when cooperative relationships 
are defined as exploitative structures that obscure “the exercise of power,”193 cooperation 
may work for those involved in reciprocal relationships.194 Also, this particular reciprocal 
relationship is built on sustainable resource management. The 1999 Orange River 
Development Project Replanning Study suggests “Substantial scope for further 
development of the Orange River will still exist after completion of the Phase 1 of the 
LHWP and full utilization of the current infrastructure.  About 1,735 million m3 per year 
(55m3/s) additional water could be abstracted from the Orange River on an 
environmentally sustainable basis.” 195   
This discussion would be incomplete if there were no brief mention of the LHWP 
corruption cases. These cases illustrate how the LHWP has become a challenge to the 
country’s fledgling democratic institutions and how the LHWP is about so much more 
than water, though it has different meanings for Lesotho versus South Africa. The LHWP 
has been plagued by bribes, corruption, and mismanagement; formal charges have been 
brought against at least ten (possibly as many as 19) of the companies involved in the 
project, and as well as the two consortia from Canada, Europe, and South Africa brought 
                                                 
193 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 192 
194 Axelrod, Evolution. 
195 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), South Africa, “Orange River Development Project 
Replanning Study:  Main Report,” v. 
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in on construction contracts.  According to Patrick McCully, author of Silenced Rivers, 
the companies196 cited are among the Who’s Who of dam construction, and include the 
German firm Hochtief, the French firm Bouygues, the UK firms Keir International and 
Stirling International, South African firms Concor and Group Five, and the Lesotho 
Highlands Project Contractors (international consortium which includes Balfour Beatty, 
Spie Batignolles, LTA, Züblin).   By 2005, five of the corruption trials had been 
completed and several companies fined.  The inconsistencies of management and money 
by the corporate executive, Mr. Sole, came to light when a democratic government came 
to power in Lesotho in 1993, took steps towards good governance, and the Lesotho 
Minister of Natural Resources called for an audit of the LHDA (Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority) affairs. The corruption cases197 offer an interesting perspective 
of IFI involvement and efforts at local influence beyond finances.  During the initial 
investigation, the World Bank attempted to have Mr. Sole‘s suspension lifted.  
 
South Africa and the Orange River 
 
The histories of South Africa and the Orange River are rich and complex, but well 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  This section focuses on the riparian state politics 
from the hydro-political perspective of South Africa.     
                                                 
196 For actual dollar amounts of bribes see Footnote 183. 
197 Extensive reference material is available on the LHWP corruption cases, including Lesotho public court 




South Africa198 is a semi-arid country, with an average rainfall of about 450 mm 
per year, well below the world average of about 860 mm per year.  Eleven of the nineteen 
water management areas in South Africa are facing a water deficit, where the 
requirements for water exceed its availability. Its rivers are small in comparison with 
other countries.  The mean annual runoff (MAR) from the Orange River under natural 
conditions is estimated at 12,000 million m3 per year.  That includes approximately 4,000 
million m3 per year originating from the Senqu River in Lesotho and 1,200 to 1,400 
million m3 from the Caledon and Kraai, respectively, and another 3,900 million m3 per 
year from the Vaal River.  The exception is the Orange River, which carries only about 
10% of the volume of water flowing annually down the Zambezi River, and about 1% of 
the flow in the Congo River. Many of the larger rivers, like the Orange-Senqu and the 
Limpopo, are shared with other countries.  
The Orange River represents the largest fresh water resource in South Africa, 
which, with an average runoff of over 11,000 million m3 under natural conditions, 
contributes more than 20% of the total rivers flow in the country.  From its origins in the 
Lesotho Highlands, the Orange River continues some 2,300km to discharge into the 
Atlantic Ocean at Alexander Bay on the border between Namibia and South Africa.  Its 
major tributaries include the Vaal, the Fish (from Namibia), the Caledon, and the Kraai 
Rivers.   
                                                 
198 While not part of the ORB, South Africa shares both transboundary and boundary-contiguous rivers 
with other neighboring countries, including:  the Limpopo River, shared with Botswana and Zimbabwe 
(contiguous), and Mozambique (transboundary); the Inkomati system, shared with Swaziland and 





As an international river, several international hydro-geological or hydrological 
conventions, legal principals, or international agreements posit that the Orange and its 
waters must be shared by all its basin states.  As a general matter, cooperation in water 
matters concerning southern Africa states and the Orange River takes place within 
multiple frameworks, including but not limited to the 2000 Protocol199 on Shared 
Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community200 (SADC) where 
activities relating to the implementation of the SADC Protocol are coordinated by the 
SADC Water Sector.  Historically, SADC states have a long history of agreements, many 
predating the Protocol and Namibian independence, and others dating back to their 
respective colonial pasts.  However, the OSRB riparian states have made a practice of 
entering into new agreements, like the Protocol.  
For all their importance within South Africa, the proximity of rivers has not been 
a deciding factor in the development of key metropolitan and economic centers.201  Most 
of the main metropolitan and industrial growth centers of South Africa developed not 
around major rivers or where water is found in abundance, but around important mineral 
resource discoveries, such as gold in the Johannesburg area, or along harbor-coastal sites, 
as in the case of major coastal cities of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and East 
                                                 
199 Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Protocol in this paper refer to the Revised Protocol, signed 
in August 2000. The first attempt, however, toward ordering region-wide control over the use of shared 
watercourses in the SADC Region resulted in the 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the 
Southern African Development Community.   The 1995 Protocol was signed by 10 of the eleven members 
of SADC and went into force September 1998.   
200 Created in 1980, the SADC was initially formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states 
(frontline states) in Southern Africa, known as the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). The SADCC was formed in order to coordinate development projects as an effort to 
reduce the economic dependence and interdependence on then apartheid South Africa for the states 
involved in this conference.  Since 1980, and the end of apartheid in South Africa, the organization’s 
objectives have evolved.  They have expanded beyond economic development into maintaining common 
political values, promoting peace and security, sustainable management of shared transboundary water 
resources, and other efforts with a view toward advancing development.   
201 Muller, “Inter-basin water sharing to achieve water security--A South African perspective.” 
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London.  In fact, most of these areas are remote from major rivers.  This is similar to 
urban development in Namibia, Lesotho, and Botswana. 
Pronounced imbalances occur between the availability and utilization of surface 
water in the country, resulting in several river catchments where the utilization of water 
already far exceeds the natural resource potential.  To overcome the gap between water 
availability and water needs, South Africa developed sophisticated, comprehensive, well-
engineered, and numerous inter-basin transfers (IBT) to assure water supply where it is 
needed. Inter-basin transfers of water allows the transfer of water supplies from areas 
where prevailing conditions may appear less critical, to areas which may be under severe 
drought conditions or experience inadequate water supply.  IBTs involve very large-scale 
transfers, e.g. from the Orange-Senqu River in the Lesotho Highlands, to many smaller 
schemes mainly for urban and industrial supply as noted in Table 2 (Major IBTs).  This 
technology and engineering mastery can be traced to South Africa’s early territorial 
beginnings.   
Frequently of significant hydrological environmental and political concern, IBTs 
are supported by national legislation.  However, IBTs have complicated integrated river 
basin management and impacts for downstream riparian states, especially those in the 
Limpopo Basin.202  There are numerous IBTs in the Orange (and Limpopo) River Basin, 
all of which have strategic and hydrologic importance to South Africa.  These IBTs to 
and from the Orange/Vaal River system impact the adjoining river basins and 
neighboring states, and are part of the political background surrounding this discussion of 
                                                 
202 Turton, “Hydropolitics and Security Complex Theory--an African Perspective.” 
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the OSRB.  As early as 1976, Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorseter underlined the 
political and material importance of dams. He wrote that: 
There can be no turning back from the husbanding of precious water resources to 
ensure that enough will be available and to maintain its quality.  This will require 
the building of more dams and I am sure that men of vision and initiative will be 
found to do this in such a way that optimum benefits will be obtained.203
Because of its size, strategic central location, and because it sustains about half 
the economic production and population of the country, from a national hydro-economic 
perspective the Orange/Vaal River system is the most important freshwater river resource 
in South Africa.  Several major and strategic industries, numerous large mines, and most 
of the country’s power stations (about 80%) are supplied with water from the Vaal River 
system, the main tributary of the Orange River within South Africa.  Also, several of 
South Africa’s most ambitious water projects undertaken are (or were) situated in the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin, including the Orange River Development Project (ORDP), 
the Vaal River development, and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).  First 
proposed in 1962, the ORDP’s purpose was to irrigate thousands of acres (hectares) of 
land in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, and Free State.  The other main objective of the 
                                                 
203 This statement is from Balthazar Johannes Vorster, South Africa’s prime minister from 1966-1978, and 
















Vaal—Crocodile Orange Limpopo 615 Industrial, domestic 
Vaal—Olifants Orange Limpopo 150 Industrial (ESKOM) **
Assegaai—Vaal Maputo Orange 81 Industrial, domestic 
Buffalo—Vaal Thukela Orange 50 Industrial, domestic 
Thukela—Vaal Non-international Basin Orange 630 
Industrial, 
domestic 
Orange—Buffels Orange Orange 10 Industrial, domestic 
Orange—Lower 
Vaal Orange Orange 52 
Irrigation, 
domestic 
Orange Riet Orange Orange 189 Irrigation 








Modder Orange Orange 40 
Industrial, 
domestic 
LHWP (1A) Orange Orange 574 Industrial, domestic 
LHWP (1B) Orange Orange 297 Industrial, domestic 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Basson, van Niekerk,and van Rooyen (1997:54) and Bryan Davies and ** ESKOM 
(Electricity Supply Commission (Republic of South Africa industry). 
 
ORDP is the generation and transmission of hydro-electric power.  Eskom204 operates 
hydro-electric power-stations at both the Gariep and the Vanderkloof Dams, the largest 
storage dams in South Africa.  The hydro-electric power station at the Vanderkloof Dam 
was the first power-generation station in South Africa situated entirely underground.  
                                                 
204 Eskom is an operation that generates and distributes electricity. It provides 95% of the electricity used 
in South Africa.  Although its headquarters are located in Johannesburg, South Africa, Eskom Enterprises 




These dams are also connected by the Orange- Fish Tunnel. The tunnel’s purpose is to 
transfer water from the Gariep Dam to the Easter Cape.        
Preceded by the development of the ORDP by several decades, the Vaal River 
development can be attributed in part to the discovery of gold and the consequent 
economic growth in that region.  Today, continued population growth, along with 
improved standards of living in the Vaal River supply area have placed demands for 
water in this part of the Orange-Senqu River Basin far in excess of the supply capability 
of local sources.  As a result, water is transferred to the Vaal Basin from various parts of 
the country where water resources are more plentiful and ‘surplus’ water is available.   
Requirements for water from the Vaal River, the main water source for the central 
industrial and mining regions of South Africa are augmented from several adjoining river 
basins, including the Usutu, Assegaai, Tugela, Crocodile/Limpopo, and Olifants Rivers.  
Since IBTs to and from the Orange/Vaal River system impact the adjoining river basins 
in neighboring states, not part of the Orange-Senqu River Basin, the ORB cannot be 
viewed in isolation.  Interbasin transfers (IBTs) of water allow the transfer of water 
supplies to areas which may be under severe drought conditions, from areas where the 
prevailing conditions may appear less critical.  As previously stated, IBTs involve very 
large-scale transfers, e.g. from the Orange-Senqu River in the Lesotho Highlands, to 
many smaller schemes, mainly for urban and industrial supply.  The import of water from 
other basins to the Vaal River System, the consumptive water use, effluent returns to the 
Vaal River, the export of water from the Vaal System and other related factors directly 
influence the water required for transfer from the Orange to the Vaal River.  That in turn 
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directly affects the quantity, quality, and temporal distribution of flows discharged by the 
Vaal River into the Orange River.   
South Africa asserts that this approach may provide some chance to buffer the 
country against disaster, though the possibility of such a disaster is remote and this tactic 
is an unsustainable practice.  The DWAF (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry) 
senior specialist engineer, with whom I spoke,  suggested that “. . . interbasin transfers 
has the inherent benefit of linking the resources of the country together over a large 
geographic area and affords the opportunity of operating the water resources in a 
synergistic systems context.”205  The high level of dependency by South Africa on IBTs 
for economic security and water supply is supported further in the National Water Act of 
1998, which regards water as a national asset to be moved internally throughout the 
country as needed.206 In my initial interview with Mr. Tekateka207, a black South African 
delegate to the ORASECOM, he appeared to be arguing against the provision in the SA 
1998 National Water Act that requires downstream consideration of upstream actions.  
Instead, he stressed the fundamental principle of the SADC Protocol, which directs the 
utilization of transboundary watercourse resources without prejudice to sovereign rights, 
i.e.  
International water resources, specifically shared river systems, shall be 
managed in a manner that optimizes the benefits for all parties in a spirit of 
                                                 
205 Interview with Mr. Leo Van Den Berg, Senior Specialist Engineer, International Liaison , South Africa 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), 2002.  A similar sentiment was recorded in the main 
report of the 1999 Orange River Development Project Replanning Study. 
206 Turton, Interview.  
207 Mr. Reginald Tekateka has had several high-ranking positions in the water sector.  When I first met him 
in 2000, he was Chief Delegate, Lesotho Highlands Water Commission for the Republic of South Africa 
(RSA). In 2003, he was the Chairperson, Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) and Chief 
Delegate Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF).  More recently, in 2007, he was again 
representing RSA. Mr. Tekateka is Chair of the Global Water Partnership of Southern Africa.   
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mutual cooperation. Allocations agreed for downstream countries shall be 
respected.   
This SADC principle contradicts the exclusivity of state sovereignty in regards to 
water resources.  However, at the time of this research, there were no clear examples of 
any specific instance where South Africa decided to suspend its water needs or strategic 
riparian advantage over the needs of a downstream riparian.   South African water law 
regards all water in the country as a national asset to be utilized equitably by all, a 
position shared by other sovereign nations with regard to their respective water resources. 
This governmental beneficence has not traditionally extended across national boundaries. 
  South Africa has a long political history tied to its colonial, national, apartheid 
and post-apartheid independent state, the transboundary politics in the region, and past 
water practices.  This history intimately involves the Orange River. As a result, there 
continue to be several long standing existing disputes in need of resolution, as well as 
emerging conversations regarding the transboundary waters of the Orange-Senqu River 
Basin.  Given the water-stressed situation facing South Africa, the increasing demand for 
hydroelectric energy, and the elevating demands, it is no wonder that the utilization of 
this shared resource is growing into a politically contentious issue. South Africa’s 
neighboring states continue to aggressively exercise their sovereignty; it is likely the 
existing conflicts will continue well into the future.  South Africa has not moved far 
enough into the future208 for the problems of the past to have receded.   
                                                 








This section explores briefly the two cooperation regimes, the Orange-Senqu 
River Commission known as ORASECOM, the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses, 
and names and types of international donor involvement.  The discussion begins at the 
basin level, follows with a brief overview of origins and purpose of the Southern African 
Development Community as an organization, and briefly describes the evolution of the 
Protocol.  It concludes by highlighting international donor contributions and the purposes 
of their funding support.  This research considered only multilateral agreements, which 
includes the Protocol, and the Orange-Senqu Basin Commission (ORASECOM), a 
discussion of which follows, and the Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), 
which is discussed in the following chapter. 
Over the past two decades, the involvement of international financial institutions 
(IFIs) in water affairs of the SADC region has been significant for both infrastructure 
projects, like the LHWP, and non-infrastructure activities like institutional development, 
capacity building, research, and monitoring networks.  The World Bank had a central role 
in supporting the LHWP and exercised a key role in organizing its financing.  More 
recently, IFIs and donor agencies have also become cooperating partners to building 
institutions and capacity for water resource management, river basin organizations, and 
regional- and basin- level cooperation regimes.  They have also partnered with 
governments working to improve transboundary watercourse transactions.  As noted 
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previously and in Table 3, the OSRB riparian states have been engaged in multiple 
bilateral agreements, but are signatories to only two multilateral ones.  Only one of these 
multilateral agreements specifically concerns the Orange-Senqu River.   
There are different actors and stakeholders engaged in this discussion at various 
basin, regional, and international levels.  There are multiple regulatory arrangements for 
transboundary river basin management and cooperation.  These arrangements include 
international agreements and conventions, as well as regional- and basin-specific 
agreements.  There are also national water laws, policy, and legislation, but these fall 
outside the scope of this investigation.  Table 3 lists the more significant ORSB basin-
specific agreements, commissions, committees, and notes key management studies; 
however it is not intended to be all inclusive.  Nonetheless, it illustrates the timing of the 
1995 Protocol, ORASECOM, and 2000 Protocol, as well as various updates to the LHWP 
Treaty.209  
There are complex technical, hydrological, and political issues and in the question 
of capacity. These have to do with the equitable sharing of the resources of the Orange-
Senqu River and need to be addressed jointly by its co-basin riparian states, ideally 
within the context one of the existing multilateral cooperation frameworks.   As I learned 
during my interview with Dr. Turton, ORASECOM is the first multilateral river basin 
organization post-SADC Protocol and “considered exemplary of successful river basin 
cooperation.”  Nonetheless, the continued presence of many bilateral cooperation 
                                                 
209 According to Turton, the LHWP Treaty is one of the most comprehensive and detailed water-related, in 
that it contains very clear rules of a binding nature regarding the obligations and tasks of each party, is 
modified when necessary to layout specifics on cost allocation, financing, insurance, start dates of fixed 
royalty payments. In other cases, a new treaty protocol will contain language on the way the project is 
managed or reflect changes in the project’s governance system.    
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frameworks are likely to complicate matters, as most not only predate ORASECOM, but 
organize specific project activity, like Protocol VI to the LHWP Treaty or the Vioolsdrift 
and Noordoewer joint irrigation scheme. They intersect with the issues involved in a 
basin-wide water management project, but are not specifically involved in regulating 
those issues.  To date, it is not clear how or if OSRB states will reconcile the differences 
in objectives, goals, and priorities in their use of river resources, or how they would 
resolve conflicts between project-specific agreements.  
One could argue that the preponderance of multiple agreements, joint riparian 
commissions, joint technical committees, and cooperative relationships et cetera, are 
evidence of mechanisms to manage disputes, demonstrate high levels of cooperation, or 
not, and hydro-politics at best.  On the other hand, cooperative relationships are also 
defined as exploitative structures that obscure the exercise of power.210
 Another emerging concern is recent rise in the number of the international actors 
contending for both RBO and individual riparian attention.  These actors, with their 
insertion of resources not generally available locally (or regionally) are furthering not 
only power asymmetry, but defining cooperation priorities. International financial 
institutions providing foreign aid, determines how the resources can be used, and have a 
particular level of influence in the development of transboundary water cooperation 
regimes, particularly in the capacity of certain riparians to sustain the cooperation 
regimes by reinforcing hydro-hegemonic position of a particular riparian. 
 
                                                 




The Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) 
According to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF),211 several of the riparians’ 
water resources in the southern African region, and in the Orange-Senqu River Basin are 
under high levels of stress. Increasingly, water scarcity is limiting these states’ the ability 
to meet future demands.  Further, because as the Orange-Senqu River Basin is an 
important international transboundary watershed under serious threat on many levels, 
many of these concerns cannot be addressed by either a single country or bilateral 
agreements.  In recognition of the transboundary nature of these concerns as well as the 
SADC Protocol, the co-riparians of the Orange-Senqu River Basin agreed to establish a 
multilateral river basin organization.  
The Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) was established in 
November 2000, between Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa as the first 
multilateral river basin organization (RBO) established under the Revised 2000 Protocol 
for Shared Watercourse Systems of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC).  ORASECOM was to create a framework for multilateral riparian cooperation 
to investigate and make decisions about the future actions on dealing with the water 
management, water politics, and resource potential of the Orange-Senqu River Basin. 
Its overall purpose is to strengthen regional cooperation of Orange-Senqu River 
basin riparians and facilitate economic development.  The ORASECOM Agreement 
recognizes and refers to the Helsinki Rules, the 1997 UN Convention, and the SADC 
2000 Protocol.  It neither overrides or replaces previously negotiated or established 
bilateral agreements nor prohibits future bilateral agreements.  However, in regard to the 
                                                 
211 Global Environment Facility (GEF), “Development and Implementation of the Strategic Action Program 
for the Orange Senqu River Basin,” 9. 
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latter, post-ORASECOM bilateral agreements must meet its terms and comply with those 
of ORASECOM.  Key objectives include the: 
• Exchange of information and data 
• Consultation on basin projects and advice to riparian national governments 
• Development of a water resource master plan for the entire basin 
• Improving public stakeholder participation, bottom-up, in river basin 
organization networks  
• Implementation of cooperation projects funded by donor organizations, 
{which include (Global Environmental Facility (GEF), European Union 
(EU), GTZ (A German based international cooperation that funds 
sustainable development), and African Development Bank (AfDB). 
In instances where national interest disputes occur, matters revert to political 
levels for negotiation.  ORASECOM provides a useful and important forum to discuss 
water matters of mutual interest at the technical level. Technical solutions are usually 
based on factual data, of which there is a great deal on the Orange River, its 
infrastructure, and bilateral agreements.  Additionally, the commission may initiate and 
execute studies to obtain facts and recommend technical solutions.  There is a large 
quantity of available factual data, generated mostly by South Africa, which may be 
attributed to its history with the Orange and Vaal Rivers and its overall greater 
development in comparison to other SADC states.  Technical disputes may be referred to 
the SADC Tribunal for resolution, but political disagreements and conflicts of national 
interest do not fall under the purview of ORASECOM.  As this evidence suggests, the 
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Tribunal212 is seen as weak and incapable of resolving political or national interest 
conflicts.   
ORASECOM has met regularly since 2001, and has served as a technical advisor 
to the Orange River basin riparians on enhancing institutional and human capacity, and 
matters of planning, development, utilization, and conservation of the OSRB. Up to early 
2005, the organizational structure of the commission was limited to a council, with 
delegations from each country and three permanent members.  They met twice a year, for 
three days, and made decisions through consensus.   
Up to now, there have been limited results achieved by the commission, in part 
because ORASECOM is, according to Turton, “probably the most complex river basin 
organization in Southern Africa, because it involves so many riparians” (although not as 
many as the Nile or Zambezi) “and existing, often highly elaborate bilateral schemes, 
without necessarily having jurisdiction over these schemes.” 213  IFI donor involvement 
for ORASECOM may help to remedy some of that complexity by strengthening its 
capacity as an organization, enabling it to compile a current library of existing bilateral 
agreements, creating a basin-wide mega-database with all information, and by helping 
ORASECOM attract the appropriate staff.  However, this donor involvement may also 
have negative effects as well; donors and NGOs frequently have their own agendas, 
which may serve to reinforce the hegemonic status quo within a particular region.   
The complexity of ORASECOM as a river-basin organization, its many bilateral 
agreements, and ‘youth’ created many challenges. Its slow start may have been 
                                                 
212 Although established in 1992 by Article 9 of the SADC Treaty as one of the institutions of SADC, the 
inauguration and swearing in of its members did not occur until November 2005 in Windhoek, Namibia.  
213 Turton, “The Political Aspects of Institutional Development in the Water Sector:  South Africa and Its 
International River Basins” 
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challenged further by the protracted restructuring of the region’s water sectors at SADC.  
Despite its efforts to embrace an integrated comprehensive approach to the Orange-Senqu 
River Basin, integration of the water sector with other sectors remains low and slow.214  
Consistent with that observation and the hierarchy of barriers to cooperation 
pyramid in Figure 2, sovereignty, hydro-hegemony, and asymmetry are fundamental 
challenges that must be addressed before meaningful cooperation is able to occur.  Each 
is attached to a specific cooperative barrier, all found at the base of the pyramid, which 
means they pose the greatest challenges to a quality cooperative regime.  For example, in 
the instance of hydro-hegemony, it is the hydro-hegemon that determines the nature of 
transboundary relationships, but it may be sovereignty that influences the actions of a 
particular basin riparian.  Integrated comprehensive basin management of water resources 
is an ongoing process that requires time, especially with one as complex as the OSRB.  It 
may be too early to consider ORASECOM either a success or failure.   
At this time, ORASECOM does receive considerable IFI donor support and is 
charged with the overall management of the ORSB basin.  Still, ORASECOM faces 
several challenges, none of which will be easily overcome by such an inexperienced 
institution, especially given the history of the region.  Like other cooperation regimes, 
especially in southern Africa, ORASECOM would benefit from the strengthening of river 
basin organizations generally; nonetheless, its foremost challenges remain:     
■ Inability to resolve sovereignty versus regional issues No matter what transpires 
in the OSRB, Namibia will continue to focus on resolving the Namibia-South 
                                                 





Africa boundary dispute (a shadows of the past obstacle) and asserting its 
sovereign right to draw water from the Okavango River (a territorial integrity 
obstacle); 
■ Maintaining substantive political will and involvement by riparians and by 
SADC water sector Riparian position being what it is, the pyramid correlates are: 
cost of cooperation, agreement process, and conflicting national/international 
interests (where the latter may be subject to IFI donor influences); 
■ Capacity constraints to develop basin strategies, harmonize projects, monitor, or 
share and evaluate technical information (the shadows of the past and asymmetry 
are the dominant obstacles influencing these constraints); 
■ Resource capture, mobilization, and management (the corresponding pyramid 
obstacles are conflicting national/international interests for OSRB riparian states, 
riparian position, and technical uncertainties);  
■ Various disparities among member states, such as economic development 
capacity, despite the fact that Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa are the most 
economically developed in the region and OSRB basin (here, asymmetry is the 
obstacle, as there are significant differences that exist and will persist. Namibia, 
for example, is a large country with a small population and less economic 
diversity than South Africa. Lesotho is both a small country with a small, mostly 
rural, population that boasts water as its principal source of wealth, among 
riparians with very little water); and  
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■ Development of strong stakeholder and public participation around the issues 
and at the catchment level (this becomes an obstacle because the majority of the 
population is dispersed and resides in rural communities.). 
 
Because existing agreements in the ORB merely liaise with it and ORB riparians 
retain the sovereign right to establish bilateral agreements with one another within the 
ORB, ORASECOM does not threaten the dominant status of South Africa with regard to 
the hydro-political configurations in the basin.215  ORASECOM makes no demands on 
South Africa to significantly alter its political behavior or hydro-politics.  South Africa 
remains the hydro-hegemon, does not have to concede to Namibia’s challenge over the 
existing Orange River boundary demarcation, and need not alter its sovereign position.  
 
International Agreements and Conventions 
 The SADC Protocol is the dominant regional treaty for shared transboundary 
watercourses in the southern Africa region.  There are, however, international agreements 
that influence regional agreements, cooperative efforts, and have been used to advance an 
individual state’s interests.  Additionally, at the state or basin level there are several 
cooperation-based treaties, accords (agreements), conventions, national laws, and policies 
that focus on transboundary water resources or ecosystems.  The 1977 Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance is one example of such an 
international treaty.  As observed in Table 3 (Chapter 3) on the local level, agreements 
are both bilateral and multilateral.  A centralizing theme of these treaties and conventions 
                                                 
215 Turton, “Hydro-Hegemony in the Context of the Orange River Basin.” 
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is that states are entitled to utilize and manage resources within areas of their respective 
jurisdictions.  Many conventions and international agreements are not binding; instead 
their enforcement may depend upon either a real commitment on part of an individual 
signatory or the presence of an influential hydro-hegemon able to corral basin riparians 
through the exercise of soft power.  LeMarquand might view the commitment on the part 
of SADC states to international agreements as consistent with his concept of image. 
 Examples of four international agreements-conventions important to management 
and sharing of transboundary water resources are noted in the table below.  With one 
exception, the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance,216 
Angola is a signatory to each of the others.  Generally, the principles espoused in the 
international conventions attempt to delineate the rights of riparian states to access and 
use the water resources of transboundary water resources.  Fundamentally, these 
international transboundary water conventions attempt to balance riparian use with 
 
Table 4.  Select International Agreements-Conventions Important to the Management and 
Sharing of Transboundary Water Resources to which OSRB riparians are signatories 
 
International Convention/ 
Treaties and Dates   Requires   Riparian States 
 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance 
(Ramsar Treaty), 1971 
(Framework for national action and 
international cooperation for the 
conservation and wise use of 
wetlands and their respective 
resources.) 
Requires:  (a) formulate plans that 
promote conservation of wetlands in 
their territory, (b) consult with other 
contracting parties regarding the 








United Nations Convention on the 
 
Equitable, reasonable utilization 
Angola 
Botswana 
                                                 
216 Specifically, this refers to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat (amended in 1982 and 1987). From this point on, I will refer to this convention as either 




Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, 
1997 
 
(This Convention is considered to be 
a ‘framework convention’, which is 
somehow different as applied than 
others, in that it needs further 
elaboration and specifications.)   
(Article 5) and the No-harm Principle 
(Article7) are the cornerstones of the 
Convention, with cooperation as the 
essential feature (Article 8). The 
Convention does not prevent states 
from departing form its general 
principles nor affect existing 





(All voted in favor of the Convention) 
 
Convention on the protection and 
use of trans-boundary 
watercourses and international 
lakes (Helsinki Convention), 1995 
 
 
Signatories take measures to prevent, 
control and reduce any trans-
boundary impact by ensuring (a) 
trans-boundary waters are managed 
in a rational, environment-friendly 
manner; (b) trans-boundary waters 
are used in a reasonable and equitable 
way; and (c) conservation and 
restoration of ecosystems. 
 
(Rules are nonbinding, but 
conceptual rules framework were 
incorporated into the Revised SADC 
Protocol 2000)* 
 
*The 2000 Protocol is preceded by 
the 1995 Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
Region. 
 
United Nations Conventions to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), 
1996 
 
(Concerns problems associated with 
widespread degradation of land in 
arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid 
areas.) 
Requires actors  to:  (a) promote 
cooperation among affected parties in 
the fields of environmental protection 
and conservation of land and water 
resources, related to drought and 
desertification; (b) undertake sub-
regional, regional, and international 
co-operation; and (c) cooperate in the 









    
 
the doctrines of absolute territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity, limited territorial 
sovereignty and integrity, and sustainable management. 
 As noted, these regional- and basin- specific agreements have not adequately dealt 
with transboundary water-sharing political concerns. These concerns are: 
• How to define and manage water apportionment among basin states considered 
by all riparians as equitable and “fair”, however defined; 
• Riparian differences of water use priorities; 
• Compensation by one riparian for damage caused by another; 
• Variance in riparian water scarcities;  
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• Prior appropriation or existing historic vested or ancient rights claimed by 
hydraulic civilizations, where new water demands conflict with natural or 
historic water needs and interests.  
 
 
Regional Framework for Transboundary Watercourses—SADC Protocol on Shared 
Watercourse Systems (herein referred to as the Protocol) 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiated the SADC 
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems and its subsequent iterations.  One of the key 
objectives of the SADC Protocol is to harmonize transboundary water policies within 
transboundary river basins and seek basin management of resources.  When established, 
SADC choose transboundary watercourses as its first policy focus.  This is an issue of 
pragmatics; many SADC countries are approaching situations of water stress (less than 
1700 m3 per capita per year) or absolute water scarcity (less than 1000 m3 per capita per 
year).217 The Protocol is unique in that its intent is to create a regional management 
framework and regulatory structure for the use of fifteen transboundary (international) 
watercourses in the fourteen SADC countries.  In its own words, “the SADC Water 
Division has been tasked with creating the enabling environment for the integrated 
management of shared watercourses on a regional rather than national level.  The two 
pillars supporting this integrated approach are the Protocol on Shared Watercourses and 
the Regional Strategic Action Plan (RSAP).”218
                                                 
217 Works discussing this further include Falkenmark and and Lundqvist’s “Looming Water Crisis: New 
Approaches Are Inevitable,” and Gleick’s “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International 
Security.”




 SADC, through its African Transboundary River Basin Support Programme, 
receives international donor funding for various activities concerned with transboundary 
water cooperation, which specifically include technical assistance to ORASECOM.  
Thus, SADC serves as a funding pass through for its member’s activities.  For example, 
GTZ funds an appointed SADC task force that has as one of its goals the harmonization 
of water policies.   
 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs)  
In the case of the Orange-Senqu River basin, many of the international financial 
institutions and donors have funded projects that support transboundary watercourse 
cooperation, specifically that of ORASECOM.  This findings’ origins are unclear; did a 
donor indicate interest? Did ORASECOM issue a request? Does this represent a shift in 
the politics by the global donor community to prioritize water management? Or does this 
represent the powerful voices of a few who used the dominant and persuasive power of 
South Africa as a hegemon in the basin and as a stabilizing force in the region?  
Arguably, as evidenced by ORASECOM and SADC IFI involvement, there are several 
willing donors contributing funds to these efforts. 
Key IFI donors include the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the European 
Union (EU), GTZ (a German-based international cooperation that funds sustainable 
development), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the European Development Fund (EDF), and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP).  
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As noted below, there are many IFI donors engaged at various levels of network 
building, capacity development, expanding research and technological gaps, and 
promoting, by their involvement, governmental transparency.  However, it is not clear if 
these lending practices are extending the scope of trust in a participatory direction by 
broadening the democratization process through opening networks of information and 
increasing general involvement in OSRB hydro-politics.  In pre-independent Namibia 
and apartheid-South Africa, the exclusivistic government and associated NGO networks 
supported the water needs of urban-industrial white populations and secondary cities or 
the white farmer-agricultural community.  The LHWP offers an excellent example of 
how South Africa was able to obtain IFI financing and donor (World Bank) support to 
further its interests.  In these post-apartheid, independent Namibian times, it is not clear if 
efforts by current IFI donor networks are doing more than continuing to support 
privileged stakeholders and, to a lesser extent, governmental bureaucrats through 
maintaining the status quo.  However, its lending practices could potentially lead to 
increased governmental transparency, build institutions, and develop research institutions 
able to lessen asymmetries associated with power and technical disparities.  Toward that 
end, it is useful to know who the IFI donors are and their particular interests in the region.  
There was no attempt to identify and catalog all IFI donors active in the OSRB, only the 
key ones. 
 Each IFI donor is explained briefly along with their transboundary water 
cooperation funding effort for either the individual riparian or in ORASECOM.  The 
World Bank and its agents (GEF, IDA, etc.) could promote transboundary watercourse 
cooperation by creating incentives for developing consensus on the acceptable behavior 
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of riparian states within the basin by providing funding for researching technical 
information.  More often, however, these organizations fund water supply and 
development infrastructure within each independent state, as opposed to treating the 
region as a whole.   
Selected Donor Portfolio Profiles 
 The list of donors and the funding purposes are not all inclusive.  In fact, only 
significant donor institutions are discussed and without reference to actual dollar 
amounts, as in many instances it was unavailable.  
1.  GEF is funding ORASECOM for a project to improve management of the 
Orange-Senqu River Transboundary Basin through the implementation of a sustainable 
program of policy, legal and institutional reforms and investment options using the 
technical assistance or science and technical analysis.  As an international donor effort, 
GEF does not address issues of sovereignty, or other factors identified in the base of the 
cooperation pyramid as obstacles to full quality cooperation.  A financial entity working 
under the auspices of the World Bank, the GEF finances projects to addressing six critical 
threats to the global environment: loss of biodiversity; climate change; degradation of 
international waters; ozone depletion; land degradation; persistent organic pollutants.  
The Global Environment Facility is one of three implementing agencies of the World 
Bank.  It serves as the financial mechanism for the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). GEF financing is provided to eligible countries 
through the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations 
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Environmental Program (UNEP), and four regional development banks, which includes 
the AfDB. 
 2.  The German Technical Cooperation or GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit) is a German-based international cooperation, owned by the 
German Federal Government, which funds sustainable development.  It promotes 
transnational and regional cooperation efforts in a number of locations throughout the 
world.  GTZ emphasizes good governance, a concern for the environment, and social 
development.   
Currently, GTZ funds advisory services at the national level specifically for the 
Orange-Senqu River Commission through an appointed SADC task force, which has as 
one of its goals the harmonization of water policies.  This task force gives the member 
states advice on adapting their policies and legislation to the principles of the SADC 
protocol.  GTZ provides financial support to train the ORASECOM secretariats in the 
development of their legal, institutional and organizational structures.  GTZ is also 
training experts from the water management authorities of Angola and Namibia with the 
aim of preparing their respective staffs for implementing a joint drinking water project in 
both countries in the Cunene region.   
3.  European Development Fund (EDF) was created by the Treaty of Rome in 
1957.  It is the primary financial instrument providing community aid for development 
cooperation within the countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and Asian Pacific.  Funded by 
the European Union’s member states, the EDF finances any projects or programs which 
contribute to the economic, social or cultural development of the countries in question. It 
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consists of several instruments, including grants, risk capital and loans to the private 
sector.  Through SADC, EDF is funding: 
. . . institutional strengthening for the management of the Orange-Senqu River 
Basin and for the development and implementation of basin-wide water 
conservation, management and environmental protection policies and strategies. 
More specifically, the project will focus on the following result areas: 
Institutional and Organisational Strengthening (ORASECOM); Capacity Building 
on Shared Water Course Management; Development of a Shared Information 
System for the Purpose of Obtaining a Common Understanding for Decision 
Making; Enhancing ORASECOM Communication and Awareness Building; 
Development of the River Basin Master Plan (including studies of transboundary 
interest); Promotion of Water Conservation and Environmental Strategies and 
Policies.219
  4. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is a regional multilateral 
development finance institution established in 1964.  Its shareholders include 53 African 
countries and 24 non-African countries from the Americas, Asia, and Europe.  The AfDB 
works in close cooperation with other international financial institutions (IFIs), including 
those of the World Bank Group, and provides complementary funding for joint projects 
and initiatives. 
5.  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is funding a multi-
phased Strategic Action Program (SAP) for the Orange-Senqu River Basin to improve the 
management of the Orange-Senqu River Basin’s transboundary water resources through 
                                                 




Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approaches that remediate threats and 
root causes.  The objectives of the project are to identify the principal threats to the 
transboundary water resources of the Orange-Senqu River Basin and to implement 
through a structured process, a sustainable and cost-effective program of policy, legal and 
institutional reforms and investments to address them.  According to the UNDP, there is 
no strategic action program or transboundary diagnostic plan for the OSRB, both of 
which this funding-supported exercise is designed to remedy.   
Once the SAP is developed, the UNDP expects its implementation will be funded 
by non –GEF resources.  Although it is not clear where funding resources will be 
secured, this effort is one of the more significant, as each of the OSRB riparian 
governments and ORASECOM are partners, along with GEF, community-based 
organizations, and, of course, the UNDP.   
6.  The African Centre for Water Research (ACWR) is an independent 
research and capacity building organization based in Cape Town, South Africa that works 
in partnership with regional and international organizations to promote integrated 
management and sustainable development of water resources in southern Africa.  Invited 
by ORASECOM and funded by TRANSNET-Program of InWent (Capacity Building 
International) of Germany, ACWR developed the ORASECOM “roadmap for 
stakeholder participation”.  Led by ACWR, this effort involved collaboration between the 





Shadows of the Past 
While history often shapes national identity, a particular type of historical past 
does not always guarantee a particular type of future. That is, having been a colonized 
state does not mean that state is doomed to constantly carrying that historical burden. 
While cooperative relationships may be the venue for consensus and contest, they may 
also be the setting where the shadows of the past offer clues to future possibilities.  When 
it benefits a particular actor in a particular manner, as in the case of South Africa in the 
Orange-Senqu River Basin, or in the case of Egypt with regard to the Nile, there is a 
tendency to defend and preserve the certainties of the past as a failsafe guide for future 
and strategic advantage. Alternatively, co-riparians may decide to renegotiate colonial 
water treaties220, as in the case of the Nile River Basin.  Several Nile Basin riparians have 
decided to ‘dump’ the colonial water agreements and pacts, and subsequently sign a 
newly negotiated agreement for Nile water utilization.   
The legacy of colonialism is not compulsion, despite fears to the contrary.  In the 
OSRB, three of its riparians, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana, are approaching 
water crisis or scarcity:  Both in terms of supply future water needs and because of the 
water-energy production linkages.  South Africa’s history and continued role as a 
political and hydro-hegemon in the OSRB has burdened it with the leadership role of 
facilitating water cooperation as a SADC member, signatory to several multi- and 
bilateral agreements, including ORASECOM, providing data and research, and appearing 
to be compliant by not acting in a coercive manner 
                                                 
220 In the case of Europe, instead of ‘colonial’ established water agreements, a comparable reference would 
be “agreements established under the rule of the former USSR.” 
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Provided negotiations go forward, the new agreement will, by design, terminate 
the two agreements signed during the colonial era:  the 1929 Nile Water Agreement and 
the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile that had given Egypt and Sudan 
extensive rights over the river's use.  The latter also gave Egypt a de facto right to veto 
any project using Nile water in other riparian states, despite the fact that it portioned out 
all of the Nile's water.221  In the case of the Nile River Basin, an independent Tanzania 
stated that it did not and would not recognize colonial signed treaties.  In this case, the 
‘shadow of the past’ contributes to the establishment of a new agreement regime among 
Nile Basin riparians and has not been separated from the hierarchy of cooperation.222 
Namibia has seemingly taken a similar position, even though South Africa has not.  By 
introducing language in its Constitution that specifically reaffirms accepted established 
international norms regarding contiguous river boundaries and recognition of territorial 
integrity, Namibia has directly challenged the OAU resolution (a declaration-resolution 
routed firmly in the past) and past colonial water agreements to which it was neither 
signatory, nor part of initial determination.  
                                                 
221 Chacha Mwanza, a writer for The Guardian, had an exclusive interview with the Minister for Water, Dr. 
Shukuru Kawambwa. Dr. Kawambwa told The Guardian that relevant ministers from ten Nile Basin 
countries would meet in Cairo mid-next January to sign the Nile Basin Cooperation Framework as 
independent states.  He added: “We have been discussing the matter since 1999. This is due to the fact that 
the water issue may cause war among stakeholders. We hope this will be the last meeting to end the 
decades-old treaties.” He maintained that soon after independence, Tanzania made it clear that it did not 
recognize all signed colonial agreements on its behalf, including the 1929 Nile Water Agreement. Further 
information is available at http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2006/12/12/80222.html. 
222 This brings in some of the issues associated with the “Treaty/Agreement Process” section in the pyramid 





“A little water clears us of this deed.”  Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 2, Scene 2. 
 
In most instances, one assumes that water issues are the focus of transboundary 
water cooperation regimes.  As observed in the case of the Lower Orange River southern 
boundary dividing the territories of Namibia and South Africa, however, it is not just the 
issue of water.  The conflict extends well beyond shared water, apportionment, and 
access.  They involve territorial control over mineral resources (diamonds, gas reserves, 
and zinc), off-shore fishing rights, and the realignment of colonial borders—the shadow 
of the past, asymmetric power, and regional hydro-hegemonic dominance.  “A little 
water” access to the lower Orange River on the part of South Africa to Namibia will not 
resolve the dispute between the two nations satisfactorily.   
South Africa and Namibia are not at war, but it would be difficult to sustain an 
argument that posits that there is no conflict between the two states -- low levels of 
conflict perhaps, but conflict nonetheless. Within the ORB, water is scarce. Since South 
Africa is the hydro-hegemon, it has secured its water supply, and dominates among its 
co-riparians. South Africa’s riparian position, downstream from Lesotho, has not 
prevented it from building the necessary infrastructure required for resource capture 
inside the sovereign territory of Lesotho.  Further, South Africa has the military, political, 
economic, technical and knowledge power to sustain its actions as far as the LHWP is 
concerned.  This advantageous positioning is, in part, a geo-political colonial legacy.  
This same legacy has positioned SA in such way that the state is able to maintain this 
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colonial hegemony, even as it struggles to resist its own dark, internal shadows of the 
past.  
Cooperative agreements and treaties merely reinforce South Africa’s power 
position.  Since hegemons exist because they can constantly reinforce that hegemony, 
they benefit from that status and guarantee its continuance.  In both the Upper (UORB) 
and Lower (LORB) Orange River Basin, the extreme power asymmetry of the hydro-
hegemon, South Africa, ensures its ability to influence the nature of cooperation among 
OSRB riparians.  In the OSRB, South Africa has the political power, as well as the 
technical capacity, to either sustain its position, resist change, or alter the political 
dynamic in such a way that all future uses (and users) of the OSRB will depend upon the 
continuous weakening of its riparian competitors.  Given the potential negotiating 
influence of Botswana in the ORB, and the exercise of its corresponding bargaining 
hydro-political power (power supported by international interests and South Africa) in 
the Okavango River Basin, Botswana could reinforce South Africa’s hydro-hegemony 
and power asymmetry.  It will not itself become a hydro-hegemon, but will instead assist 
South Africa in continuing its regional dominance.  
In the matter of Namibia and South Africa, the ‘practice of cooperation’ identifies 
a set of complex relationships and attitudes used in negotiation and evaluation of 
relationships between the two states that have not only shared an intimate geo-political 
history on matters of mutual sovereign interests, but also securitization of their respective 
borders and long-term economic interests.  What is clear is that Namibia understands that 
the ORB boundary water issues cannot be addressed without addressing the broader and 
more basic politics of statehood.   
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Lastly, we observe that when regional institutions try to engage in transboundary 
watercourse cooperation efforts, there are the international actor investments that contend 
for basin organization and individual riparian attention.  These actors, with their insertion 
of resources not otherwise available locally or regionally, are furthering not only power 
asymmetry, but defining cooperation priorities and establishing the agenda.  International 
financial institutions providing foreign aid have a particular level of influence in the 
development and continuation of transboundary water cooperation regimes, particularly 
in the capacity of certain riparians to simultaneously sustain the cooperation regimes and 
hydro-hegemonic position of a particular riparian. 
Will these same themes be evident in the Okavango River Basin?  Several of the 
actors are the same; these are Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa.  Lesotho is no 
longer a significant riparian, but the water resources from the LHWP may potentially 
become an asset for consideration.  There are also entirely new actors, like Angola, 
whose riparian position is important, but comes with daunting challenges.  As we move 
into the next case study, it will be important to remember that the shadows of the past 
follow; Botswana retains its hydro-political leverage, and, in a very peculiar manner, 
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• Germany and Britain (Treaty 
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Sources:  Actual Agreement or Treaty, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, Interview with Drs. Anthony 
Turton and Peter Ashton, South Africa, 2002.  Many of the agreements entered into between South Africa and its 
neighboring states occurred during periods of political tension that occasionally involved cross-border raids by the 
South African Defense Force (SADF), Interview 2002, Turton, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. 
SADC Member states establish and sign 
the 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourse 
Systems.  Protocol concerns all 
International River Basins in the SADC 
Region.  1995 
Amended SADC Protocol on shared Water 
Course Systems to incorporate issues 
contained in the 1997 “UN Convention on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Water Courses” and  
includes concerns of  member states 
expressed in June/July 2000,  meeting in 
Windhoek, Namibia.  The 2000 version 
supersedes the 1995 version and is 




Table 3.  Multilateral and Bilateral Water Sharing Agreements, Treaties, Protocols, and Key Studies for Riparian States in 
the Orange-Senqu River Basin (OSRB) (Multilateral Agreements in bold text)
 167 
 
This research asserts that riparian states are more likely to focus on territorial and 
sovereignty issues where they can leverage their power to obtain their respective goals 
rather than on cooperation over water resources.  For states where water is particularly 
scarce, increasing water supply may be one of several goals, even if it is not clear that a 
particular water agreement is the mechanism by which that goal can be met.  Although 
water conflicts are a low-level source of conflict, one should not dismiss water as a good 
reason for cooperation. The international agreements negotiated for water cooperation 
still serve a useful purpose. 
 In their survey of over 130 international environmental agreements, Haas and 
Sundgren223 examine a number of political variables (e.g. year of treaty, subject of treaty, 
sovereignty issues affecting treaty outcomes such as hegemonic influences and regime 
types) and the impacts those variables have on the negotiation process.  Their analysis 
considered three indicators of treaty effectiveness:  (1) whether or not the major 
polluters/users of a resource are parties to the agreement; (2) how quickly the agreement 
enters into force; and (3) the subjective impressions of knowledgeable observers of a 
treaty’s effectiveness.  As there is no ‘indicator’ or surrogates for environmental 
effectiveness, their analysis is lacking in explaining environmental effectiveness.  Indeed, 
the authors indicate, “. . . it is extremely difficult to establish the impact of these treaties 
on improving the quality of the environment, which is their nominal objective”.224. 
 In regions where watercourses are transboundary and shared among water scarce 
states, nations experiencing water shortages may decide that the way to address the issue 
                                                 
223 Haas and Sundgren, “Evolving International Environmental Law.” 




is to prevent shortages by gaining control over watercourses.  Alternatively, another 
approach might be for a nation to take any range of actions that lessen its vulnerability to 
water shortages.  Thus, when nations decide to address the threat of water scarcity they 
may also decide to suppress the conflicts that such ecological change induces by 
improving its capacity and ability to ameliorate its water future shortages. This process 
extends the scope of types of water conflict to include the future.  Namibia can now 
accuse Botswana, its co-riparian, of taking actions that interfere with Namibia’s future 
water security, because of Botswana’s proposed pipeline diverting water from the 
Kavango River (Okavango River) to meet water demands in Windhoek.  
In the Okavango River Basin, Botswana behaves as the temporary hydro-
hegemon, drawing on South African and international support.  This is only a temporary 
status because of the rapidly changing economic and political dynamics among 
Okavango riparians.  Presently, Botswana decided to have the Okavango Delta declared a 
Ramsar site in 1996 without involving Namibia or Angola.  Involving Angola may have 
been exceedingly difficult, as it was engaged in a long-standing civil war at the time 
Botswana was seeking the Ramsar designation; Botswana as a sovereign state was 
completely within its rights to negotiate protections and designation of the Delta without 
consultation with its co-riparians. Even if Botswana had consulted Namibia, the Delta 
may have still been declared a Ramsar site.  
Botswana’s actions may have unintended long-term consequences.  Under this 
scenario, controversies over shared international watercourses arise from questions 
concerning the distribution of externalities.  In this instance, Botswana chose not to 
consult with Namibia either, a political and hydro-strategic decision on the part of 
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Botswana.  Had Namibia been a consulting party, it may have voiced strong objections to 
such a designation in an effort to protect its sovereign right as the upstream riparian.  This 
new designation might impact Namibia’s ability to divert Okavango water within its 
territorial boundaries in order to meet its growing water demands.  Still, since the 
Okavango Delta is within Botswana sovereign boundaries, as a sovereign state it was 
completely within its rights to negotiate protections and designation of the Delta without 
consultation with its co-riparians.   
 With the sheer quantity of international and environmental agreements frequently 
taken for granted, it is important to recognize that reaching cooperation agreements is 
difficult.  The mere existence of a treaty demonstrates the existence of some level of 
cooperation and negotiation between these sovereign states.  However, a deeper level of 
cooperation would be demonstrated by actually implementing the agreements discussed.  
This point of the conversation is difficult to reach.  The states involve are navigating 
political boundaries, degrees of water interdependence, degrees of water scarcity, and 
access to alternative water resources.  All these concerns create a complex web of linking 
the myriad political, geographical, and social concerns between these states.  This web 
links issues that may only be tangentially related to the issue of transboundary water 
resources management, such as defining borders, redressing past grievances, the 
historical relationships between actors, exercising sovereignty over other natural 
resources, or seeking concessions on other, non-hydrological issues.    
 In Chapter Two, I argue that there is a hierarchy of obstacles to cooperation which 
must be addressed before quality cooperation over shared freshwater resource is likely.  
While all the obstacles apply to a greater or lesser degree, those in the shaded section 
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below the heavy line are more difficult to overcome. If not resolved, these issues are most 
likely to interfere with the ability of riparians to engage in positive conflict and achieve 
quality cooperation.  In the following paragraphs, I would like to return to the conceptual 
pyramid in order to make more explicit two or three factors in order to discuss their 
impact on the Orange-Senqu river basin.   
 The questions posed by individual shared watercourses, the riparians involved 
with these watercourses, and the need to determine how that one resource will be shared 
and protected are all recognized as hydro-political foreign policy challenges where 
cooperation regimes and relationships are dependent upon factors outside the water 
sector.  As illustrated in the OSRB case study and represented in the pyramid’s base as 
discussed in Chapter Two, the dominant significant real politics are precisely that:  
sovereignty, hydro-hegemony, and asymmetry, and upstream-downstream and national 
and international interests.  These factors have little to do with water per se, but which 
still spill over into the discourse surrounding water cooperation.  From a practical and 
material perspective, Namibia wants the river boundaries where it shares the Orange-
Senqu River redrawn— a desire based on sovereignty, national, and international 
interests.  Doing so will allow Namibia to reclaim and reassert its sovereignty in ways 
that its participation in ORASECOM will not.  In this case, water issues are embedded in 
the larger politics of sovereignty and the shadows of the past, as the current boundary is a 
remnant of South Africa’s rule over Namibia.  By refusing to passively accept this 
boundary, Namibia is pushing against South Africa as the hydro-hegemon.   
For the other riparians, the obvious issue is water-use. While the Orange-Senqu 
River basin is important to all four riparian states—South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and 
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Lesotho—the latter two, Botswana and Lesotho, both upstream, use little of its water.  In 
fact, Botswana uses none and Lesotho’s current use is low and mostly non-consumptive, 
as the water collected is used for hydro-power generation. This is especially striking 
when one considers that Lesotho controls the river’s headwaters. However, the most 
significant benefit for Lesotho’s powerful location is actually derived from the transfer of 
the Orange-Senqu water into the South Africa through the LHWP, not through any of the 
benefits associated with more obvious water-uses.  
This seeming paradox demonstrates out the number of countries and upstream-
downstream factors located near the base of the pyramid. Four countries are part of the 
OSRB basin.  Two make no great demands on its waters. The other two, Namibia and 
South Africa, are heavily dependent upon the outcomes of agreements concerning the 
OSRB waters. These two countries are, however, better equipped nationally to make 
strategic (and political) decisions regarding alternative water sources and new 
technologies.   
The most significant treaty for OSRB cooperation is a bilateral one between South 
Africa and Lesotho for the LHWP. The one multilateral agreement, ORASECOM, still 
struggles to establish itself, and is subject to the possibility that Botswana may exert its 
position to obtain water from Lesotho in the future.  Botswana would have a variety of 
reasons for doing so, especially since if it acted in support of Namibia’s sovereign claims 
in the OSRB in exchange for not Namibia not exercising its sovereign claims by 
extracting water from the Okavango River basin, where both are riparians and members 
of OKACOM.  Botswana’s primary interests in ORASECOM are both strategic and 
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diplomatic.  Though water is an important consideration, the issue is less about water and 
more about politics.  
 South Africa has been and continues to be a powerful actor in water politics—
hydro-hegemony.  However, while that position is subject to change, albeit not by much, 
what is less clear is how the state of South Africa will hold onto its power and influence 
in the basin, as the clear hydro-hegemon, while also protecting its ability to meet its 
growing and future water needs, much of which will be supplied by the Orange-Senqu 
River.  It has to accomplish these two goals while not alienating its co-riparians.  Another 
state replacing South Africa as the hydro-hegemon or regional hegemon is highly 
unlikely.  As the hydro-hegemon, one that attracts major IFI donor funding for research, 
capacity building, knowledge and policy development, all while supporting a large water 
elite, South Africa is positioned to use its position and power to enable quality 
cooperation while simultaneously securing its future water supply.  One might argue that, 
as the country with the largest population with the most dynamic and complex economy, 
South Africa’s water needs must be met.  It is unclear, at this time, whether such a need 
will compromise prospects for quality cooperation in the Orange-Senqu River basin.  In 
fact, there is at least one argument that suggests South Africa’s advantages and past 
cooperation efforts, although mostly bilateral, may contribute to strengthening 
ORASECOM by growing its institutional knowledge and contributing existing and 
mostly uncontested hydrological data.225 Further, as the section on hydro-hegemony 
                                                 







posits, a hydro-hegemon has both hard and soft dimension.  It can exercise power in such 
a way that weaker states, having limited alternatives, may coordinate with and respond 
positively to the hydro-hegemon’s use of power to secure and stabilize efforts at 
transboundary water cooperation and their respective regimes.     
The case studies in this research provide examples of the circumstances in which 
history is important in the areas of influencing transboundary water cooperation.  
Specifically, these case studies focus on the geo-political legacy; knowledge, experience 
and institutions; and political realignment.  As can be seen in the case studies that follow, 
it appears cooperative events surpass the numbers of conflicts, but that negotiated 
transboundary water agreements alone are not sufficient to eliminate non-water-related 
conflicts that may be camouflaged by TWAs.  The economic and political burdens of 
unresolved transboundary water conflicts are significant.  The creation of cooperation-
based transboundary water agreements represents a convenient first step, but there are 
presently no guarantees of regarding the quality of cooperation.  Sharing water remains a 




Chapter 4:  The Okavango River Basin    
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the hydro-political dynamics of the Okavango River 
Basin. While these dynamics are comparable to those of the Orange River Basin, they 
play out in a decidedly different manner. By tracing the connections between the 
Okavango River Basin riparians, this chapter delineates the ways in which not dealing 
with the shadow of the past impacts the political reality of the present.  
The Okavango River Basin is the recipient of both regional attention from its 
riparian and international attention, due entirely to the Okavango Delta and its 
designation as a Ramsar site. This area is a renowned world-class wildlife and wilderness 
tourism destination, a factor that this chapter examines in light of its impact on regional 
economies and international image.  Internationalization of the Okavango Delta has 
resulted in multiple local, regional, and global stakeholders vying for a role in 
‘protecting’ the Delta from ecological and environmental harms.  These stakeholders 
include NGOs and other organizations interested in molding the discourse, scientific and 
otherwise, that emerges from this region. Unlike the Orange River, there is considerably 
less available hydrological and environmental scientific data on the Okavango River.  
Much less is known and documented about the basin’s hydrology, the cultural and ethnic 
diversity and socio-economic trends of the communities of the Okavango Delta area.226  
                                                 
226 The amount of ethnic diversity in the Botswana Delta region derives from a blend of baYei, baTwana, 
baSarwa, baMbukushu, baHerero, baGcanikhwe, and other tribes, some of which are marginalized and 
fundamentally disenfranchised in the country as a whole. 
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This chapter examines the impact this moldable discourse has on the politics of the 
region, as well as the basin’s strategic role for its various riparians.  
 In both basins, Botswana and Namibia are two of the more economically 
developed states in sub-Saharan Africa and in the SADC region.  Botswana occupies a 
favorable political position from which it could gain hydrological advantage and 
influence the behavior of its co-riparians in these two basins.  Botswana contributes no 
flow to the Orange River basin, but is considered one of its riparians. Although at this 
point its actual influence is unknown, Botswana has the potential to use its position in the 
Orange River Basin to affect Namibia’s hydro-politics either directly or indirectly.  In 
exchange for concessions by Namibia in the Okavango River Basin, Botswana could 
align itself with Namibia in its continued negotiations with South Africa to redefine the 
Orange River boundary.  This is only hypothetical; it is not clear that any action on the 
part of Botswana is likely to influence the Orange River boundary conflict between 
Namibia and South Africa. What this chapter examines is Botswana’s growing power in 
the region, especially as it aligns itself with South Africa’s attempts to maintain its role as 
regional hegemon.  
In order to move towards these arguments, this chapter begins by describing the 
similarities between the two basins. In both, there is a heavy reliance on water resources, 
a historical-colonial legacy that conditions current political discourse among riparians, as 
well as how and where water-related infrastructure has been developed.  Further, there is 
the historical and continuing geopolitical hydro-hegemony of South Africa that 
potentially eclipses all transboundary water negotiations.  South Africa is not a riparian in 
the Okavango River Basin; however, it exerts considerable power and influence in the 
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region at-large. Its position as the regional hydro-hegemon, and as a hydro-hegemonic 
power broker, factors in all cooperation conversation.   From a political perspective, this 
chapter examines South Africa’s interest in the Okavango Basin, Delta preservation, 
suggesting that regional hydro-politics deal with more than just the conservation and 
preservation of the Okavango Delta.   
Through examining the cooperative relationships operating in the Okavango 
River Basin, this chapter will demonstrate how South Africa is part of that relationship 
structure, and why its participation in this structure exemplifies post-colonial and post- 
apartheid community building.227  By critiquing South Africa’s involvement in the 
politics of the region, this chapter will also complicate understandings of cooperation.  
After all, given the power of South Africa, its cooperation can act as exploitive by 
simultaneously coercing compliance from its co-riparians and by obscuring the exercise 
of power.228
 
Okavango River Basin Land-Uses 
The Okavango River basin is home to approximately 1.4 million people, with 
600,000 living in the Okavango Delta region. People have lived in the basin for hundreds 
of years, but the Delta region has always been a difficult place to live because of disease, 
warfare, poor soils, low rainfall, and slavery.229  Its principle land-types include small 
amounts of grassland in its very upper reaches and savanna and woodlands in Angola. 
Woodlands and swamps, both permanent and seasonal, are found in its lower reaches 
                                                 
227 Fukuyama’s Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy both provide further information on 
this topic.   
228 Bourdieu, Outline.  
229 Mendelsohn and El Obeid, Okavango River. 
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around the Okavango Delta. Small-scale agriculture, generally the crop farming of maize, 
manioc (cassava), millet and vegetables, constitute the dominant land use activities in 
Angola. Farm yields are generally higher in the upper catchment areas due to higher and 
more predictable rainfall. Still, the post-war impact has resulted in many poor subsistence 
farmers in Angola. 
Further south, along the Namibian Okavango (Kavango) stretch of the river and 
upper reaches of the Okavango River in Botswana, livestock (cattle) farming is the 
dominant form of agricultural activity.  Millet, maize, and sorghum are also grown.  In 
the Okavango Basin, agriculture dominates freshwater withdrawals and use.  In Namibia 
and Botswana (and in Zambia) the river basin region is also the location of several 
protected conservation areas and National game parks and reserves.  
In the Okavango Delta areas of Botswana, tourism-related operations, such as 
hotels, lodges, or safari camps, dominate.  Maun, Botswana is the primary urban center 
and departure point for Delta tourism and one of three in the basin. The other two urban 
centers are Menongue in Angola and the border town of Rundu in Namibia.  Maun and 
Rundu both have airports. In Botswana, along the Namibian border, are many veterinary 
fences, at least one of which has been in place since the early 1960s. The first cordon 
fence - the Kuke fence - was constructed in 1958.  These fences were installed initially to 
protect cattle against foot and mouth disease infections from buffalo.  However, others 
have since been installed both within the countries and along borders in Namibia, 
Zambia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe to reduce disease transfer between domestic and 




Okavango River Basin Hydro-politics 
The Okavango Delta water quality is “exceptionally clean and clear because few 
minerals or clay particles are released from the Kalahari sands and because floodplain 
and marshes along the rivers filter out nutrients and mud particles”.230  Considered one of 
the most pristine freshwater ecosystems in southern Africa, the Okavango River is shared 
by three countries: Angola, Botswana, and Namibia.  It represents an important perennial 
river source of water for Namibia, and is the single most important freshwater resource 
for the Okavango Delta in Botswana231.  The river is relatively remote from the major 
economic and administrative centers and capital cities of its riparian states.  However, 
there are three small urbanized centers in the Okavango Basin region:  Menongue, 


















                                                 
230 Mendelsohn and El Obeid, Okavango River, 93. 
231 This has been described in Greer’s Okavango: The Jewel of the Kalahari (1987) and was confirmed 
during my interviews with Drs. Turton and Ashton in 2002 and 2003.  Dr. Turton holds the Gibb-SERA 
Chair in Integrated Water Resource Management at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and 




Figure 5.  Map of the Okavango River Basin, its riparian states, and the Okavango Delta. The Okavango 
River Basin shared by primarily by Angola, Botswana, and Namibia.  Reprinted with permission from 
Turton, Ashton, and Cloete, eds., Transboundary rivers, sovereignty, and development:  Hydropolitical 








Including these urban centers as well as the populations living along the 
floodplains associated with the eastern Caprivi and the network of channels (oshanas) 
forming the Cuvelai drainage system, the river ultimately supports a population of a little 
more than 800,000.   
When it comes to water demands in the basin, there are obvious competing 
interests and water-use patterns.  For Angola and Namibia, water interests in the 
Okavango are focused on irrigation, water supply, and potential future hydroelectric 
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power schemes.232  For Botswana, these interests center on sustaining uninterrupted water 
supply to the Okavango Delta ecosystem.   
Several important considerations contribute to a discussion of the hydro-politics 
of the Okavango River basin.  First, the riparian actors in the Okavango and Orange 
River basins share a complex geo-spatial and politically integrated history.  They also 
share a similarly convoluted history with South Africa, the regional, economic, and 
hydrological hegemon.   
Second, the competing claims on the hydrological resources in the basin create a 
need to identify additional sources of water in order to meet growing agricultural and 
urban demands, particularly for Namibia, located upstream to Botswana.  There are also 
the proposed dams in Angola, upstream to both Namibia and Botswana, and the 
downstream claims by Botswana.  Botswana needs to supply water for the Orapa mines, 
local production, and other uses, such as fisheries, agriculture and livestock, and delta-
based tourism and wildlife utilization.  
The growing shortage of water constrains future development and, potentially, 
contributes to conflict.  In both basins, Namibia is the most arid of all sub-Saharan SADC 
states.  Thus, one factor of significant concern for Namibia is finding an ample water 
supply that offers both long-term sustainability and will also meet the growing deficits in 
the central areas of Namibia.233  While Namibia and Botswana are downstream riparians 
that contribute almost no stream flow, both riparians are better positioned than Angola 
                                                 
232 Mendelsohn and el Obeid, Okavango River. 
233  The Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development discuss this in “National Water Policy 
White Paper.” Heyns also raises this issue in “Existing and Planned Development Projects on International 




institutionally, technologically, and politically to negotiate and implement their water 
interests relative to the Okavango River.    
A third consideration is the peace dividend in Angola.  Currently there is little 
known about Angola’s water development plans for the upper catchment of the 
Okavango River.  However, sustained peace in Angola creates opportunity for both 
Namibia and Botswana to engage in new hydro-political negotiations; these negotiations 
would be necessary for Angola to undertake much needed development.  Angola, the 
upstream water-rich basin headwater riparian, has only recently ended its civil war of 
over two decades, which made both data collection and economic development in the 
upper reaches of the Okavango basin virtually impossible.  The remnants of war, which 
include the presence of land mines, large numbers of displaced Angolans, and a 
government unable to comprehensively address these problems in the immediate future 
means that up-stream development and research may be slow to occur.  
The fourth consideration is the Okavango Delta.  Upstream diversion by either 
Namibia or Angola is perceived as a real threat to the future ecological health and of the 
Okavango Delta.  The Okavango River supplies water to one of the world’s unique inland 
deltas, a Ramsar234 site called the Okavango Delta in northern Botswana, known as the 
                                                 
234 Botswana, which deposited its instrument of accession on 9 December 1996 (the entry came into force 
April 9, 1997), designated the Okavango Delta system as its first wetland of international importance. The 
Ramsar site is approximately 68,640 square kilometers (6,864,000 hectares), which places it ahead of 
Canada’s Queen Maud Gulf (6,278,200 ha) as the world’s largest Ramsar site.  The designated area 
includes the Okavango River, the entire Okavango Delta, Lake Ngami, and parts of the Kwando and 
Linyanti river systems that fall along the western boundary of the Chobe National Park. The Okavango 
Delta System is hydrologically unique. It is the largest inland delta in sub-Saharan Africa after the inner 
delta of the Niger.  Since it lies in a semi-arid area, 97% of the annual inflow of between 7,000 and 15,000 
million cubic meters is lost to evapo-transpiration and seepage. The Delta discharges only 3% of its water.  
UNESCO, Ramsar Archives, 1997. 
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“Jewel of the Kalahari”235.  The delta has been and continues to be the subject of 
international attention and status, as is the river itself.  Because the river is an endoreic 
system that empties into the inland delta, not the sea, development options for both 
Namibia and Botswana are limited, thus presenting challenges to each riparians’ 
sovereignty and their prospective water development plans. Hasler236 argues that there are 
four issues that threaten the Delta.  He cites global climate change, proposed diversion of 
water by upstream actors, proposed river damming by upstream actors, and competing 
activities within the Delta, particularly conflicts between water for tourism and water for 
water-dependent uses (agriculture, cattle production, etc.).  
The Okavango Delta is an important local and international ecological wetland 
system that nurtures a wide variety of riverine fauna and flora, and wildlife, and is a 
major economic resource for Botswana, which makes every effort to keep the Delta a 
prime tourist destination.  With or without upstream water diversion of the Okavango 
River, the delta remains vulnerable.  Botswana considers the value of uninterrupted flow 
to the Okavango Delta essential to its tourist economy.  Namibia, on the other hand, 
believes diversion of river flow will aid the nation in meeting its growing water demand 
without significantly jeopardize the Delta’s ecological health.  These divergent interests 
are a source of quiet conflict between Namibia and Botswana.   
The designated Ramsar area includes the Okavango River, the entire Okavango 
Delta, Lake Ngami, and parts of the Kwando and Linyanti river systems, both of which 
fall along the western boundary of the Chobe National Park. The Ramsar Information 
                                                 
235 Indeed, this poetic phrase appears as the title to Greer’s Okavango: The Jewel of the Kalahari.  This 
region has also been described as one of the ‘Last Edens’ in “Okavango Delta: Old Africa's Last Refuge” 
by Douglas B. Lee in National Geographic Magazine (Vol 178, No.6. December 1990). Botswana was the 
magazine’s lead and cover article. 
236 Hasler, “Political Ecologies of Scale.” 
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Sheet filed for the site notes that the main threats to the area come from possible water 
extraction from the Okavango and Kwando rivers and their tributaries by fringe states, 
Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zambia.237  Interestingly, the Ramsar designation238 
came about the same time as Namibia’s pipeline plans.  Designation as a Ramsar site 
could be considered one mechanism that Botswana has used to protect the Delta and its 
source of water—the Okavango River.   
Botswana and Namibia have ratified the Ramsar Convention. However, Angola 
has not.  This is problematic, as Angola contributes 94% of the river inflows to the Delta.  
Heyns239 suggests the Ramsar declaration was done without any consultation with the 
two upstream states.  As a result, Botswana’s ratification of the convention can be seen as 
linking the hydraulic interests of Botswana to a framework of global environmental 
interests.240 Alternatively, Botswana’s effort to have the Okavango Delta designated a 
protected site could be read as an effort to protect a natural resource of extraordinary 
ecological significance and a site of considerable economic value to the national 
economy vis-à-vis monies generated through tourism and related local employment. 
The Okavango River originates has competing upstream extra-border demands 
and intra-national border competing water demands.  The Okavango, known as the 
Kavango River in Namibia, is Namibia’s only perennial river and passes only briefly 
                                                 
237 UNESCO’s letter informing the Bureau of the accession of Botswana, posted 24 February 1997. From 
the Ramsar Archives. 
238 The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance is an international agreement that, 
upon site designation, requires Botswana to conduct and implement a comprehensive management plan for 
the designated site.  The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is an intergovernmental global treaty that came 
into force in 1975.  Its mission is “conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and 
national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development 
throughout the world” (Ramsar COP8, 2002).  For additional information, see http://www.ramsar.org. 
239 Heyns, Interview. 
240 Swatuk, “Kant and Should.” 
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through the northeastern corner of the country.  It remains ripe for an inter-basin transfer 
(IBT).  IBTs constitute a leading role in Namibia’s water schemes.241  A Kavango River 
IBT would provide much needed water to Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, as it is 
distant from any primary surface water source and is experiencing significant 
urbanization, economic development, and related increases in water demand.   
River Physiography and History  
The Okavango River is the third largest in southern Africa, and because it flows 
into the Okavango Delta—considered one of the largest freshwater ecosystem oases in 
the world (as of year 2000)—it is often described as the river that never finds the sea. An 
important characteristic of the Okavango River is the clarity and purity of its water, 
which is attributed to the draining of the Kalahari sands, and (for the time being, at least) 
the few sources of pollution or contamination in the basin. “The Delta is really a gigantic 
sink into which the river pours about 9.4 cubic kilometers of water each year”.242  
According to Ashton and Neal,243 the Okavango River Basin is a sub-basin of the 
Makgadikgadi Basin, which is part of the Nata River.  However, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, that distinction has not been a consideration in the discussion of the 
transboundary hydro-politics of the Okavango River basin. 
Originating in the Angolan hills, the headwaters of the Okavango River flow from 
two main tributaries, the Cubango River (which is how the Okavango is known in 
Angola) and Cuito River in the Angolan Highlands.  The Cubango flows southward for 
                                                 
241 The role of IBTs is also discussed in Ashton’s “The Search for an Equitable Basis for Water Sharing,” 
Heyns’ “The Interbasin Transfer of Water Between SADC Countries:  A Developmental Challenge for the 
Future,” and in Turton’s  “The Political Aspects of Institutional Development in the Water Sector.” 
242 Mendelsohn and el Obeid, Okavango River, 26. 
243 Ashton and Neal, “An Overview of Key Strategic Issues in the Okavango Basin.” 
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about 600 square kilometers from its Angolan highlands until it reaches the Namibian 
border.244  The Cuito River joins the Okavango River near Katere.  This junction is 
characterized by a large floodplain, which includes a section of permanent swamp.   Flow 
from the Cuito doubles the volume of water in the Okavango River.  The Cuito has a 
more even flow rate and a later flood peak than the Cubango.  At times of low flow, the 
Cuito contributes a large proportion of water to the Okavango River system.  The 
southern part of the catchment is a fossil drainage, where these tributaries, known as 
omiramba, contribute little or no flow.  The largest, the 650 km long Omuramba 
Omatako, is blocked by sand dunes and dense vegetation.  At Dikuyu Island near Mukwe 
the river turns south and for the next 55 kilometers both banks are in Namibia.   
 The river, as stated previously, is shared by three countries.  Angola, its origin, is 
the most water-rich and the source of its headwaters.  Mid-stream, it flows through 
Namibia, the most arid and water-stressed of the three.  Botswana, downstream and also 
water-stressed, contains the river’s delta (Figure 5).245  All water flowing into Botswana 
comes originally from Angola.  The Okavango River is the only perennial river flowing 
across its territory into the sovereign state of Botswana.   
The borders of the Okavango riparians (Angola, Botswana, and Namibia) 
originated at the Berlin Conference in 1884 and subsequent treaties signed between 
Portugal, Britain and Germany, during the 1880s and 1890s.  Pre-colonial groups in the 
Okavango River basin included the Khoisan peoples who were joined around the eight 
century by Bantu-speaking peoples from West Africa.  In the Angola territory, these two 
                                                 
244 Heyns, “A Hydropolitical History of South Africa's International River Basins.” 
245 Although not considered an important riparian or included in this discussion, it should be noted that 
Zimbabwe contains about 3.2% of the basin, as well.  
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peoples intermarried, together forming groups, villages, and eventually kingdoms.  In the 
southern part of Angola, and the northern part of Namibian territory, were the 
Ovimbundu.  They occupied lands adjacent to the Ovambo peoples’ kingdom, the largest 
ethnic group in what is now Namibia.  Other groups included the Herero peoples in the 
central arid plateau, the Nama to the south, and the San and Damara, hunter-gatherer 
groups in central and southern Namibia.  In the contemporary Caprivi region were the 
Kavango, Matsubia, and Mafu groups.  These different groups form Namibia’s multi-
ethnic society of today. 
Botswana is the least ethnically diverse.  Eighty-five percent of Botswana’s pre-
and post-colonial population is Tswana.  The Tswana chiefdoms were politically and 
socially organized around eight chiefdoms where chiefs dominated decision making and 
used a system, kgotla, that continues on into the present day (Kgotla is an assembly of all 
men in the community convened to consult and discuss important community matters, 
and functions as a check on the authority and power of the chief. Such an arrangement is 
not without constraints on chiefly power.  The dictates of traditional law, determined by a 
group of elders, also acts as a constraint on power.).  Outside of the Okavango Delta and 
Caprivi regions, water availability has always been a problem for the peoples of 
Botswana.  The arid conditions of Botswana created an economy and wealth based more 
on cattle and less on agriculture.  In contrast to the cattle-based economy of Botswana, 
the peoples of Namibia generally practiced mixed farming based on where they lived  
The Portuguese, Dutch, and later the German and English all had early contact 
with pre-colonial southwestern and southern African peoples.  The type of contact and 
relationship with both the pre-colonial groups and territories would be driven, in part, by 
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the diversity of interests, their knowledge of mineral resources, the European-national 
economy, and the global political economy.  
The Okavango River system became known to the outside world (European 
explorers-colonists) in the mid 1800s.  In 1849, English explorer and missionary David 
Livingstone visited Lake Ngami; Charles John Anderson, believed to be the first 
European to see the Okavango River, reached the River near Nkurenkuru in 1859. In 
1877, Portuguese explorer and surveyor Alexandre Serpa Pinto explored the upper 
reaches of the river system. Although occupied by the local peoples for hundreds of 
years, the basin generally and Delta region particularly have been difficult places to 
colonize, settle, or live, due mostly to the tsetse fly and its related disease, warfare, 
slavery, poor soils and low rainfall.246  Indeed, for years, the presence of the tsetse fly 
may have offered some protection to the Delta.   
Between 1884 and 1890s colonial rule was established and the basin riparians 
divided by the Portuguese, Germans, and British.  Of the three Okavango riparians, 
Botswana was first to gain its independence from Britain in 1966.  Prior to its 
independence, Botswana was not colonized by any European state, but functioned as a 
protectorate of Britain. Angola achieved its independence in 1975.  However, it would 
not be until 1990 that Namibia would become an independent state. 
 The Okavango River has been the subject of water development for many years.  
In 1969, when Namibian territory was under the South West Africa Administration of the 
Union of South Africa, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) appointed 
                                                 
246 Mendelsohn and el Obeid, Okavango River. 
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consultants247 to conduct a preliminary study on the potential technical and economic 
feasibility of constructing a hydro power plant on the Okavango River.  Additionally, 
DWAF had certain parts of the Okavango River, where the river first becomes the 
international boundary, explored at the same time.  However, the potential site was not 
considered viable as the flow in that section of the river is variable. Moreover, using that 
location would have involved international negotiations with Portugal (eventually, these 
negotiations would need to involve Angola). 
The river’s active catchment area is located entirely in Angola.  The 
Cubango/Okavango provides about 55% of all water flowing into the Delta.  Another 
45% derives from the Cuito and its tributaries, which cover an area of about 708,600 
square kilometers.  The Okavango River flows for a distance of 4115 km along the 
northeastern border between Angola and Namibia before turning southward and into 
Botswana.  The basin population of approximately 220,000 inhabitants is divided 
principally between Namibia and Botswana, with Namibians numbering a little over 
100,000.  Major infrastructure in the basin includes the Eastern National Water Carrier 
(ENWC) in Namibia, which currently extends from Windhoek to Grootfontein, and the 
Mopipi Dam in Botswana.  Throughout Namibia there is other water infrastructure 
impacting the river, including dams, boreholes, and pipelines. 
The combined catchment area of the two main tributaries results in a MAR (Mean 
Annual Runoff) of approximately 9,585 M3m per annum, which is ten times more than all 
the ephemeral rivers of Namibia together, and which equals the combined runoff of the 
                                                 
247 From the “Technical Report on the Pre-feasibility Study for the Popa Falls Hydro Power Project by 




Orange River and the Cunene River.  Once the Okavango River flows into Botswana, it 
transmutates from a range of permanent river channels into semi-permanent drainage 
channels, lagoons, islands, and floodplains that connect and disconnect in a complex 
dynamic forming the Okavango Delta.248  
Located in its entirety in Botswana, the Okavango Delta and its future contribute 
significantly to the importance of understanding the transboundary cooperation and 
conflict of riparians in this river basin and their respective water needs and demands.  For 
many different groups, the river system as a whole has high value.  One group consists of 
international interests, tourists, and others who treasure unique, healthy ecosystems in 
wild places with beautiful scenery and massive concentrations of wildlife.  It has been 
suggested by Botswana minister Jacob Nkate, WSSD, September 2002, that for many 
people, Botswana is the Okavango Delta, and it would be exceedingly difficult to 
imagine Botswana without it.249    
                                                 
248 The Okavango Delta (Figure 6) is a 15,600 square kilometer high-quality habitat for thousands of 
mammals, birds, fish, and other animals. The Okavango Delta is the last surviving remnant of the great 
Lake Makgadikgadi whose waters and associated swamps once covered much of the Middle Kalahari. It 
also is closely associated with the Kwando, Linyanti, and Chobe swamps and river systems to the northeast. 
Inhabiting the waters of the Okavango Delta are an estimated 35 million fish of perhaps as many as 80 
species.  Additionally, the Delta offers an oasis of habitat for plant and animal life.  The abundant wildlife 
in the Delta supports a vital and fundamental segment of the Botswana economy—the eco-tourism 
industry.  The Delta is a prime tourist destination.  The tourism industry in Botswana is fourth largest 
behind diamond, copper, and nickel mining and exports, in that order.  The Okavango's waters still cut the 
characteristic fan shape of the Delta. 
249 Jansen and Madzwamuse, “Transboundary Rivers, Sovereignty, and Development.” 
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Figure 6. The Okavango Delta—an inland delta—system Ramsar site in Botswana.  Reprinted with 
permission from original in Turton, Ashton, and Cloete, eds. , Transboundary rivers, sovereignty, and 




Discussed in significantly more detail in the next section, it is important to 
acknowledge upstream impacts on the Okavango River physiography and hydrology.  
The vast majority of the river’s active catchment area is located in Angola.  Forty-five 
percent comes from the Cuito with another 45 to 55 percent comes from the Cubango 
River.  A significant feature of the Okavango River, and the basin itself, is its lack of 
pollution and contamination, a bittersweet gift from Angola’s turbulent past.   
 Angola’s decades-long civil war resulted in the protection of the hydrological 
integrity of the Okavango River basin as it prevented upstream development in the 
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Cuando-Cubango Angolan region of the river.  However, now that the war has ended, 
Angola is likely to begin its water development plans and strategies for development in 
the Cuando-Cubango Angolan region of the Okavango River Basin in an effort to catch 
up with other basin states.  As such, upstream river resources may come under 
pressure.250  When upstream development occurs, it has the potential to cause pollution, 
reduced river flow, and reduced water quality, all actions that may result in negative 
downstream effects.  A more detailed discussion of Angola’s politics and hydrological 
implications of peace for the downstream riparians and Okavango River Basin follow in 
the next section.   
 
Namibia and the Okavango River Basin 
 
Namibia needs to increase its water supply and provide water to its growing urban 
population, especially in the central areas where its capital is located.  Since most of 
Namibia is covered by desert and grassland, water and its respective benefits are 
tantamount to the country’s future. It receives about half of its electricity supplies from 
South Africa’s power utility, ESKOM—a dependency the government of Namibia would 
very much like to reduce. Projects like the Epupa Dam along the Cunene River could 
provide new sources of energy supply.251  However, the country has only partial access to 
five perennial rivers, none easily accessible and all in remote border areas—the 
Okavango (Kavango in Namibia) along the northeastern border and the Orange in the 
south, and the Cunene (Kunene in Angola), Zambezi, and Chobe (Figure 5). 
                                                 
250 Mbaiwa, “Causes and Possible Solutions to Potential Water Resource Conflicts in the Okavango River 
Basin.” 
251 Heyns, Interview. 
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A large hydro-electric dam on the Cunene would solve many critical energy and 
water supply problems for Namibia, and would also benefit the drought-prone Namibe 
and Cunene provinces in Angola.252 Angola and Namibia have had a relatively long 
engagement of negotiations about the construction and proposed location of a hydro-
electric project (Epupa Dam) on the Cunene River, where it forms the border of Namibia 
and Angola.   
Angola and Namibia began negotiations in 1991; however, a serious division 
arose over the exact location of the dam.  Namibia preferred a site four kilometers 
downstream from the Epupa Falls, while Angola made a case in favor of a site in the 
Baynes Hills, 40 kilometers further downstream.  Angola is keen to build the project at 
the Baynes site because its smaller capacity would make it more dependent on flow 
regulation at the Gové dam further upstream.  This means that a portion of the funding 
for a dam at Baynes could be used for the rehabilitation of the Gové dam, damaged 
during Angola's recently ended civil war. 
 The Namibians perceive the Kavango River Valley as a possible bread-basket253 
which is consistent with the Government of Namibia’s Vision 2030 comprehensive 
framework to make Namibia food self-sufficient, and increase socio-economic 
development.254  Namibia’s arid climate and limited rain make it unlikely that it will be 
able to sustain reliable rain dependent crop production.  The agriculture sector contributes 
significantly to Namibian exports, but it consists primarily of cattle and meat products.  
                                                 
252 Lang, Steven, “Southern Africa: Plans to Dam the Cunene River Are Shelved Again.”  
253 Mendelsohn and el Obeid, Okavango River.  




Since 1990 such exports accounted for more than 70% of Namibia’s agricultural 
exports.255
In an effort to increase economic development, enhance water supply to 
Windhoek, and following several consecutive seasons of drought, in 1996 the Namibian 
government unilaterally proposed to extract and divert water from the Okavango River in 
Namibia, upstream from the Delta.  Namibia, as an independent sovereign state, made 
plans to construct a 250-kilometer-long pipeline, the Eastern National Water Carrier 
(ENWC) or Rundo-Grootfontein Pipeline, (note the broken line in Figure 7) to transfer 
20-million m3 of water in subsequent phases.  This section of the pipeline would target 
directly withdrawals from River that portion of the Okavango within the Namibian 
territorial boundaries.   
When the second phase of this IBT was proposed, Namibia believed that the IBT, 
a project to be financed in part by China, would result in increasing water flow to 120-
million m3. Not only was Namibia experiencing severe drought-generated water stress, it 
also believed the pipeline was a preventive measure against future droughts.  According 
to 1997, wire services from South African Press Association (SAPA), the Chinese 
government (PRC) had pledged $283,000 (US dollars) toward the pipeline project. Japan 
had also expressed interest in funding the project and Namibian President Sam Nujoma 
had made appeals to the German government for project loans as well.  Owens Corning, a 
U.S. corporation, offered to supply $50 million in pipes, and suggested that the pipeline 
would accelerate the rate of Namibian industrialization. 
                                                 
255 Melber, Namibia: A Decade of Independence. 
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Interestingly, the idea of the Eastern National Water Carrier (ENCW) was 
initiated prior to Namibia’s independence, when the territory was known as South West 
Africa (SWA) and all water management was governed by the Union of South Africa 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.  Such IBTs were common place for the Union 
of South Africa, where a preference for large scale water engineering infrastructure 
development had been repeatedly used as an instrument of economic development and 
water provision to places where water was scarce and unreliable.   
Completion of the ENCW follows a colonial norm and a shared past, in which 
large hydro-schemes dependent upon large scale infrastructure remain the favored 
solution, as opposed to indigenous and rural water development alternatives. Currently 
the ENWC links two dams—the VonBach in Windhoek and Omatako in Hereroland.   
The state felt the need to take action to remediate both the immediate water concerns and 
those in the future as a preventive measure.  Although Botswana had its own water 
development plans in the 1990s, Namibia—then territory under the Union of South 
Africa—had been considering the construction of a pipeline since 1973.256  In fact, a 
portion of the ENWC pipeline already existed (Figure 7).  Namibia presented its pipeline 
plans to Botswana only upon their completion, which contributed to the view that 
Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM) was a mere “paper tiger”.257  It is 
important to note that when established in 1994, it was Namibia that initiated OKACOM, 
                                                 
256 Heyns, Interview.  
257 Ramberg, “A Pipeline from the Okavango River,”129. 
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believing that its participation would lead to, “Agreed access to a reasonable and 
equitable share in the waters of the Okavango.”258   
 
 
Figure 7.  Proposed Rundo-Grootfontein Pipeline (represented by the broken line)—part of the ENWC IBT 
to divert water from the Okavango River Basin where it crosses into Namibia, and the current pipeline 




Botswana, along with many international NGOs and institutions, argues that 
diversion of the river would render irreparable harm to the Delta's ecological system and 
the economy of Botswana.  According to a member of the Botswanan delegation to 
OKACOM, Steve Monna, who I interviewed while doing fieldwork in the region, after 
diamonds, delta-generated tourism is the second largest contributor to the national 
                                                 
258 Electronic communication with Mr. Piet Heyns, 25 April 2003. I had extensive interviews with Mr. 
Heyns in 2002, and again in 2004 in Namibia, as well as electronic communications.  He was an excellent 
source of many state documents and reference materials, and allowed me to participate, as an observer, at 
OKACOM and other meetings.   
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economy of Botswana.  For Angola and Namibia, the river represents potential 
hydropower and irrigation for reconstruction of areas that were destroyed during the 
Angolan Civil War and the Namibian War of Liberation, respectively, and for new and 
future economic development.  According to Heyns, the Namibian delegate to 
OKACOM, who I also interviewed while doing fieldwork, the Kavango River’s potential 
is in irrigation, and in its potential to provide increased water to Windhoek via the 
Eastern National Water Carrier.259  A proponent of cooperation, Heyns does not dispute 
the ecological value, importance, or uniqueness of the Okavango Delta. He merely points 
out that the benefits of developing this research are not insignificant.  
 
Angola and the Okavango River  
 
 The Republic of Angola, headwater and upper-most riparian of the Okavango 
River, is rich in mineral and oil resources: diamonds in the northeast, offshore oil 
reserves in the Cabinda region, and rich agricultural land in the central highlands (areas 
farmed as coffee plantations during colonialism).  Angola is bordered on the south by 
Namibia, east by Zambia, and north and east by the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
along the Southern Atlantic Coast.  With a little over 1,600 km of Atlantic coastline and 
about twice the size of Texas, Angola is the seventh largest African state and one of the 
least populated.  After an armed struggle against Portugal that began in 1961, Angola 
became independent in 1975.   




Portugal’s departure from Angola (and in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau) would 
have regional, national and continental implications.  In Angola, the departing Portuguese 
failed to hand over control to any succeeding government or nationally recognized 
political entity.  For South Africa, it would generate two political concerns: a black-ruled, 
independent, and Marxist-Leninist state on its geo-political borders, as well military 
actions involving Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States, strategic moves 
reflective of Cold War politics and states.260  During the 1970s and 1980s, Cuban 
President Fidel Castro sent Cuban soldiers to fight on behalf of Angola and Namibia 
against South Africa.  He also sent doctors and civilians to assist in several other African 
countries’ liberation struggles.   
South Africa’s military action against Angola would also create alliances of 
several independent African states (Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and Sudan) against South 
Africa.  Additionally, it would lead to Namibia’s insurgent independence group SWAPO 
(South West Africa’s People’s Organization)261 to align itself with the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).  As a result, the MPLA, the USSR, Algeria and 
Egypt would all provide military training support to SWAPO in its fight for an 
independent Namibia.  SWAPO, ironically, evolved from an organization founded in 
Cape Town, South Africa in 1957, named Owamboland People’s Organization (OPO).  
Following a 1959 protest against the forced removal of blacks from the city of Windhoek 
into the black township Katutura, the name changed to both disguise the organization’s 
                                                 
260 U.S. Department of State, The CIA World Factbook.  
261 SWAPO’s origins further illustrate the intimate geopolitical relationship between the colonial history of 
the region and political relationships and may help to explain some aspects of the nature of cooperation 
between independent African states. There are several tribal groups in Namibia. Two important ones 
associated with the fight for independence are the Owambos and Hereros. Like many states in Africa, tribal 
differences contribute to political tensions, schisms, and violent conflict.  
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tribal support base and to attract members from other ethnic groups in Namibia.  For 
South Africa, fighting the MPLA, fighting communism, and fighting to retain control 
over Namibia would turn out to be the singular military and political activity until 1988, 
when South Africa agreed to withdraw troops from Angola, provided Cuba did the same. 
Portugal’s formal, reluctant, and rapid departure would take with it much of the 
country’s governing expertise and businesses, triggering institutional failures and a 
scramble for power to among three political groups: the Movimento Popular da 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).  United in their 
demand for independence from Portugal, but differing in ideology, these three groups 
would fight the Portuguese, each other, and South Africa along Angola’s southern border.   
Once the internal conflicts for dominance were over, Angola reflected the global 
conflict of the Cold War politics of that same time period.  Each group, the FNLA, 
UNITA, and MPLA would have support from either the Soviet Union and its allies, or 
the United States and its allies.  For example, the FNLA was supported by Zaire, which 
was also supported by U.S. assistance, and, ironically, by China. UNITA, the least 
ideological, would seek and receive South African and, as a consequence, U.S. support.  
The MPLA, with its strong Marxist philosophy, would receive financial backing and 
military support from the Soviet Union and troops from Cuba. 
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With support from the Soviet Union262 and its ally, Cuba, the MPLA won control 
over the newly independent Angola.  This would launch a MPLA-UNITA civil war 
within Angola that would itself last twenty-seven years, and result in millions killed, 
maimed, displaced, and subject to famine and poverty.  The war enabled the theft of 
public money and exacerbated corruption.  Further, control of diamonds and oil resources 
became an integral part of the conflict. The UNITA stronghold included the Cuando-
Cubango province (the majority of the Okavango River basin catchment area) and the 
central highlands.  Dominance of the catchment region by UNITA would spill over into 
the Namibian-Angolan border region.  The result would be large numbers of Angolans 
moving into the northern part of Namibia, many of whom are still there.  Large numbers 
of left-over land mines add another complication to province resettlement, development, 
and catchment area management.   
Angola has a history characterized by exploitation, which included an active 
commercial slave trade263 and violence on a scale that has no comparable measure in 
either of its basin riparians, Botswana and Namibia.  Tony Hodges writes that Angola is 
in the process of a “. . . quadruple transition:  from war to peace and reconciliation; from 
humanitarian emergency to rehabilitation, recovery and development; from an 
                                                 
262 The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was being played out on the various 
continents as each sought allies and supported causes in an effort to either win loyalty or keep various 
countries from aligning with either one side or the other, in this ideological struggle between communism 
and democracy.  Many African independence or freedom fighters struggling for independence sought and 
received Soviet support for their cause.  The United States with its ally, South Africa, backed UNITA as a 
counter to the Marxist-oriented MPLA and to counter Soviet influence in Africa. 
263 According to Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (1994), the scale 
of the slave-trading economy in Angola involved the direct participation of the agencies of the civil 
government.  Also, Angola was a dumping ground for convicts crowding the Portuguese prisons, which 
contributed significantly to the “special character” of colonialism in Angola. Only the Portuguese used 
Africa, specifically Angola, as a penal settlement. 
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authoritarian, one-party system of governance to pluralist democracy; and from a 
command economy to one based on the laws of the market.” 264   
In all of Angola, landmines, desolation, systemic neglect, and human 
displacement have stymied development.  The destruction of most infrastructures and the 
presence of landmines have limited the physical movement of people and will continue to 
suppress development initiatives in the catchment area.  It is estimated that less than 3% 
of Angolans live in the Angolan Okavango basin area.  In recent decades, no censuses 
have been conducted in Angola; however, estimates of total population range from 12.5 
to 15 million.265  Further, the long civil war has made accurate date difficult to obtain and 
verify, if it is even available.  Different sources estimate between two and four million 
internally displaced people (IDPs) throughout Angola,266 with approximately 160,000 in 
Menongue and 40,000 in Cuito Cuanavale—the basin catchment areas.   
The war’s official end was April 2002. The end of the civil war in Angola raises 
many questions of interest to its basin riparians, particularly regarding cooperation 
around the Okavango River basin.  It was the Angolan civil war which prevented 
development of the upper basin area Cuando-Cubango (Kuando-Kubango) and thereby 
resulted in no upstream activity that would either reduce stream flow or increase the 
pollution loads resulting from agricultural production.   
                                                 
264Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, 199. 
265 More data on the region’s population can be found in the CIA World Factbook (worldfacts.us), in 
Mendelsohn and el Obeid’s Okavango River; UNEP database of population; or from the Office for Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
266 In “The Peace Dividend in Angola,” Porto and Clover posit that there were more than a million and a 
half casualties, four million internally displaced people (a third of the population), and close to one-half 
million refugees in neighboring countries. 
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Angola is not likely to encounter water scarcity in the immediate future, due in 
part to the fact that its population centers and highest water demands are located along 
the coast, far away from the upper reaches of the basin.  In terms of downstream water 
security there are several factors267 of interest: 
1. Development in the Kuando-Kubango region of the basin most likely 
will occur slowly due mostly to the presence of landmines, lack of 
infrastructure, i.e. road and rail infrastructure, and the resettlement of 
IDPs and other refugees.   
2. Angola’s post-war peace-building and humanitarian challenges and 
recovery efforts are complicated by its successful oil operations and 
revenues. These were virtually unaffected by the war but do not benefit 
the society as a whole.  Since the formal Angolan economy has shrunk, 
much of the resources and leadership needed for redevelopment are not 
available where they are needed. 
3. The Civil war had “catastrophic consequences for agricultural 
production and created a humanitarian crisis that was compounded by 
the periodic pause and resumption of armed hostilities between 1991 
and 1998. 
4. Unplanned developments in Angola along the de-mined transport 
routes and corridors in the Cubango and Cuito sub-basin regions. 
5. Patterns of unsustainable development and related water uses 
including: overgrazing, the diversion of water to service urban 
expansion, irrigated agricultural production, resettlement, and general 
redevelopment. 
 
Another factor not yet analyzed in the literature is the growing development investment 
by China.  With unrestricted ‘no strings attached’(that is, requiring no analysis of 
economic, environmental or interstate impacts) financial investment from China, the 
development of natural resources infrastructure, like extracting oil and minerals or 
                                                 
267 Porto and Clover, “The Peace Dividend in Angola.” 
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constructing the roads and dams necessary for continued hydro-power, construction in 
select African states has been accelerating.268   
At the conclusion of the Angolan civil war, and even as late as 2004-2005, very 
little was know about the water resources or water use in the upper catchment area of the 
Okavango River basin.  The civil war prevented the collection of baseline data.  
According to a 2000 Global Environment Facility (GEF) report, the Okavango River 
Basin was considered one of the least human impacted basins on the African continent, 
but socio-economic and population pressures from its riparians posed the utmost threat to 
its character.  As stated previously, Angola is the dominant hydrological contributor to 
the Okavango River Basin; if it is to improve significantly its involvement in regional 
water cooperation dialogues it will require increased technical, managerial, and 
governing capacity.  With such improvements, Angola stands to become the basin hydro-
hegemon and by tapping its rich water resource create anxiety for its downstream 
riparians.  
Presently Angola is not in a position to undertake upstream efforts to control the 
flow of water or use its geographical position to exclude downstream riparians.  Without 
Angola being able to physically and technologically seize control over the Cubango and 
                                                 
268 “China is building major new railroad lines in Nigeria and Angola, large dams in Sudan, airports in 
several countries and new roads, it seems, almost everywhere.  One of the largest road builders, China 
Road and Bridge Construction, has picked up where the solidarity brigades of an earlier generation left off. 
The company, which is owned by the Chinese government, has 29 projects in Africa, many financed by the 
World Bank or other lenders, and it maintains offices in 22 African countries.” From “New Power in 
Africa:  Entrepreneurs From China Flourish in Africa,” by Howard W. French and Lydia, published in the 





Cuito Rivers, hydro-political and hydro-geologic extremes in asymmetrical physical 
interdependence269 will not take place just yet.  However, Botswana and Namibia’s 
demands for water from a single resource and political and future developmental change 
in Angola, potentially increase the long-range potential for exacerbating basin conflict, 
especially in light of disproportionate downstream dependence on a flow of water an 
upstream riparian may cut off.  Again, this is dependent upon the capability of an 
upstream riparian to convert its resource and geographical advantage into an actual 
capacity to inflict downstream flow reduction.  While this may not be the case with 
Angola and its downstream riparian states, it is the case with Namibia and Botswana.   
Angola is a member of OKACOM.  It is also a SADC member and signatory to 
the Protocol.  It has the highest and most reliable rainfall, lowest evaporation rates, and 
more rivers and streams than any of the other Okavango River riparians.  It is not, 
however, a signatory to the Ramsar Convention.  As a result it is not under the same 
obligations that Namibia and Botswana are under to promote the conservation of the 
Delta’s wetlands and their resources.  However, as a member to the Permanent Okavango 
River Basin Commission (OKACOM), Angola is part of an institution that is developing 
sustainable ecosystem management plans for the entire basin.  All the same, Angola is an 
unknown entity, and as the upstream riparian eventually may take the lion’s share of the 
water.  History has demonstrated that upstream states, regions, and hydro-hegemons 
frequently consume or exercise control over the larger share of water.   
Now that Angola’s civil war has ended, resettlement and development is 
beginning to occur. Angola is anxious to move toward the level of development of its 
                                                 
269 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 
 204 
 
basin co-riparians. Because of this, its river resources may come under pressure.270  When 
upstream development occurs, it has the potential to cause pollution, reduced river flow, 
and reduced water quality, all of which are actions that may result in negative 
downstream effects.   
There are, however, more important post-war challenges facing Angola. The 
country has begun measures promoting national reconciliation, demilitarization, the 
disarmament of combatants, and the strengthening of political participation.  Further, the 
country is beginning to address the growing need for policy reform as well institutional 
development for public administration, education, and social services. All these require a 
nuanced allocation of the various resources necessary to address urban and rural poverty, 
high mortality, unemployment, and economic diversification.  According to the UNDP’s 
Human Development Index, Angola is ranked 161 out of 173 countries, with an 
estimated one million or more children having no access to educational or health 
facilities.  It is believed that children under 15 comprise over half of Angola’s population, 
with 20 to 25 percent under the age of five. 
Politics plays an important role in securing and implementing water agreements.  
Cooperation, connecting the principles (1) equitable and reasonable utilization271 and (2) 
no significant harm, necessitates that all riparian states are able to not only negotiate, but 
are able to introduce and take advantage of joint opportunities for water development and 
management.  However, a riparian actor’s ability to do so may be constrained by capacity 
imbalances, an inability to analyze and formulate knowledgeable policy positions, or past 
                                                 
270 Mbaiwa, “Causes and Possible Solutions to Potential Water Resource Conflicts in the Okavango River 
Basin.”   
271 Based on the Helsinki Rules. 
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circumstances leaving them subject to the decisions of a hydro-hegemon.  Though a 
major water contributor not only to the Okavango River basin, but also the Zambezi and 
Cunene as well, and a signatory to several bilateral and multilateral transboundary water 
agreements, Angola lacks the institutional, technical, and managerial capacity necessary 
to effectively engage in water resource management decisions.  More importantly, 
Angola does not have the necessary technology, knowledge base, expertise, or 
institutional capacity to take advantage of its geographical position in the Okavango 
River basin.  
Though the upstream riparian, presently Angola has no capacity to restrict or 
exclude its downstream riparians from unlimited access to the river’s water resources.  At 
the time of this research there was no readily available data for upstream water 
withdrawals or development in Angola.  The extensive use of land mines272 in the 
Cuando-Cubango province during the civil war remain an immense challenge as clearing 
the mines has suffered from inadequate resources to take on such a challenge.  As a 
result, developing land-use intelligence and reducing the data gaps by collecting 
ecological and hydrological information from the field continues to be a difficult and 
dangerous task.   
Equally important to planned water development is the level of unknown, 
unregulated and unmanaged Okavango catchment activity, which also may have an 
impact on downstream water quality and quantity.  In spite of the peace dividend, Angola 
is experiencing limited development capacity, significant scientific gaps, technical 
                                                 
272 In “Angola,” published in Chabal’s A History of Postcolonial Luscophone Africa, David Birmingham 
estimates that as many as 9 million mines were put down in Angola. 
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uncertainties, a gap in governmental professional and technical knowledge, and 
conflicting post-war national interests, all of which are likely to impede its upstream 
water development, at least temporarily. 
 
Botswana—the Okavango River Basin and the Delta  
 
 Like its other Okavango River basin riparians, Botswana shares a complex 
economic and political history with South Africa and, like Angola, provided support and 
refuge to anti-apartheid activists during the 1970s and 1980s.  During that time, and even 
now, Botswana seemed acutely aware of its economic dependence and interdependence 
with South Africa.  Because of geography and history, Botswana has had and continues 
to have strong and multilayered economic and political connections with South Africa.  
Before discussing Botswana’s hydro-politics, it is useful to offer some perspective on its 
past history, including its economic and political relationship with South Africa, which is 
very different than that of Namibia and Angola’s with South Africa.   
Botswana, previously Bechuanaland, and Lesotho were British protectorates, as 
opposed to colonies.273 The Bechuanaland (Botswana) Protectorate encompassed the 
                                                 
273 Interestingly, in Botswana colonial rule has been described as so mild that the term ‘indirect rule’ might 
be more appropriate according to John Holm in “Botswana: A Paternalistic Democracy.”  Unlike South 
Africa or Namibia, fewer Europeans settled in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. As a result, less pressure was 
placed on the colonial government to rule and protect settlers.  Unlike other colonial settlements where the 
potential for agriculture (i.e. coffee, cacao, or cotton plantations) or resource extraction (gold, or other 
minerals) was dominant, cattle provided the pre-colonial, and, to a great extent, the post-colonial source of 
wealth.   As a protectorate Botswana’s Tswana chiefs dominated traditional decision-making, exercised 
authority, and used their influence to protect the territory’s incorporation.  Indeed, in the 1880’s when the 
Tswana chiefs appealed to the British for protection, they were also mindful of Germans wanting to link the 
territory that would become known as the Caprivi region and the upper reaches of the Okavango Delta’s 
source waters to German territory in Tanganyika, the African territory that was once part of the German 
East African colony.  Named after Lake Tanganyika, this territory is now part of the Tanzania mainland. 
Tanganyika became part of British colonial Africa after World War I under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.    
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northern part of the territory, and eventually came under the protection of the British 
Crown. For Bechuanaland, part of the rationale of becoming a British protectorate was to 
prevent advances into its territory by Boers from the Transvaal or German expansion 
from South West Africa. Ironically, it was governed by powers exercised by the high 
commissioner in South Africa, an incorporation Botswana had historically opposed.274 
Botswana strongly opposed this governance, but that opposition did not, and has not, 
resulted in Botswana escaping the socio-political and economic influence of South Africa 
(then Union of South Africa) from the late eighteen hundreds on. It was not until South 
Africa became a republic and left the Commonwealth in 1961 that it abandoned its efforts 
to incorporate the Bechuanaland protectorate.275 During that same period, at least through 
the 1950s, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was making similar efforts to incorporate 
Bechuanaland into its territory.276  
Their economic relationship is complex as well.  Since 1910, Botswana has been 
economically connected to South Africa (SA), wherein SA collected levies from customs, 
sales, excise duties, and subsequently participated in revenue sharing as a result the South 
African Customs Union (SACU).  The formula for revenue sharing and the decision 
making authority over duties is held exclusively by the government of South Africa, 
which was not renegotiated until 2001.  In addition to Botswana, the SACU arrangement 
included Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland.277 The benefits of belonging to a single 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
275 du Toit, State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa.    
276 Ibid. 
277 The SACU links trade of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa.  The South African 
economy dominates SACU. According to the 2007 U.S. Department of State Country Profile on Botswana, 
a new SACU structure has now been formally ratified and a SACU Secretariat has been established in 
Windhoek, Namibia. Following South Africa's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO, of which 
 208 
 
customs union, and sharing road, rail, and communications networks accrued mostly to 
South Africa, chiefly because South Africa was the most developed and had the 
necessary physical and economic infrastructure.     
Hydrologically, Botswana is not considered a water-scarce state.278 According to 
Falkenmark and Lundvist279 and Fruhling280, Botswana uses less than one percent of the 
available water, and is much better off than many of its neighboring states and co-
riparians.  Nonetheless, according to the SADC regional water strategy, Botswana is 
recognized as one of the more water-scarce states in southern Africa.  It is dependent 
upon groundwater, ephemeral and perennial rivers, IBTs, and rain.  With the exception of 
the Okavango and Chobe Rivers in the northeastern region of the country, all other 
surface rivers within Botswana are ephemeral.   
Like its co-riparian Namibia, in Botswana there are enormous distances between 
water supply locations and water demand population centers.  To some extent, the 
location of population centers may be related to the presence of the Kalahari Desert and 
disease risk associated with the tsetse fly in the Delta.  So while surface water supply 
from the Delta was more abundant, the more favorable climate and arable farming soil 
conditions are concentrated in the southern and eastern part of the country.  
Botswana is a co-riparian in six river basins: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Botswana also is a member), many of the SACU duties are declining, making American products more 
competitive in Botswana. Currently the SACU countries and the U.S. are negotiating a Trade, Investment 
and Development Cooperation Agreement, scheduled to be signed in 2008. Botswana signed an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the European Union in December 2007, and, as a member of SACU, it signed 
a preferential trade agreement in 2004 with Mercosur. SACU also has plans to negotiate free trade 
agreements with China, India, Kenya, and Nigeria.   
278 Ohlsson, Hydropolitics.  
279 Falkenmark and Lundvist, “Looming Water Crisis.”  
280 Fruhling, “A Liquid More Valuable Than Gold.” 
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1. Molopo/Nossop River to the south, which flows into the Orange River and 
forms the southern border between Botswana and South Africa. 
2. Limpopo River to the eastern border, between Botswana and South Africa. 
3. Makgadikgadi pans and drainage basin281 to the west of the Limpopo. 
4. Kwando/Linyanti/Chobe Rivers in the north, where the Kwando, 
originating in Angola, enters Botswana after crossing through the Caprivi 
Strip in Namibia and then spreads into the Linyanti swamp system in 
Botswana.   
5. Okavango River basin, shared with Angola and Namibia in the northwest, 
which terminates in the Okavango Delta and its outlets in Botswana. 
6.  Orange River Basin to the southern border between Botswana and South 
Africa where Botswana contributes no flow, but potentially may put into 
effect its significant political leverage and influence. 
Highly uneven and limited, renewable groundwater resources represent another 
source of water for Botswana. Often saline where they exist, groundwater resources 
supply livestock, rural villages, and the mining sectors.  Even if not considered water-
scarce,282  Botswana faces serious water challenges, which potentially could limit future 
welfare and economic growth.   
Botswana’s national water master plan, the single policy tool of the 1990s, states 
as its major objectives:  
                                                 
281 Makgadikgadi pans constitute a region of sandy alkaline clay depressions (pans) in northeastern 
Botswana. On the eastern side of the pans, the Mosope, Mosetse and Nata Rivers all drain into the 
Makgadikgadi pans.  On the western side the Boteti River is considered part of the Okavango Delta 
wetland system.  Of the four rivers, the Nata is the largest, draining mostly from Zimbabwe, into the 
Makgadikgadi.  The pans form a broad inland basin situated roughly halfway between Maun and Nata in 
northern Botswana. 
282 Ohlsson, Hydropolitics.  
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a. Estimate national water demands from 1990 to 2021;  
b. Determine availability and development potential of the country’s water resources 
to meet those demands; and 
 
c. Determine the most favorable water resources development programs and policies 
and identify their associated financial, institutional, legal resource requirements, 
as well as environmental and social impacts. 
 
All of these objectives suggest that Botswana’s national water plan is for the nation to 
develop economically within the country’s water means.  The National Water Plan Study 
argues that the uncertainty of future water supplies in Botswana, competing uses, and 
high opportunity costs of water makes irrigation prohibitively expensive.  As a result, 
large scale irrigation becomes a less likely alternative and too expensive for food self-
sufficiency. One result is that “Botswana accepts that total food self-sufficiency is neither 
achievable nor sustainable.”283      
There are over 50 different types of dams in Botswana.  Some are earthen, and 
others are major infrastructure works. The latter include many that have been completed, 
are under construction, or are in the planning stages.  The Ntimbale dam was completed 
in 2006, and the Thune and Lower Shashe are scheduled to be completed by March 
2009.284  Namibia has ten large dams.  Currently no significant amounts of water are 
being abstracted from the Okavango or Chobe Rivers.  In the early 1980s, Botswana had 
plans to develop a series of pipelines in the Okavango Delta wetlands to supply existing 
settlements, increase agriculture irrigation prospects and improve fishing facilities.285  
However, by its declaration as a Ramsar Site, Botswana’s ability to undertake Delta 
                                                 
283From the 1992 Botswana National Water Plan Study prepared by SMEC/KPB/SGAB (available: 
http://www.atlas.gov.bw/) and the FAO report from the Natural Resources Management and Environment 
Department Report (available: http://www.fao.org/docrep/V8260B/V8260B0g.htm).   
284 SADC Review, “Botswana Water and Energy.” 




water development schemes is constrained by the same rules it expects Namibia to follow 
by not developing its hydrological schemes along the Kavango stretch of the river.   
What is important here is that nearly ten years later (1990s) and in response to 
international NGOs, e.g. the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and 
local riparian communities objecting to Delta water development the government of 
Botswana agreed to support an independent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) of 
the SOIWDP.  IUCN conducted the assessment and concluded better alternatives existed.  
In 1992, the government determined to forego its 1980s SOIWDP Okavango Delta water 
development plans.286  Botswana’s response suggests that the government is willing to 
soften its political posture (that is, give up part of its sovereignty) in order to further in 
the case of its water development plans especially if it strengthens its ability to subject its 
co-riparian, Namibia, to similar independent third-party oversight.   
About this same time, an extended drought in Namibia had reduced the national 
water supply and increased pressure to move forward on its Eastern National Water 
Carrier (ENWC) pipeline construction project to transfer water from the Okavango River. 
Namibia’s national Environmental Impact Assessment on the project concluded it would 
have no major impacts on the Okavango River Basin-Delta.287  In response, Botswana 
insisted that an independent international EIS be conducted to investigate the 
environmental impact of the water diversion, via the pipeline, on the downstream delta in 
                                                 
286 Ibid. 
287  Hellmuth, “Water Resources of Namibia,” in Fuller and Prommer, Population-Development-
Environment in Namibia Background Readings. 
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Botswana.  Namibia subsequently retreated from its decision to go forward with the 
pipeline construction.  Why?  It rained.288   
It is difficult to determine whether the decision was driven by external factors or 
natural ones. The rain ended the drought and temporarily reduced Namibia’s water need, 
thus lowering the urgency behind constructing the pipeline.  However, Namibia still 
needs water.  Accessing the Okavango River remains an option, even if it must arrange 
for IBTs further upstream through bilateral negotiations with Angola.   
The need to divert the Okavango to augment the water supplies in the central area 
of Namibia had been identified long before Namibia’s independence.  The questions of 
access, however, were not taken-up with the co-riparians previously because Namibia 
was not a sovereign state.289 Although the Helsinki Rules convention, to which Namibia 
and Botswana are signatories, suggests a different approach, Turton290 contends that 
Namibia has the right to use the water of the Okavango to develop and administrate 
important economic and social activities, and will exercise its right if no other water 
resource is available.  
                                                 
288 This pithy summary came up during my interviews with both Heyns and Turton. It also came up in my 
interviews with Shirley Bethune and Steve Rothert. At the time of my interview in 2000, Dr. Bethune was 
working for the Ministry of Environment and Tourism on the National Water Resources Management 
Review Team. She is an aquatic ecologist, engaged in water and wetland-related consultancy work and a 
part-time lecturer at the Polytechnic of Namibia. She is the founder and co-chair of the Wetland Working 
Group of Namibia and the founding member of the Okavango Basin Steering Committee, which she also 
co-ordinated.     
     I interviewed Steve Rothert after the publication of his 1999 paper, “Meeting Namibia's Water Needs 
While Sparing the Okavango.”  He provided me with an early version copy. Steve Rothert is the Director of 
the California Field Office Prior for American Rivers. He worked with the organization as a private 
consultant on hydropower and dam-related issues. Steve has also worked in Botswana, where he 
represented the International Rivers Network on dam and other river issues throughout southern Africa.   
289 From information presented at the Green Cross International Okavango Pilot Project (OPP) Workshop, 
during the session entitled “Cooperation in the Okavango River Basin:  the OKACOM Experience”, in 
March 2003.  The OPP Workshop was part of a Green Cross Water for Peace initiative.  The Okavango 
was one of six basins included in the overall study effort. 
290 Turton, “Hydropolitics and Security Complex Theory.”  
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In this region, the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses is the relevant 
benchmark, not Helsinki.  However, the revised 2000 SADC Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses includes similar language and provisions.  The Helsinki Rules would argue 
that no basin state may deny another state reasonable use of common water resources for 
the purpose of reserving water for itself but that signatory states need to engage equitable 
sharing, guarantee access to water resources, and consider the potential for downstream 
(implied) harm.  A more detailed discussion of the SADC protocol for transboundary 
water resources as a regional framework for transboundary watercourses is in the 
Agreements, Accords, River Basin Organizations, and International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) section.  
In terms of the politics of transboundary water cooperation and agreements, what 
this case study illustrates is not only the fragility of such agreements and river basin 
organizations (RBOS), but also how important it is that their respective strategic 
framework, mandates, and implementation are to insulate a particular transboundary 
water resource or influence riparian behaviors where water is increasingly scarce.  There 
are many variables able to undermine cooperation, including an extended period of 
drought; escalation of regional, domestic, or past political issues among riparians, i.e. 
Caprivi, Sedudu-Kasikili river island or others; increased numbers of refugees or other 
types of population shift; the continued tension between Botswana and Namibia; and 
unilateral action by an upstream riparian (Angola or Angola and Namibia).  While 
Angola lacks such an option at present, Namibia, on the other hand, does not.   
Namibia has the capacity, technical knowledge, and geographical advantage over 
Botswana necessary to divert water and inflict major downstream losses.  With such a 
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potential upstream threat, Botswana acted to have the Okavango designated as a Ramsar 
site, leveraging contacts like the U.S. State Department and World Conservation Union 
outside of the water-sharing basin to compensate for an axiomatic lack of geographical 
leverage.291 However, according to a 2000 Green Cross International Report this interest 
in conservation is just Botswana’s publicly stated position.  All along it was “quietly 
developing a series of pipelines along the Panhandle.”  These pipeline projects are 
intended to “. . . supply existing settlements, and will also act as a strong migration pull 
factor in the future.” 292
Aside from the Ramsar designation to protect the Okavango Delta, Botswana has 
been and continues to be a vocal opponent to Namibian water development schemes that 
result in Okavango River stream flow reduction like Namibia’s Eastern National Water 
Carrier (ENCW).  The ENCW planning and implementation began in the early 1970s, 
which when fully completed would supply water from the Okavango River to the city of 
Windhoek, a distance of approximately 720km.  When initially planned it was to have an 
eastern link to Gobabis and western links to the Namibian coastal communities of 
Swakopmund, Walvis Bay and Rössing Mine.  The ENCW pipeline from Windhoek to 
Grootfontein is complete.  It is the outstanding component linking Grootfontein pipeline 
to the Okavango River that is the more controversial aspect of the IBT, as it is believed 
that such and IBT would change the water flow received by the Okavango Delta. 
                                                 
291 Both Keohane and Nye’s Power and Interdependence and LeMarquand’s International Rivers examine 
the idea of leverage more thoroughly.  
292 From the 2000 Green Cross International Report prepared by Anthony Turton (AWIRU-Africa Water 
Issues Research Unit of the University of Pretoria).  The Report was a project proposal to provide an 
objective assessment of the needs and positions of the Okavango Riparian states, in part to prepare for the 
next serious drought in the basin, and to develop a set of conflict prevention measures. 
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Several groups oppose any change in the status quo of the Okavango Delta and 
the water it receives to sustain the ecosystem.  Many of the opponents to IBTs by 
Namibia are local inhabitants who live and depend or the river system’s resources such as 
fish, water, building materials, and jobs in the related tourist industry comprise a second 
group.  Okavango Delta tourism provides a high economic value to Botswana. 
Another opposition group to IBTs includes international and regional interests 
that reflect the internationalization of the ecological importance of the Okavango Delta as 
a unique ecosystem.  For example, a 2002 GEF report maintained that “the threats to the 
Okavango River Basin are real and imminent as evidenced by the unilateral initiative by 
Namibia to abstract water from the system under emergency drought conditions . . . it is 
expected that the opportunity to protect this relatively pristine system will not appear 
again”.293  Nonetheless, upstream from Botswana, Namibia asserts its diversion of a 
portion of the Okavango River would contribute significantly to providing much needed 
water and would not appreciably adversely impact the Delta’s hydro-ecology.  According 
to the 1997 Feasibility study on the Okavango River to Grootfontein Link of the Eastern 
National Water Carrier (ENWC), hydrological modeling concluded that the proposed 
abstraction from the Okavango represented a reduction in flow, but that it would not “dry 
out the Okavango Delta but will affect the outflows from the Okavango Delta into the 
Thamalakane River, reducing it by 1.44Mm3/a.”294 The environmental findings of the 
study states further that:  “The Okavango River does not inundate its flood plains during 
low flow months and the effects of any abstraction would be confined to the main 
                                                 
293 GEF, “Environmental and Sustainable Management of the Okavango River Basin,” 29.   
294 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Feasibility Study on the Okavango River to 
Grootfontein Link of the Eastern National Water Carrier, 48-49.   
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channel.”  It goes on to say that:  “Such a decrease would be hardly discernable”295.  
Admittedly, this report’s conclusions are dated, but without scientific or factual 
environmental information to the contrary, this report’s findings remain unchallenged.  
OKACOM members have agreed to another study and environmental analysis.  
The proposed completion of the ENCW pipeline illustrates how attempts by one 
state to increase and secure water resources is met with suspicion by another.  The 
construction of a dam at Popa Falls is another controversial water scheme by a co-
riparian that has drawn Botswana’s ire, as well as that of international NGOs, including 
International Rivers (IRN).  
The proposed and planned construction of the Popa Falls hydropower station 
represents another factor that complicates the hydrology of the Okavango Delta, but also 
represents how an upstream riparian—Namibia—is actively considering, once again, its 
future hydro-security.  Again, some of the louder protests against Namibia’s proposed 
actions came from environmental NGOs and Botswana’s tourism industry wanting to 
secure the Okavango Delta.  For many Botswanan citizens, and other interested actors, 
protecting the Okavango Delta is the center stage of identity formation constructing an 
“imagined security community”.296  
 
South Africa and the Okavango River Basin 
 South Africa is not a riparian in the Okavango River Basin.  However, its position 
as regional political power and influential actor and hydro-hegemon should not be 
                                                 
295 Ibid., 49. 
296 Conca and Dabelko, Environmental Peacemaking.  
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overlooked and cannot be ignored.  Neither should its past political relations with each of 
the Okavango basin states.   
 South Africa has had a unique role within the southern African community and 
among current SADC states.  Its political and military role in the region and with 
Okavango basin riparians has been volatile, violent, and, most recently, virtuous. Post-
1994 South Africa works toward being a “good” neighbor toward its neighboring states.  
It represents approximately one-third of the SADC population, but uses almost eighty 
percent of all exploited water resources, of which only ten percent are actually available 
in South Africa.297   
 Though geographically on the sidelines, South Africa has had an important role in 
improving the knowledge base and management dialogue on the Okavango River basin.  
Numerous interviews with regional water elites, researchers, scholars, and public officials 
suggests that efforts on the part of South Africa may altruistically represent an effort on 
the part of this group to be a good and helpful co-riparian, as well as a keen awareness of 
asymmetry, hegemony, and in the case of shared transboundary river basins, riparian 
position and history.   
 South Africa, like many of the international interests in the Okavango River basin, 
has focused its attention on the Delta.  Conservation and protection of the Delta as a 
local, regional, and international ecosystem has gained significance as a common good.  
However, it is not clear that this is South Africa’s principal interest or goal with respect 
to the Okavango River Basin.  Because of the Okavango Delta, the Okavango River basin 
is an internationalized basin subject to international financial donor and non-
                                                 
297 Van Wyk,  “The International Politics of dams with specific reference to Lesotho.” 
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governmental organization interest.  The Okavango basin riparians, in some respects, lack 
a functional hydro-hegemonic state.  Thus basin states have reached a normative 
agreement with the local hegemon—South Africa. According to Warner,298 hegemony 
brings greater benefits than discomforts and non-hegemons may be so repressed that 
there is no hope of successful counter-hegemonic action. In this case, such an action 
would be counterproductive, especially for Botswana and for South Africa. Remember, 
all flights transfer in Johannesburg.  South Africa is likely to receive some residual 
economic benefit from the Delta’s continued survival and economy.   
 South Africa is and intends to remain both the regional hegemon and as well as 
the hydro-hegemon in the SADC region at large.  Part of retaining that position will 
depend in part on being able to continue its influence in the region, exercise influence in 
a basin in which it is not a riparian, and continue as an African continental power.  South 
Africa is playing the long game; this nation is trying to exercise and secure its regional 
hegemony, of which its hydro-hegemony is a major component.  
 Many of the water elite in South Africa have contributed to major research and 
analysis on the Okavango Delta, and are likely to continue to play a major role.299 
Additionally, South African scholars, academic and policy professionals, and its 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF)  have been a principal source of 
hydrological data, regional and state background and archival information, and at the 
forefront of research efforts especially in regard to the Okavango Delta.  As the keeper of 
hydrological data, much of it undisputed, and as the regional actor with the capacity and 
                                                 
298 Warner, “Hydro-hegemony as a Layered Cake.”  
299 A variety of sources confirm this, including Ashton’s “The Search for an Equitable Basis for Water 
Sharing,” Heyns’ “Achievements of the Orange-Senqu River Commission in Integrated Transboundary 
Water Resource Management,” Green Cross International, IRN and  U.S. State Department-funded 
research vis-à-vis IUCN.  
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talents necessary in the manufacture, negotiation and authoritative certification of 
knowledge, capture of new and additional data, transfer technological skill and 
knowledge, and harness broad international support, potentially South Africa can wield 
considerable influence among SADC states and within basins where it is not a riparian.   
 As has been noted in the discussion on OKACOM, all major airline flights go 
through Johannesburg OR Tambo International Airport, formally known as the 
Johannesburg International Airport in South Africa.  The airport is the transport hub of 
southern Africa and absolutely the busiest airport on the continent, testament to the long 
standing power that is South Africa, most of which is a carry over from its regional 
dominance prior to the independence of all the basin riparians. 
 Another reason to consider the importance of South Africa in the context of the 
Okavango River Basin is its river basin boundary territorial dispute with Namibia.  The 
territorial dispute between Namibia and Botswana was decided in Botswana’s favor.  As 
a result, South Africa may consider Botswana sympathetic to its position regarding the 
Orange River boundary dispute with Namibia.  As discussed in the Orange River Basin 
case study, when deciding on the final river boundary between South Africa and 
Namibia, South Africa has not compromised on its national territory.  The contentious 
border conflict between South Africa and Namibia shares many similarities with the 
Kasikili-Sedudu territorial dispute between Namibia and Botswana. As a water-neutral 
hegemonic presence in the Okavango River Basin, however, South Africa may use its 
economic and political relationship with Botswana to gain its support in maintaining 
South Africa’s position. 
 220 
 
 South Africa has strong economic and historical ties to both Namibia and 
Botswana, and is a key exporter of goods to both nations.  South Africa is the single 
largest supplier of energy to Namibia, and, during apartheid, provided water to Botswana 
at times of drought.300  It has bilateral transboundary water accords with both Namibia 
and Botswana and is a signatory to several international conventions to which they also 
are parties.  To further transboundary water development, management, and cooperation 
in river basins that South Africa shares, Botswana and the Republic of South Africa are 
members of the Botswana / RSA Joint Permanent Technical Water Committee 
 
Agreements, Accords, River Basin Organizations (RBOs) and International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
 There are different levels at which agreements are negotiated, established and 
operate in their respective efforts to navigate various aspects of transboundary water 
cooperation.  Additionally, there are different actors, stakeholders, and institutions 
engaged in dialogue at the various basin, regional, and international levels.  There are 
multiple regulatory arrangements for transboundary river basin management and 
cooperation, including international agreements and conventions, regional and basin 
specific agreements, and in some cases, although not discussed here, there is national 
policy and legislation.  This section briefly outlines several of the more significant 
international, regional, and basin-specific institutions and, includes brief descriptions of 
the agreements, organizations, or river basin organizations (RBOs) and their particular 
                                                 
300 Turton, Interview. 
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role, connection, and interest in outcomes associated with the Okavango River basin and 
it respective riparians.   
 A parallel discussion is also included in the Orange River Basin chapter, with a 
notable difference:  there is no internationalization of the Orange River.  The Okavango 
Delta has become part of an international resource dialogue.  Because of the 
internationalism associated with its protection, management, and sustainability, there are 
several agreements (accords) and international interests, which have captured and 
compete for the attention of Okavango River riparians or to which the basin riparians are 
signatories.   
There are water management issues associated with water resources in the 
Okavango River basin, including  the complexity of the Delta and River basin 
ecosystems, their vulnerability to anthropogenic impacts, regional and international 
pressure to comply with or abide by agreements, protocols, etc., and harmonization of 
state water development plans with shared goals and objectives.  In addition to the water 
management issues, there are political and technological issues, and significant resource-
specific information and data gaps that need filling.   
In an effort to manage the Okavango River’s resources against escalating 
demands for water to support development needs in each basin state, there are several 
regional agreements and protocols that serve an important role toward local 
transboundary water cooperation.  All three riparian states are signatories to several 
international and regional conventions and treaties, briefly enumerated and summarized 
below.   
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I begin at the basin level with OKACOM, which is followed by a table of 
Okavango NGO stakeholders, and an explanation of the role of international financial 
institutions and international conventions to which each is a signatory.  This section 
concludes with a discussion of the SADC Protocol on Shared Water Course Systems and 
how it matters for Okavango hydro-politics.   
 
The Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) 
 In 1994, the Governments of Botswana, Namibia, and Angola committed to a 
multilateral Permanent Water Commission on the Okavango River Basin (OKACOM) to 
investigate how the legitimate water needs of each basin riparian could be accommodated 
in a sustainable manner.  The existing institutional arrangement (OKACOM) is believed 
to provide the “most logical framework for initiating discussions and negotiations 
between the basin states”.301  Additionally, OKACOM aspires to be the formal 
transboundary multi-state RBO responsible managing the resources of the Okavango 
river system through the development of an integrated water management strategy for the 
entire basin.  Since 1995, several research efforts were launched to provide estimates of 
projected water needs for each of the basin states.  One immediate and early stumbling 
block that interfered with collecting the data for each of the OKACOM states was the 
civil war in Angola and the immediate post conflict problem of access to the upper 
Okavango catchment area due to landmines, and weak dysfunctional—essentially 
nonfunctioning—post-war government institutions.  As a result, early estimates of growth 
in consumptive water demand for Angola may have been under estimated. 
                                                 
301 Ashton, Interview.  
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As stated previously, prior to OKACOM, Botswana had considered a major water 
development project for the southern margin of the Delta but cancelled its plans on the 
basis of an independent environmental analysis in 1992 by IUCN and, because of its 
Ramsar designation. Namibian abstraction options from the Okavango River not only 
predated the establishment of OKACOM, but also its independence, and were included in 
its 1995 Central Areas Water Master Plan.  OKACOM predates the 1995 and 2001 
Revised SADC Protocol on Shared Water Course Systems.  At that time, funding for the 
representatives derived principally from national ministers.   
Each country sends a delegation to OKACOM meetings, which typically are 
rotated among the various riparian states.  Recurrent costs for Commission meetings and 
delegation attendance varies by country.  The 1994302 OKACOM agreement establishes a 
Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission, whose key objectives are: 
 To act as technical advisor to the Contracting Parties on matters 
relating to the conservation, development and utilization of water 
resources of common interest.  
 Advise on measures to determining the long term safe yield of the 
water available from all potential water resources in the River; 
  Create the criteria to be taken into account in the conservation, 
equitable allocation and sustainable utilization of water resources; 
 Prevent the pollution of the water resources; 
 Determine the measures to be taken to alleviate short term 
difficulties resulting from water shortages;  
 Investigate the development of any water resources, including the 
construction, operation and maintenance of waterworks.  
                                                 
302 Although OKACOM is mandated to convene all riparians, and to some extent all relevant institutions, it 
is not legally binding on member states and has been constrained by member government’s inadequate 
professional resources. A central challenge for OKACOM (indeed, for any river basin accord or treaty) is 
to determine integrated management of shared watercourses to the mutual benefit of all riparians and the 
ecosystem, without the individual states losing their sovereign control over those same resources. 
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Further provisions concern the following: composition of the Commission (art. 2); 
meetings of the Commission (art. 3); powers of the Commission (art. 4); and its financial 
arrangements (art. 6).   
 Presently, OKACOM has no effective mechanism for collecting or managing data 
or basin planning.  Where there is data, it is incomplete. There is no comprehensive set of 
uncontested basin data.303  Although the cabinets of the riparian governments have vested 
authority in OKACOM to advise on policy, technical and investment matters related to 
the Okavango River Basin, the precise policies, enabling mechanisms, investment 
vehicles, and resource commitments have not yet been firmly established. 
It would seem that the unwritten strategy of OKACOM is to secure the consensus 
of all riparians on the less controversial issues by postponing the key but difficult issues 
concerning the Okavango River to either a future date, succeeding generations, or until 
another crisis forces the issue.  Indeed, it has taken OKACOM until 2005 to establish an 
interim permanent secretariat (OKASEC), which will not be fully operational until 
October 2008.  Given those circumstances, even with international donor funding ($2.2 
Million from SIDA) and support, it is questionable if OKACOM will be able to ever 
function in such a way that it will be able to consider objectively the water development 
plans of its riparians; develop mutually acceptable solutions for sharing water resources 
and basin management; design a system where information and data are mutually 
accepted, harmonized, valid, and communal; or establish a protocol for riparian states to 
                                                 
303 Turton’s “A Hydropolitical History of South Africa’s River Basins,” Ashton’s “The Search for an 
Equitable Basis for Water Sharing”, Heyns’ “The Interbasin Transfer of Water Between SADC Countries,” 
and publications from Green Cross International all demonstrate this. 
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voluntarily give adequate advance notice of changes in the status quo in their respective 
water development plans.    
To have long-term success as the coordinating agency for transboundary 
cooperation on the Okavango River and principal mechanism for collaboration across the 
linked sectors and socio-economic systems of each riparian’s national ministries, 
OKACOM must be accepted and seen as an entity able to implement natural resource 
policy as it relates to the Okavango River basin.  Other linked sectoral interests and 
national ministries, i.e. agricultural, financial, and mining interests may find OKACOM 
either too limiting in its goals and mandates to serve the broader goals of each riparian’s 
national development, thus posing a risk to the long-term success of OKACOM.  Finally, 
it is not likely that OKACOM will become an effective operational river basin 
commission without substantial and continual resource investments from international 
financial institutions.  Even with that investment and continued regional and local 
interest, I would expect water resource management and development in the Okavango 
River basin to proceed according to individual national development plans. 
OKACOM has not managed to address one of the fundamental obstacles in The 
Pyramid (Figure 2): sovereignty.  Each state retains the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources according to their own environmental and developmental polices.  Several 
Namibian government official with whom I spoke reminded me of this when I spoke with 
them.  Another base level obstacle (Figure 2, The Pyramid) where OKACOM is both 
weak and limited is hydro-hegemony.  There is no hydro-hegemon in the Okavango River 
basin—yet.  This research strongly suggests that although South Africa is not an 
Okavango Basin riparian, it retains its position as the hydro-hegemon.  Other obstacles 
 226 
 
include technical uncertainties, problems of reciprocity, and, as this case clearly 
demonstrates conflicting national and international interests.  Along with the political set-
backs, these obstacles create challenges for OKACOM’s ability to move its basin states 
toward quality cooperation. 
 
Select Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) concerned for the Okavango River 
Basin and Delta 
 
There are several local and international NGOs and stakeholder groups that have 
been actively involved in water conservation efforts and specifically in water research, 
data development, advocacy, and management matters of the Okavango River basin and 
Delta.  The Okavango Liaison Group (OLG) formed in 1996, and is a regional coalition 
of non-governmental organizations, communities, and individuals working for the 
sustainable development of the Okavango River and Delta.  This coalition claims as its 
members: the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), Conservation International (CI), 
Somarelang Tikologo, Hotel and Tourism Association of Botswana (HATAB), Desert 
Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN), Earthlife Namibia, and International Rivers 
Network (IRN).  Not all of these NGOs are discussed below; however, additional detail 
on several of the more prominent groups active in basin and Delta conservation follow 
(Table 5).   
 
Table 5. Select NGOs Concerned with Water Resources in Okavango River Basin Countries 
        
NGO-Mission Okavango River Basin Related Efforts  
 
Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DFRN) 
 
DRFN is to empower decision-makers at all levels through, 
capacity building, facilitation, knowledge generation and 
 
DRFN is an important research and data resource 
organization operating in Namibia.  It is an active 
NGO institution committed to research, education, 
consultancy and the democratization of knowledge 
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sharing in order to promote sustainable development in the interest of sustainability.
 
  
World Conservation Union’s (IUCN)  
 
IUCN is a global environmental network that supports 
scientific research; manages field projects; and brings 
governments, non-government organizations, United Nations 
agencies, companies and local communities together to 
develop and implement policy, laws and best practices. 
 
IUCN Botswana Office, established in 1984)) 
mission is “influence, encourage and assist societies 
throughout the world to conserve the integrity and 
diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of 
natural resources is equitable and ecologically 
sustainable”.  
 
 In 2002, IUCN and the Botswana government 
signed the Okavango Delta Management Plan. 
Green Cross International (GCI) Geneva-based international 
organization 
 
GCI’s mission is:  providing assistance to communities 
affected by the environmental consequences of wars and 
conflicts, preventing and resolving conflict that results from 
environmental degradation, and promoting legal, ethical, and 
behavioral norms.  GCI emphasizes its unbiased environmental 
analysis, expertise, education, research, scientific studies and 
social and medical support. 
 
 
Considers its “Water for Peace” initiative, which 
includes the Okavango River Basin, a principle 
research imitative.  
 
International Rivers Network (IRN)   
 
Through research, education and advocacy, IRN works to halt 
destructive river infrastructure projects, address the legacies 
of existing projects, improve development policies and 
practices, and promote water and energy solutions for a just 
and sustainable world. The primary focus of IRN’s work is in 





Protect rivers and defend the rights of communities 
that depend on them. IRN opposes destructive dams 
and the development model they advance, and 
encourages better ways of meeting people’s needs 
for water, energy and protection from damaging 
floods.   
 
The Okavango Delta is an IRN campaign, where it 
has conducted research efforts and advocacy for 
Okavango River water conservation and 
sustainability (IRN has also argued alternatives to 
the Namibia’s pipeline project and proposed Epupa 
Dam construction on the Cunene River.)   
 
 
It should be noted that the Okavango Wildlife Society (OWLS), which had as its 
mission the conservation of the Okavango Delta and associated communities in 
Botswana, disbanded March 31, 2003, after 39 years of operation.  The Kalahari, 
Conservation Society, its sister NGO, absorbed its remaining members and subsumed its 
mission. 
In Botswana and Namibia, a select group of NGOs are not only active, but receive 
considerable IFI donor support.  For example, the DRFN helped to facilitate creation of 
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the country’s first basin management committee in the Kuiseb River Basin.  Additionally, 
they have been aggressively conducting outreach, education, and public awareness about 
water resources, as well as, for land and energy.  In my interview with Dr. Seely304, she 
discussed the need to educate and expand opportunities for stakeholder involvement well 
beyond the bureaucrats, privileged and water elite.   
In Botswana, IUCN-Botswana is an active NGO and major actor in environmental 
matters.  In addition to its other activities, IUCN-Botswana is engaged directly with 
conservation and sustainability of the Okavango Delta.  As an international organization, 
it along with several others have engaged in significant efforts to continue advocacy and 
the process of strategic environmental planning.  One of IUCN’s stated roles is to raise 
awareness about multilateral environmental agreements and international conventions.   
IUCN works in close cooperation with other NGOs to build larger and more 
effective NGO environmental networks.  The Okavango Liaison Group (OLG) is such a 
network.  It is an informal network of NGOs focused on the sustainability of the 
Okavango River Basin.   
The long-term survival of the Okavango Delta may depend on the aggressive and 
continuing involvement of NGOs capable of sustaining international pressure and 
creating a political mass of scale that basin states are unable to bypass and therefore 
strengthen their efforts toward joint management through OKACOM.  International 
financial institutions will also have a role, especially as donors to NGO efforts. 
 
 
                                                 




International Financial Institutions (IFIs) - Global and regional organizations 
 
 
In addition to basin specific commissions, institutions, and organizations there are 
global and regional non-state actors that impact transboundary water cooperation and 
riparian states.  Key non-state actors include international financial institutions (IFIs) and 
regional organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)305, World Bank, and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) respectively, and are constrained in 
the undertakings they can take part in. These non-state actors can still exercise significant 
influence through the types of assistance they offer to each of the countries in the 
Okavango River Basin.   
The following discussion explores the World Bank and its respective basin 
portfolios and infrastructure projects, the United Nations (UN) involvement in the region, 
and then SADC.  Further, this discussion briefly explains the general mission of these 
non-state actors and considers specifically how the World Bank and UN commitments to 
riparians and river basin commissions either alter the distribution of benefits from 
cooperation by the contributing resources to create incentives for agreements or provide 
resources that result in an increase of technical information but fail in considering other 
aspects of the cooperation hierarchy pyramid. 
 The World Bank makes available financial and technical assistance to developing 
countries around the world. Owned by 185 member countries, it is made up of two 
development institutions—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
                                                 
305 The International Monetary Fund lends to countries with balance of payments difficulties, provides 
temporary financing and support policies to correct the underlying problems, and loans to low-income 
countries with the aim of reducing poverty.  In addition, the IMF monitors economic and financial 
developments, directs its policy advice at crisis prevention, and provides technical assistance and training 
in its areas of expertise. 
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(IBRD), which focuses on middle-income and credit-worthy poor countries, and the 
International Development Association (IDA), which serves the poorest countries in the 
world.  The overall objective of both institutions is to improve living standards and 
reduce global poverty.  Although not a bank in the conventional sense, the World Bank is 
a complex organization. Its development institutions—IBRD and IDA—and financial 
groups -- Global Environmental Facility (GEF) Operations and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC)306 -- provides low interest loans, interest-free credit and grants to 
developing countries for many purposes, including health, communications, education, 
technical assistance, research, capacity building, and infrastructure development.   
 The Global Environment Facility is one of three implementing agencies of the 
World Bank.  The GEF finances projects addressing six critical threats to the global 
environment: loss of biodiversity; climate change; degradation of international waters; 
ozone depletion; land degradation; and persistent organic pollutants.  It serves as the 
financial mechanism for the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs).  GEF financing is provided to eligible countries through the World 
Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP), four regional development banks, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).   
                                                 
306 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an instrument of the World Bank Group that provides 
loans, equity, structured finance and risk management products, and advisory services to build the private 
sector in developing countries. 
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 The World Bank (or its agents, i.e. GEF, IDA, etc.) could help promote 
transboundary watercourse cooperation by creating incentives for agreement, developing 
consensus on the acceptable and appropriate behavior of riparian states within the basin 
through strengthening shared values and providing funding for technical information.   
More often, however, it has been known to fund water supply and development 
infrastructure within each independent state, such as the case in Botswana in the late 
1980’s (see World Bank Portfolio Table below).  The majority of World Bank projects in 
the Okavango Riparians are related to health, capacity building, sector reform, and land 
and resource-animal conservation environmental management, not infrastructure 
development and not water related development or management. 
 
World Bank Portfolio of Okavango River Basin States  
 
In Angola, the World Bank’s portfolio now comprises six current ongoing 
projects with a total amount of committed credits and grants of US$279 million from 
International Development Association (IDA), and grant co-financing of US $ 104 
million.  None of the six projects include infrastructure development or financial 
incentives for transboundary water cooperation commissions or technical assistance. 
Botswana became a member of the World Bank and the IDA in 1968, two years 
after its independence.  Now it is a contributor to IDA.  In that time, the World Bank has 
approved a total of 28 loans and credits for Botswana for approximately US$297.64 
million. Botswana has an outstanding debt obligation to the World Bank for about 
US$11.66 million. As of February 2007 there were no active IBRD/IDA projects in 
Botswana. In past years, IBRD/IDA projects in Botswana have been predominantly in the 
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areas of education, water supply, highway reconstruction, livestock management, and 
urban development 
The last water supply project funded by the World Bank in Botswana closed in 
1983.  The project was to reduce water shortages and avert the repetition of future water 
shortages in Gaborone and in the meat processing center of Lobatse through 1988, and to 
prepare for additional water supply after that time.  This would have been a three part 
project:  (1) raise the existing Gaborone Dam by eight meters; (2) expand water treatment 
and transmission facilities; and (3) investigate sites for two additional dams and prepare 
preliminary designs for the dams and associated plant.   
For Namibia, its first IBRD loan is a Development Policy Loan (DPL) of 
approximately US$7.5 million was approved in May 2007. This is not an infrastructure 
loan.  Instead, it will focus on the development of specific policies and instruments to 
implement sector reforms; implementation of these policies; and building institutional 
capacity required for effective implementation of sector reforms.  Namibia has benefited 
from several Global Environmental Facility (GEF) grants. There are two active GEF 
projects at present: Integrated Community-based Ecosystem Management Project and 
Namibian Coast Conservation and Management Project. A third small GEF project—a 
pilot partnership for sustainable land management – is currently under preparation. 
Based on current World Bank project portfolios in the Okavango (and Orange 
River) riparian states, none of the current projects affects directly transboundary river 
basin cooperation institutions.  Although principally a recipient of GEF funding, 
OKACOM may be considered an exception.  On the other hand, the United Nations (UN) 
and several of its programs (UN Environmental Program, UNEP, and UN Development 
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Program, UNDP) and departments, such as the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA) considers sustainable use of fresh water resources an essential 
contributing factor to the socio-economic development of countries and their hydro-
environmental systems.  Toward that end, the UN funds transboundary watercourse 
cooperation or related research efforts by assisting countries independently, directly or 
indirectly through third party entities at the basin level like OKACOM, regional level like 
SADC, or as a consultative partner with Green Cross International (GCI).307
 The UNDESA, along with GCI, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and GEF have all contributed to funding river basin research and 
administrative support of OKACOM.  Funding efforts by these entities of OKACOM 
(and SADC) have been directed toward improving the ability of OKACOM to function as 
a multinational planning and consensus building institution.   Overall, international non-
state actors have contributed to increasing the hydrological and technical knowledge base 
of the Okavango.  However, they have been less successful in determining the real 
objectives and concerns of the basin riparians or increasing the understanding of the types 
of information needed for each riparian to comprehend fully the benefits and costs of 
reaching agreement and cooperation.   
 An important question to ask is if IFIs and donor support play a crucial role.  
Specifically, do IFIs function as honest brokers capable of moving the debate beyond 
conflicting national interests, issues of sovereignty, hydro-hegemony, asymmetry, and 
up-stream-downstream considerations? The case of the Okavango River basin illustrates 
                                                 
307 Green Cross International (GCI) is an international organization whose mission is defined as:  providing 
assistance to communities affected by the environmental consequences of wars and conflicts, preventing 
and resolving conflict that results from environmental degradation, and promoting legal, ethical, and 
behavioral norms.  GCI emphasizes its unbiased environmental analysis, expertise, education, research, 
scientific studies, and social and medical support. 
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how, at the operational level, improving the hydrological knowledge base, closing the 
technical gaps, and strengthening the basin’s principal river basin organization, 
OKACOM, may have benefits to all its riparian states.  However, such activity may be 
misdirected, if the knowledge-base of the full range of political concerns, like 
sovereignty, history, identity, hydro-hegemony, asymmetry, and hydrological realities, 
are not given equal or greater attention.  If regulatory politics, sovereignty, and hydro-
hegemony are the factors directing behavior, institution and capacity building are less 
likely to facilitate or force behavioral change or outcomes.   
Namibia needs water and, as discussed, when the IFIs fund infrastructure projects 
within riparian states, there is the potential to increase and improve water supply.  If these 
institutions and non-state actors fund other ‘soft’ project activity, such as capacity 
building instead of water and sanitation infrastructure, the redistribution of control over 
resources inter and intra-state is not likely, nor is the reallocation of economic benefits 
and costs.  South Africa remains the regional hegemon, all flights still go through 
Johannesburg, Angola is still overwhelmingly occupied with civil war recovery and 
rebuilding a nation, Botswana touts its IJC victory and the delta’s economic benefits over 
Namibia, and Namibia itself still needs to increase its water supply along the northern 
border it shares with Botswana and Angola, and its shared southern disputed border along 
the Orange River. 
Key International Agreements and Conventions  
There are several cooperation-based relationships between the basin-states, 
including bilateral and multilateral treaties and accords (agreements), international laws 
and conventions, regional protocols and treaties, and national laws and policies that focus 
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on transboundary water resources or ecosystems.  A centralizing theme of these treaties 
and conventions is that states are entitled to utilize and manage resources within areas of 
jurisdiction; proposed plans should have no adverse effects on neighboring states; 
mutually acceptable solutions to water management and utilization should ensue; basin- 
states should share and exchange information; advance warning should precede intentions 
to alter the status quo; and in most cases they lack enforcement mechanisms and are not 
binding.   
Four of these agreements are noted in the table below, as the Okavango riparian 
states are either signatories that have ratified these conventions or voted in favor of their 
adoption. There are many such international conventions and treaties.  However, these 
four were selected as they are significant to transboundary water resources, were crafted 
with the intent to influence the behavior of states around transboundary water resources 
and unique international wetlands, and concern the protection and conservation of 




Table 6. Selected list of International Agreements-Conventions to which Okavango River Basin 
Riparians are Signatories  
 
International Convention/ 
Treaties and Dates   Requires   Riparian States 
 
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
of International Importance 
(Ramsar Treaty), 1971 
(Framework for national action and 
international cooperation for the 
conservation and wise use of 
wetlands and their respective 
resources.) 
Requires:  (a) formulate plans that 
promote conservation of wetlands in 
their territory, (b) consult with other 
contracting parties regarding the 








United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, 
1997 
 
(This Convention is considered to be 
a ‘framework convention’; in  it 
needs further elaboration and 
specifications.)   
 
Equitable, reasonable utilization 
(Article 5) and the No-harm Principle 
(Article7) are the cornerstones of the 
Convention, with cooperation as the 
essential feature (Article 8). The 
Convention does not prevent states 
from departing form its general 
principles nor affect existing 







(All voted in favor of the Convention) 
 
Convention on the protection and 
use of trans-boundary 
watercourses and international 
lakes (Helsinki Convention), 1995
 
 
Signatories take measures to prevent, 
control and reduce any trans-
boundary impact by ensuring (a) 
trans-boundary waters are managed 
in a rational, environment-friendly 
manner; (b) trans-boundary waters 
are used in a reasonable and equitable 
way; and (c) conservation and 
restoration of ecosystems. 
 
(Rules are nonbinding, but 
conceptual rules framework were 
incorporated into the Revised SADC 
Protocol 2000)* 
 
*The 2000 Protocol is preceded by 
the 1995 Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) 
Region. 
 
United Nations Conventions to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD), 
1996 
 
(Concerns problems associated with 
widespread degradation of land in 
arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid 
areas.) 
Requires actors  to:  (a) promote 
cooperation among affected parties in 
the fields of environmental protection 
and conservation of land and water 
resources, related to drought and 
desertification; (b) undertake sub-
regional, regional, and international 
co-operation; and (c) cooperate in the 










Generally, the principles espoused in the international conventions attempt to 
delineate the rights of riparian states to access and use the water resources of 
transboundary water resources.  Concurrently they are intended to balance riparian use 
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with the doctrines of absolute territorial sovereignty, territorial integrity, limited 
territorial sovereignty and integrity, and sustainable management and conservation of the 
freshwater resource and ecosystem.  Consistent with this approach is that which insists 
that upstream riparians consider community interests (watershed communities, others 
beyond the river basin that need the water, and the disproportionate impact on women 
and girls), and water use impacts on downstream users. 
 What these and regional and basin specific accords, treaties, or conventions have 
not captured adequately with regard to transboundary water-sharing political concerns 
are:  
• How to define and manage water apportionment among basin states considered 
by all riparians as equitable and “fair”, however defined; 
• Riparian differences of water use priorities; 
• Compensation by one riparian for damage caused by another; 
• Variance in riparian water scarcities; 
• Prior appropriation or existing historic vested or ancient rights claimed by 
hydraulic civilizations, where new water demands conflict with natural or 
historic water needs and interests.  
The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not had much success in addressing 




Regional Transboundary Watercourse Framework - Revised Protocol on Shared 
Water Course Systems in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)  
 
This section begins with a brief statement about SADC generally, its 
predecessors, one source of its funding, and concludes with its important relationship to 
transboundary water cooperation in the southern African region, specifically Okavango 
River basin.  The SADC socio-political economic forerunner is the Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which had as its origins another group 
known as the Front Line States (FLS). The SADCC was formed to counter the economic 
dependence on the apartheid regime of South Africa.   SADCC member states included 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
The FLS were those anti-apartheid states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe that also sought economic liberation from apartheid 
South Africa.  However, the FLS lent support to the black liberation movements against 
the apartheid regimes operating in South Africa and Namibia (pre-independence 
Southwest Africa (SWA)) and struggle for an independent Namibia.  The transformation 
from the SADCC to SADC occurred in 1992,  at which time, SADC determined that 
regional integration along several sectors, including energy, tourism, environment and 
land management, water, mining, labor, culture, sports, transportation and 
communications, were critical to the overall development of its member states.  In 
recognition of the importance of water resources and because there are so many 
transboundary rivers in the southern African region, it was determined that the first treaty 
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agreement SADC undertook was shared water resources, which resulted in the 1995 
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems.308  
The relevant benchmark for shared transboundary freshwater resources for 
southern African river basin riparians is the August 2000 Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), hereinafter 
referred to as the “Protocol.”  SADC’s water initiatives receive funding from several 
international donors, including the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) which made an initial investment of $2,160,000 US, and a commitment to an 
additional $6.5 million through 2008.  
The revised Protocol replaced the 1995 SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse 
Systems (Article 16) and articulates more specific obligations on the part of signatory 
riparian states.   For example, under the revised Protocol member states are to put into 
place domestic legislation for the licensing of water resources abstraction and for the 
permitting of wastewater disposal. According to Article 2, the “ . . . overall objective of 
this (revised) Protocol is to foster closer cooperation for judicious, sustainable and co-
ordinated management, protection and utilisation of shared watercourses and advance the 
SADC agenda of regional integration and poverty alleviation.”   The goal, then, of the 
Protocol extends beyond the integrated management of shared water resources, but 
connects sustainable management of those resources to poverty alleviation, equity, and 
protection of biodiversity.  The Protocol also provides a framework for coordination and 
collaboration in the water sector that includes:  (a) the ongoing program coordinated by 
the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission to improve management of the 
                                                 
308 This was described to me in my interviews with several SADC officials in Lesotho in 2000 and in South 
Africa in 2002.   
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Okavango Basin and protect biodiversity; and (b) new activities to be jointly identified 
with SADC that support implementation of the Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses. 
There are several articles of significant interest in the revised Protocol, including 
the requirement that one state notifies another when it may be impacted by a water 
development scheme.  In particular, the Protocol states that any state planning a water 
development or otherwise related water scheme that may have a significant adverse effect 
upon another watercourse state must notify that state and provide an environmental 
impact statement for the impacted state.  The notified state has six months to respond.  
The Protocol states that the notifying state “shall not implement or permit the 
implementation of the planned measures without the consent of the notified state” 
(Article 4).  The Protocol does, however, allow for those situations where advanced 
notification is not possible or necessary. In these cases, a state “may proceed to 
implementation”, as described in Article 4, but requires a “formal declaration” of the 
urgency to follow.   
It is not clear how such provisions would ultimately be enforced, or by whom.  
The Protocol states that disputes should be resolved amicably. Failing that, disputes 
should be referred to the Tribunal.   It is not clear, however, how tribunal referrals are to 
be managed. This is a significant issue, as the Protocol does not curtail the sovereign 
authority of riparians to develop their water resources according their respective needs.   
Under the terms of the Protocol, SADC member states may continue to establish bilateral 
agreements and exercise actions to secure water resources to meet their respective needs 
and development objectives.  For example, very recently Botswana has begun studies that 
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explore using water inter-basin-transfers from Chobe/Zambezi River to augment the 
existing water supply beyond 2016.309   Like the international instruments for the 
sustainable management of shared transboundary watercourses, the Protocol provides 
only a framework for cooperation.  Nonetheless, as a signatory to the Protocol, as 
Botswana pursues its water interests in the transboundary Chobe-Zambezi River, it is 
required to take into consideration objections from member states.  Exactly how that is to 
take place is not yet clear.  The Protocol is also weak in establishing upstream-
downstream or water apportionment dispute resolution procedures and reigning in the 
regional hydro-hegemon.  
Governments jealously maintain sovereignty over their own stretches of rivers 
and freshwater resources, especially where water resources are scarce, and they involve 
the discourse of “national interest” to legitimize development of a basin’s resources.   By 
its own Articles, the Protocol supports and continues such a defense. The Protocol’s 
present language leaves riparian state sovereignty strongly intact, and its very authority 
might be compromised since its present funding relies heavily upon international donors.   
Shadows of the Past  
“A nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without 
a soul." Sir Seretse Khama, (1921 – 1981) the first President of the Republic of Botswana. 
 
 
The colonial borders of Angola, Namibia and Botswana were decided at the 
Berlin Conference in 1884 and in several treaties signed in the 1880s and 1890s between 
Portugal, Britain, and Germany.   As in all of colonial territories, the legal and governing 
                                                 




machinery put into use were designed to benefit and serve the colonial enterprise.  In this 
region in particular, South Africa’s dominance of territory included Zimbabwe (formerly 
Rhodesia) and Namibia, where the liberation struggles were fought against colonialism 
and an apartheid system.  
The ‘shadows of the past’ -- colonialism, colonial rule, and apartheid -- had a 
profound impact on the way people perceived one another across racial, religious, and 
ethnic boundaries.  It directly influenced flows of wealth, education, health and other 
services, employment options, developmental opportunities, resource allocation and 
exploitation, infrastructure, and the delineation of political boundaries, external and 
internal. The limitations placed on would remain even after independent states were 
established.   
Colonialism and apartheid established social and identity structures, institutional 
roles, developmental practices, and political relationships that have not dissolved at 
independence.  The pre-independent water policy and priorities in Namibia, and other 
southern African states, were structured around the exploitation of water resources for the 
purposes of supplying and meeting the water needs of white-run commercial farms and 
white–owned mining concerns.  According to Forrest310 and Turton,311 governments 
utilized mega-state (white dominated colonial ruling authority) mega-sized water projects 
as conduits of power, through which pipelines, water canals, dams, hydroelectric projects 
                                                 
310 Forrest, “Water Policy and Environmental Sustainability.” 
311 Turton, “Water and Sustainable Development.” 
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and irrigation schemes served to reinforce state authority at the same time as they helped 
to entrench the economic privileges of white minority farmers.312
How the Okavango Basin riparians gained their independence impacts how they 
interrelate with one another, and their respective institutional governing capacities. 
Additionally, it established who controlled water resources and how water was 
distributed.  More importantly, the path to independence would, in many respects, 
influence political behavior of post-colonial independent states and dependencies.  For 
example, unlike Namibia and Angola, Botswana’s political status as a British 
Protectorate provided a modest amount of political insulation from South Africa’s 
apartheid rule and politics.  It meant that Botswana would not engage in many armed 
struggles for its independence, would not have two hugely different socio-economic 
groups, living entirely different experiences, like the black Africans in townships with 
minimal infrastructure, services, education opportunities and white settler descendants 
living in modern cities.  In Botswana (Bechuanaland Protectorate), with its traditional 
tribal chiefs left intact and continuing to administer locally, there was less pressure to 
protect European and colonial setter interests.  Further, under such circumstances, the 
institutionalism of racism and other apartheid practices did not inflict the same 
consequences on the national black psyche or create such dramatically different societies.   
Angola and Namibia not only engaged in violent and armed struggle for their 
respective independence -- they found themselves allies against South Africa, whose 
colonial legacy helped guarantee its continued status as regional hegemon.  Namibia’s 
(Southwest Africa, SWA) final independence from South Africa would be the result of a 
                                                 
312 Forrest, “Water Policy and Environmental Sustainability.”  
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multilateral political process involving the United Nations, as well as armed conflict.  
Angola would obtain its independence from Portugal, but descend into a civil war for 
control over the newly independent state, a struggle that would involve Namibia, 
particularly its northern areas, the Caprivi strip region, and the Namibian/Angolan 
territory in the Okavango River basin.   
Three events connected with South Africa contributed to increased political 
awareness and the impetus for the formation of a nationalist party (the urban-based 
Botswana People’s Party, BPP) in Botswana: (1) the Sharpeville massacre; (2) the 
banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress 
(PAC); and (3) the influx of an estimated 1,400 black South Africans into Bechuanaland.  
Holm313 argues that the influx of politically aware South Africans into Bechuanaland 
would not only fuel the BPP, which was serving Batsawana migrant workers in 
Johannesburg, but would become a voice for total independence for Bechuanaland.   
During the apartheid period, when Namibia was part of South West Africa (1915 
– 1989), South African bureaucrats controlled all water management decision-making in 
what would become the Republic of Namibia.  Prior to South Africa’s control, the 
territory of what would become Namibia was controlled and occupied as a German 
colony (1895-1915).  During both periods, white farmers, mining and urban interests 
were the principal beneficiaries of water policy and projects.  Namibia’s 95 years of 
colonialism reflect the political interests that not only gave water preference to whites, 
but exploited aquifer drainage and underground access to natural water pools. This 
                                                 
313  Holm, “Botswana:  A Paternalistic Democracy,” 185. 
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exploitation has now led to aquifer shortages.314  Further, South Africa’s institutions, 
reliable (and usually unchallenged) science, data, and technological knowledge base of 
the water sector dominate the region and are reflected in its high level of involvement in 
the Okavango River Basin.    
Conclusion 
 What the Orange and Okavango River Basins have in common hydrologically is 
Namibia, its overwhelming need for water, and its riparian position as a mid-to-
downstream state in both basins.  Another factor both the Orange and Okavango River 
basins have in common politically is South Africa.  In the Orange River, South Africa is a 
basin riparian; in the Okavango, it is not, but still exerts influence.  Each of the basin 
riparians also has a long-standing socio-economic and political history with South Africa 
that extends into the present, and is likely to continue into the future.   
In the Okavango Basin are several factors that contribute to the hydro-politics of 
the basin, and the potential conflict or cooperation among riparians. They include:     
(a) Climate, geography and hydrology—the climatic oscillation between 
wet and dry years is a key variable;315  
 
(b) The end of the civil war in Angola has opened opportunities for 
Namibia, as an upstream riparian to Botswana, to enter bilateral 
transboundary water agreements with Angola that potentially weaken 
Botswana’s position as a ‘downstream’ riparian; 
 
(c) Botswana’s potential political influence and negotiation power with 
South Africa in the Orange River Basin as leverage over Namibia in 
dealings in the Okavango;  
 
                                                 
314 Forrest’s “Water Policy and Environmental Sustainability,” Turton’s “Water and Sustainable 
Development,” and Lange’s “An Approach to Sustainable Water Management” all describe this pressing 
concern.  
315 Turton and others, Transboundary Rivers. 
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(d) The high degree of reliance on the Okavango River by all three riparian 
states with few real viable alternatives. The concern over ecological 
health, along with the national, local, and international interests in the 
Delta and the conflicting and competing interests of human 
development throughout the basin, provide an “archetypal example of 
complex and conflicting demands;”316 and 
 
(e) The shadow of the past relations between Botswana and South Africa 
as they relate to Namibia, Namibia and South Africa—Orange River 
dispute—and between Botswana and Namibia. The shadow of the past 
particularly informs the conflict over several river islands, particularly 
Sedudu (Kasikili) Island.317  
 
 
If the number of agreements, joint permanent commissions, institutional 
organizations, and history is any indicator, there is overwhelming evidence of multiple 
levels of cooperation among riparians sharing the freshwater resources in the Okavango 
River Basin.  However, it is important to understand that lack of conflict does not 
necessarily equate to cooperation, and importantly, cooperation itself can become a 
coercive force.  
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, contemporary theories typically explain 
cooperative and reciprocal relationships by framing them as structures through which 
prosperity is gained and community built.318  On the other hand, cooperative relationships 
are also defined as exploitative structures that obscure the exercise of power.319  In this 
instance, with the support of the international community, NGOs and others, Botswana’s 
                                                 
316 Ibid., 354. 
317 Simmering conflict continues between Namibia and Botswana over Botswana’s construction of an 
electrified fence along its border with Namibia, along the Caprivi Strip. Ostensibly, Botswana constructed 
this wall to stop the spread of cattle diseases. Botswana asserts that it had to destroy an estimated 300,000 
head of cattle after an outbreak of disease, which Botswana believed came from migrating buffalo from 
Namibia.  The fence also restricts the annual migration of large wild animals, such as buffalo and 
elephants, into Namibia. 
318 Fukuyama’s Trust and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy provide further resources on this topic. 
319 Bourdieu, Outline.  
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efforts to have the Okavango Delta declared a Ramsar site, without consultation with its 
neighboring states demonstrates clearly an exercise of power by Botswana, and shrewd 
politics on their part.  Did Botswana recognize or consider its actions coercive?  Most 
likely it acted, as states are prone to do, in its own interest.  However, as Portes and 
Landolt suggest, the first approach fails to recognize the place of coercion in the 
construction of social order. 320    
Would it have been possible to designate the Delta as a Ramsar Site if Botswana’s 
neighboring states had been consulted?  Overwhelming international support and the 
uniqueness of the Okavango Delta would most likely have resulted in the Delta being 
designated as a Ramsar site with or without input and support from Botswana’s 
neighboring states.  The Delta’s long-term survival, however, depends upon resources 
that extend beyond Botswana’s border.  It is dependent upon Angola and Namibia 
limiting their upstream actions. Future transboundary water cooperation on other matters 
may have been enhanced, if Botswana had involved Namibia and Botswana, and if some 
reciprocity for their support had been established beforehand.  Additionally, the Delta’s 
survival will depend upon factors well beyond any unpredictable or negotiated state 
behavior, such as climate change and rainfall. 
According to Axelrod, cooperation does in fact work for those involved in 
reciprocal relationships.321  However, the “reciprocity’ for Namibia and Angola has not 
yet been determined.  If part of the initial ‘Ramsar’ negotiations, Botswana may have 
been required to offer Namibia and Angola a share in the tourism profits, or in the case of 
Namibia, Botswana may have had to agree to support Namibia’s position on where to 
                                                 
320 Portes and Landolt, “The Downside of Social Capital,” 20.    
321 Axelrod, Evolution. 
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establish the Orange River boundary with South Africa in exchange for their respective 
cooperation.    
The commitments and contradictions inherent in cooperative and reciprocal 
relationships extend beyond the physical confines, and Namibia’s water needs are so 
great that it may have no choice but to divert water from the Kavango. In contrast to 
Namibia’s dire straits, Angola has hydro- political leverage that it has not begun to 
exercise, including but not limited to strong bilateral agreements with Namibia—a state 
with whom it shares a past with regard to South Africa’s colonial control, and Namibia’s 
own struggle for independence.   
Colonialism, its resultant struggles for independence, apartheid, the Cold War, 
and Angola’s own civil war, have left imprints on current riparian relationships, 
influenced current water management decisions, and conditioned each riparian 
government’s institutions and abilities to engage in transboundary watercourse 
cooperation.  For Namibia and Angola, shared water resources (the Okavango and the 
Cunene (Kunene) Rivers) are important factors in the Angolan post conflict 
reconstruction and development. 
 As with the OSRB, the intent here is to review how the conceptual factors and 
hierarchy of the obstacles to cooperation (pyramid) are tested in the case of the Okavango 
River basin.  The circumstances of the Okavango are significantly different than those of 
the OSRB in that it is an obvious example of the contradiction and conflict between 
ecological needs, water supply, and state borders. As discussed previously in this chapter, 
there are similarities and differences between these two cases.  The internationalization of 
the basin and accompanying interest in the Okavango Delta in Botswana, and the 
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upstream downstream relationship between Namibia and Botswana both impact the 
politics of each basin.  As in the OSRB, there are asymmetries of power, capacity, 
resources, and knowledge among the basin riparians. In both basins the shadows of the 
past are ever present and create a similar set of problems for those states recovering from 
repressive colonial regimes which denied large segments of the population education, 
employment, developmental infrastructure, and other advantages granted white settler 
populations. 
In the Okavango basin, Namibia seeks to secure access to and control over the 
upper reaches of the water that traverses its territory, and over which it may exercise its 
sovereign right to do so.  Again, returning to the factors below the heavy line in the 
shaded base of the pyramid, sovereignty, upstream-downstream conflict, conflicting 
national and international interests, hydro-hegemony and asymmetry are the factors 
which absolutely must be considered and resolved before any meaningful cooperation 
can occur even in the presence of a TWA.  Because of its special ‘protectorate’ status, 
much of the social networks and local self-governing infrastructure remained in place.  
However, while Namibia’s domination and control by South Africa when part of its 
territory left a cadre of water elites and intellectual water infrastructure capital, Botswana 
lacks much of the technical capacity and scientific and infrastructure knowledge available 
to its co-riparian.  Angola, the upstream riparian and potential future Okavango basin 
hydro-hegemon, is in total recovery from its post-colonial, long-term civil war. Right 
now, Angola is water rich, and is currently non-threatening to the downstream-flowing 
water necessary to sustain the Okavango delta ecosystem.  
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In the Okavango basin, threats from a changing climate, increased drought, and 
hydro-geography impact the delta’s chances for survival and may further exacerbate 
scarce water supplies. The internationalization of the delta has resulted in an 
overwhelming number of IFI donors and international NGOs all making sizeable 
contributions to its continued survival.  This is an advantage for Botswana, but makes 
water an economic and ecological good that complicates Namibia’s ability to peacefully 
secure its water supply needs—creating conflicting national and international interests, 
one of the major obstacles identified in the pyramid.  In this instance, water is the issue, 
as the major question surrounds Namibia’s need to secure sufficient water supply to meet 
its growing population and agricultural demands, at the potential expense to the ecology 
of the delta.   
In this case, the factors of asymmetry, riparian position, upstream-downstream 
conflict, sovereignty, and conflicting national and international interests are all 
influencing the level and type of cooperation occurring in the Okavango River basin in 
both positive and negative ways.  However, another factor also comes into consideration: 
the cost of cooperation. The cost of cooperation is driven by local and global efforts to 
protect and sustain the Okavango Delta. 
The delta is threatened by more than proposed withdrawal by Namibia if the 
ENWC (also called the Rundo-Grootfontein Pipeline) is completed to transfer water from 
the Okavango to supply Windhoek.  Other threats include:  agriculture; cattle production; 
wildlife utilization; tourism, within the delta itself and within Botswana; a more water-
astute Angola aggressively making use of its upstream position; global climate change; 
and, as stated earlier, proposed diversion of water by upstream users.  These threats 
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represent global, international (transboundary), and national/local district problems which 
tap into multiple factors in the hierarchy of obstacles to cooperation.  They also 
complicate and increase the costs, as well as the potential benefits, of cooperation in the 
Okavango basin.   
There are international institutions, some of which include RAMSAR, the World 
Heritage Convention, International Rivers, USAID, and SIDA, all interested in the 
Okavango whose perspective which may not be appreciated or adequately recognized by 
OKACOM.  From an international relations (IR) perspective, the Okavango River basin 
reflects a more functionalist perspective than that of the OSRB.  In spite of Namibia’s 
water needs, it appears that the dominant goals of the actors involved in the basin are 
shared prosperity and sustainable peaceful cooperation. Increasingly, international 
organizations and donors have become key actors and are responsible for policy 
implementation surrounding the protection of a freshwater ecosystem global importance.  
In this internationalized basin, IFI, international organizations and donors have become 
the forces behind agenda formation and significantly influence the political will of 
Botswana and that of South Africa in the context of protecting the delta.   
As a result of this international interest, TWA cooperation and national hydro-
politics may conflict with one another.  For example, an early Botswanan National 
Development Plan—NDP6—1985 to1991, emphasized food self-sufficiency wherein a 
later plan emphasized food security both have implications for Delta water use for 
agriculture and related irrigation.322  Over time, however, that has changed and NDP8 
recognized delta revenues from tourism, which has directly forced policy decisions on 
                                                 
322 Hasler, “Political Ecologies of Scale and the Okavango River Delta”  
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how delta waters are to be used.323  This is just one of many examples where Botswana is 
exercising its sovereignty through deciding how its water resources will be used and 
weighing them against national and international interests and the costs of cooperation. 
While international interests have recognized environmental water rights as a separate 
user category, except as related to delta tourism, Botswana has made the connection 
explicit, inextricably tying its water-use with both tourism and the state’s economic well-
being.  These factors must be reconciled before quality cooperation within TWAs may 
occur and can only happen where space for positive conflict is created. 
Namibia, Botswana, and Angola all accept the internationalization of the 
Okavango as it relates to international interests in the delta’s survival and sustainability.  
But, the IFIs, international NGOs and donor agencies are simultaneously supporting 
upstream claims for Okavango water resources, including the construction of proposed 
dams in Angola and as mentioned previously, the Namibian ENWC pipeline.  When 
OKACOM was first negotiated (1994), Namibia expected that agreed access would result 
in an equitable share of the river’s waters.  That has not happened, and is less likely given 
the internationalization of the river and particularly the delta—clearly bringing into 
question the treaty/agreement process.   
As one further test of the claims in chapter two and the pyramid’s 
conceptionalization of the obstacles to TWA quality cooperation, I want to touch briefly 
on the matter of hydro-hegemony within the Okavango river basin. It may appear that 
there is no hydro-hegemon in the Okavango River basin.  Angola, the upstream and 
headwater riparian is unable to do much of anything as its attention is on post-civil war 




recovery.  Namibia, the mid-stream riparian, has the skilled water elites, but it takes more 
than knowledge to function as a hydro-hegemon.  Namibia has not acted on its objectives 
to extract and divert water resources from the river where it crosses into its territory.324  
Botswana, the downstream riparian, has the most to lose on a regional and national level 
should the Okavango River cease flowing into the delta.  However, it also lacks the 
ability to persuade its other riparians to behave in any particular manner.  That leaves 
South Africa.   
South Africa is not a riparian within the Okavango River basin. It does however 
exercise significant regional influence on the basin’s actors, facilitates studies, attracts 
international donor interest, and has been involved or directed, as a leading partner with 
the Southern African Community Development Water Sector and other international 
interests, conferences and workshops concerning the Okavango River basin and delta.  
Although I would not consider South Africa the basin hydro-hegemon in the same 
manner as it exists in the Orange-Senqu River Basin, it is an important actor and has 
strong connections to the water elites in Namibia and Botswana, and to OKACOM 
membership.  Still, South Africa’s ability to function as the hydro-hegemon not only in 
the Okavango River basin, but also in the SADC region more broadly, cannot be under 
stated or underestimated.   
While securitization is not an overriding theme in either basin, the OSRB 
riparians, especially South Africa, are more likely to take on the behaviors attributed to 
states operating from an international relations Realist framework, especially if there are 
dramatic shifts in water supply outpacing South Africa’s ability to respond.  It would 
                                                 
324 I do not attribute non-action on Namibia’s part to fear of reprisals, since it has proposed that it may take 
such action in the future.   
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appear that a key instrument of state policy and force behind South Africa’s TWA 
ORASECOM agenda is long term water security and economics.  Given the dominant 
goals of the actors, especially South Africa, the OSRB has the potential to become 







Chapter 5 - Research Conclusions  
   
Summary  
 There are complex technical, historical, and political issues shaping the hydro-
politics of the resources of the Orange and Okavango Rivers.  Classic environmental 
conflict-cooperation arguments, at their peak during the 1990s, and the eternal debate 
between the Malthusian-Hobbesian theory (environmental scarcity leads to conflict) and 
Cornucopian-Lockeian theory (technology plus virtual water solves everything) are 
important contributions. However, both of these theories fail to provide a deeper 
understanding of the nature of hydro-politics, including the basis for water conflict, the 
types of conflict, the rationale behind transboundary water cooperation, and the types of 
cooperation possible. There is a need to approach political realism around TWAs and 
environmental cooperation over shared freshwater resources in a more systematic 
manner.  
 Accordingly, this research analysis has argued that, central to that deeper 
understanding, is to create a ranking for the obstacles other scholars considered relevant 
to the development to TWAs and cooperation.  I used Maslow’s hierarchical approach-
triangle to visualize the order of the obstacles to quality cooperation and positive conflict 
as a first step.  Upon closer examination, however, the hierarchy of obstacles to 
cooperation provided a means to integrate missing and important factors from the earlier 
theoretical frameworks, such as hydro-hegemony.  Developing this hierarchy also 
suggested that environmental cooperation comes with an array of problems, as identified 
in the first two levels of the triangle’s base (these include the number of countries, 
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sovereignty, asymmetry, riparian position, conflicting national and international 
interests), that must be addressed. For the purposes of this argument, a triangle was 
insufficient. A factor was missing -- the shadows of the past.  The strategic-geopolitical 
analysis of TWAs and environmental cooperation is multidimensional and complicated 
by history.  This multidimensionality requires a representation able to accommodate the 
many viewpoints implicit in this analytical style. Because of this, I expanded Maslow’s 
triangle into the pyramid (Figure 2).  To achieve quality cooperation and a space for 
positive conflict, the conditions for cooperation325 not only have to consider obstacles to 
cooperation (Figure 2-The Pyramid).  They must also be addressed in a specific order, as 
described in Chapter 2, and they must be mindful of how history conditions cooperation.   
  Both basins have TWAs.  Given how the factors at the bottom of the pyramid 
condition what is possible at the next level, it is not clear how to assess the effectiveness 
of their respective TWAs.  In the instance of the Orange and Okavango River Basin 
cases, we are able to see how geopolitical interests and history condition the types of 
environmental cooperation possible, even in the presence of existing TWA commissions.  
In both of the case studies, we see how the hierarchy of obstacles to cooperation (The 
Pyramid, Figure 2) becomes operational.  Beginning at its base, history, economics, and 
technological mastery make South Africa the hydro-hegemon.  Both the TWAs described 
are multilateral rather than bilateral agreements.  More actors, greater asymmetry, 
concerns over sovereignty, conflicting national agendas, and multiple international 
interests further complicate the potential effectiveness of these TWS in reaching quality 
cooperation.  
                                                 
325 LeMarquand’s International Rivers and Just and Netanyahu’s “International Water Resource Conflict” 
both provide an in-depth analysis to the conditions for cooperation.  
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In the Orange River Basin case, the pyramid allows us to understand Namibia’s 
sovereign territorial concerns, its need to counter SA hydro-hegemony, and exploit its 
own resources and meet its water needs.  For the non-hegemonic states, Lesotho and 
Namibia, agreeing to a TWA may be nothing more than recognizing the cost of 
cooperation is significantly less than protracted conflict, where they are likely to win 
nothing.  Sometimes this compromise might be financially advantageous. In the case of 
Lesotho, this riparian state would not be able to negotiate around those basic obstacles 
anyways, so any financial benefits may be seen as a bonus.  Further, in so doing it may 
gain technical information and data and negotiation skills not otherwise available through 
the practical leadership (or perceived generosity) of the hydro-hegemon.  Lesotho’s 
riparian position has made it a political player from a state-centrist perspective, but, in the 
future, its juridical stance in the LHWP corruption cases may improve its negotiation-
conflict resolution strengths in the overall ability to engage in positive conflict.   
 In the case of the Okavango, Namibia’s water fortunes are improved; it is 
upstream from Botswana, and shares a mutually supportive history with Angola in its 
liberation struggles against South Africa.  The presence of a riparian hydro-hegemon in 
the Okavango can be disputed. South Africa has assumed that role, but one day Angola 
may be poised to assert itself as serious competition.  Angola, still the local unknown in 
regards to its water development plans, is presently engaged in post-civil war recovery 
(conflicting national and international interests), has no costs of cooperation to speak of, 
and is likely to benefit from participation in Okavango cooperation regimes by obtaining 
technical information and scientific data not currently available.   
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 Botswana has also found the costs of cooperation beneficial, especially as it 
relates to the Okavango Delta.  However, Namibia and Botswana have only recently 
addressed a conflict regarding sovereignty with its origins in colonial history.  Botswana 
also remains the downstream riparian, and is still confronting its burgeoning water needs. 
At present, Botswana benefits tremendously from South Africa’s hydro-hegemonic 
stance within the Okavango, as South Africa has helped advance the internationalization 
of the Okavango Delta, provided technical reports, improved data, and helped to counter 
Botswana’s downstream riparian disadvantages with the basin.  
No timeline is discussed in this research, but there is ample evidence to suggest 
that post-colonial southern African states have turned their attention to the formalizing 
their transboundary water agreements.  Such efforts can be quantified on the basis of the 
numbers of and formalization of agreements (although multilateral agreements are rare) 
and increased financial investments in capacity building.  These efforts also include the 
broadening and strengthening of institutions such as SADC, in order to encourage water 
resource development and to draw these matters to the attention of national, regional, and 
international actors.  A few of the external drivers expressing interest and financial 
support in water matters in Africa were mentioned in the case studies. Others for whom 
this has become something of a priority include the UN-Water/Africa (Inter-Agency 
Group on Water in Africa) and Africa Water Vision 2025.  The 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development connected safe and reliable water supplies to the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MGDS). Even the United States Congress326 has 
                                                 
326 At a May 2007 hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, USAID, Subcommittee 
Chairman Donald Payne said:  “Lack of clean water worldwide, but especially in Africa, is a global crisis.” 
To provide clean water, USAID was funding water-supply activities and hygiene programs worth $91.6 
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recognized and accepted that Africa is facing severe freshwater stress.  A clean, reliable, 
readily available, and convenient water supply for daily needs is important, but this 
specific issue is not the focus of this research.  This research focuses on the ways in 
which the lack of access to clean, fresh, reliable water is a vestige of colonial rule.  
Consider, for example, the Congo region; water resources are abundant, but the 
availability is one of the poorest in Africa.  There is plenty of water but the region lacks 
the political capacity and infrastructure to deliver it.   
This issue specifically impacts the countries involved with SADC. The black 
township Katutura, just outside of Windhoek, Namibia is the home to approximately 60% 
(150,000) of the urban area’s population but lacks both a broad municipal water 
infrastructure and a reliable drinking water supply, a pattern repeated in many of the 
townships in South Africa as well.  Since Namibia’s independence in 1990, and the 1994 
elections in South Africa, their respective governments have been trying aggressively to 
improve the clean water delivery and sanitation. 
 The analysis presented here leaves room for additional interpretation of the 
hierarchy of obstacles and has left open the undeniable possibility that hydro-politics is 
not solely, or even primarily, about water resources.  Indeed, this study strongly suggests 
that, notwithstanding the need for an increasingly reliable and equitable water supply, 
hydro-politics brings out other considerations; chief among them are sovereignty, 
hegemony, and the role of history in impacting the prospects for transboundary water 
                                                                                                                                                 
million, for the 2006-2007 fiscal year, in more than 30 African countries and has planned to spend an 




cooperation.  Given these various non-hydrologic factors, it is suspect to suggest that 
transboundary water cooperation is solely about shared water resources.   
The emergence of a meta-theme about the global freshwater crisis has been 
gaining in its ability to capture news-headlines, lead journal articles, and special reports. 
It has also become the central focus of many international and regional organizations and 
institutions.  There is reason to believe that the great themes surrounding the earth’s 
water limitations; diminishing aquifers, polluted water supplies, and an increased demand 
brought on by rapid population growth, urbanization, agricultural needs, and energy 
production are all creating a strain on maintaining sustainable water supplies. When 
linked to the growing alarms over the impacts of climate change on water resources, the 
increasing frequency of drought, and a reconsideration of security concerns, it is not 
unexpected that the volume on the fragility, sustainability, and long-term availability of 
freshwater resources is turned to “high.” The global water crisis has several different 
contexts: sustainability, the political economy of water scarcity, and the basic need to 
supply water for human needs, agriculture, and sanitation.  
According to the African Ministers’ Conference on Water (AMCOW), more than 
300 million people do not have access to safe and reliable drinking water supplies in 
Africa.  In response, the AfDB suggests that barely four percent of water resources in 
Africa are exploited.  Other reports indicate that water delivery, where it exists, is subject 
to infrastructure inefficiencies, over-extended systems, poor maintenance, and outdated 
technology.  I believe that this water crisis should be detached from the hydro-political 
analysis on conflict-cooperation transboundary water resources.  The debate surrounding 
the transboundary water resources is rooted in matters of power, sovereignty, hegemony, 
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hydro-hegemony, and the ways in which history determines the prospects of cooperation. 
The rhetoric surrounding the freshwater crisis in Africa focuses on the material end-
results of this debate, whereas I am focusing on the discourse surrounding the issue, and 
the political machinations reflected in that discourse.  
Water is essential to life.  Water resources are important to food security, 
transportation, freshwater ecosystems, leisure, identity, culture, virtually all the products 
used in the everyday, and, most importantly, energy.  For the Orange-Senqu (OSRB) and 
Okavango riparian states, water will be subject to increasing population and development 
demands.  The imbalances between availability and demand, the rising need to protect the 
ecosystem, and sharing water resources have all been identified as critical goals for the 
basin states.  Evidence provided in these case studies demonstrates how regime formation 
and treaties and agreements such as OKACOM and ORASECOM, and the full 
implementation of the SADC Protocol, have been the most visible instruments driving 
transboundary water cooperation in the Okavango and Orange-Senqu river basins.    
Much of the financial, technical, and knowledge resources supporting these 
transboundary regimes has been from international donors, a fact not lost on SADC 
member states.327  With the exception of Lesotho, states in both basins are more 
economically developed than all others in sub-Saharan Africa.  They are faced with 
delivering upon and financing the promises of independence as well as remedying the 
inequities of the past.  As a result, these states have embarked on expansive development 
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improve sanitation in an equitable and sustainable manner.  The conference “Watering Development in 
SADC:  Beyond IWRM concepts and the Converted” provided an opportunity for a regionally specific, 




activities that include alleviating poverty, providing much needed housing and education, 
building utility (electrical, water, roads) infrastructure, and job development.  For the 
time being, it may be necessary for financially strapped African states to orient their 
transboundary freshwater agreement agendas toward the external interests of 
international donors.   
In South Africa and Namibia, the application of technical and engineering 
solutions has driven their water agenda in the past, and will be a significant part of 
growing future capacity.  IBTs, dams, water transfer schemes, and water practices 
designed to serve relatively small white settlement populations and their agricultural 
interests dominated past water practices and are in place today.  Angola, after decades of 
civil war, remains a water-rich state.  Presently, its internal water quality concerns are 
supplying an urban population, industrialization, and infrastructure development.  
Botswana, with its traditional Sotho greeting “Pula”328 (“Let there be rain!”) is currently 
meeting the majority of its water needs from groundwater extraction.  Botswana’s hydro-
vulnerability is based on the high percentage of surface water resources that originate 
outside of its territory.  Because of this vulnerability, Botswana was the most reluctant to 
provide information, as it considers water a strategic issue.  Still, despite its dry climate, 
cattle farming and beef production are the dominant professions within Botswana.    
Lesotho and South Africa are inextricably linked geographically, and also 
hydrologically, economically, and politically through the LHWP.  One official329 with 
                                                 
328 In Setswana, “Pula” means rain. 
329 Mr. Reginald Tekateka has had several high-ranking positions in the water sector.  At the time of my 
interviews (2000) he was the Chief Delegate for the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission for the 
Republic of South Africa (RSA). In 2003, he was the Chairperson, Orange-Senqu River Commission 
(ORASECOM) and Chief Delegate Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF).  More recently, in 
2007, again representing RSA, Mr. Tekateka is the Chair of the Global Water Partnership-Southern Africa.   
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whom I spoke shared that the LHWP was an agreement outside the realm of the Protocol, 
but that the 1986 LHWP Treaty had “equalized the status of Lesotho with that of South 
Africa.”  He added that, for Lesotho, “. . . the LHWP was a development project, for 
South Africa it was a water project.”  When asked about the SADC Protocol, he thought 
that it had raised Lesotho’s awareness of the “Senqu having downstream implications” 
and that reference to the Senqu-Orange River change “was driven by political 
sensitivities, because of the past and because the SADC Protocol was driving inclusion.”  
As an almost-quiet side comment, he murmured that the hand-picked governing board for 
the LHWP had been established by law and was composed of Lesotho civil servants 
without the necessary skills or experience, in part because of a shared heritage of colonial 
South African politics. 
There is a consensus among experts that international watercourse agreements 
must be more concrete, setting out measures to enforce commitments made and 
incorporating detailed conflict resolution mechanisms in case disputes erupt. Better 
cooperation also entails identifying clear yet flexible water allocations and water quality 
standards, taking into account hydrological events, changing basin dynamics and societal 
values. Finally, international watercourse development may require some compensation 
mechanisms, such as payments for transfer of water rights. Based on the analysis 
presented here, there is little evidence of such progressive and explicit development in the 
content of cooperation over time. This is in part because international donor involvement 
may not be able to directly influence local needs or accommodate local (sub-national 
basin level stakeholder) priorities, and because what looks favorable from a hegemonic 




perspective may not be perceived in the same way by the weaker riparian states looking 
through the shadows of the past.   
Liberalists have treated it as self-evident that interdependence equates to 
increased cooperation.  However, from the perspective of a hydro-hegemon, cooperation 
may be pursued as a means to redirect interdependencies in such a manner that 
subordinate actors not only accept the hegemon’s authority, but also internalize its values 
and norms.  Under these circumstances, the results are neither negative nor dominative, 
but add order and stability, and, according to regime theory, can lengthen the “shadow of 
the future” for all involved.330 By focusing cooperation, a hydro-hegemon like South 
Africa can hide the negative effects of power asymmetries.  Despite this occlusion, the 
non-hydro-hegemons may grow to resent their dependency on the hegemon as well as the 
tactics the hegemon employs to sustain its power and, in this case, protect its water 
resources.  It is under these circumstances that the shadows of the past matter.  
Understanding what is happening in southern Africa in the Okavango and 
Orange-Senqu river basins have implications on a global scale.  In the Okavango, 
Botswana’s and Namibia’s water needs may ultimately trump the long-term ecological 
survival of the Okavango Delta and its system of wetlands.  Both states’ water needs, 
potentially, are placing a strain on the waters that assure the Delta’s survival.  Both 
countries are mostly desert, need water, and have competing water requirements for food 
and development, like many other areas in the world where there are similar debates over 
shared transboundary scarce water resources.   
                                                 
330 Baylis, “International Security in the Post-Cold War Era.” 
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Many of the issues confronting the riparians of the Orange-Senqu River are 
similar to those facing the Okavango riparians.  However, there are also different points 
of conflict.  If one were to put the border demarcation issue between Namibia and South 
Africa to the side, the central remaining issues include the increasing demands on water 
resources and the growing need to manage available water resources in a sustainable 
manner in order to reduce strains on a finite resource.  Finding ways to first determine the 
type and level of conflict as well as subsequently addressing each through cooperation 
agreements, regimes, behavioral change, technology, and engineering is part of the 
challenge.  That works when water is the problem.  When water is not the problem, a 
different set of solutions and a different form of analysis is required.  While this research 
may appear contradictory about whether or not water is the problem, it recognizes that 
both scenarios may exist, and works to distinguish between transboundary water conflicts 
that concern one and not the other. 
 What are the possible lessons from this research? More broadly, what are the 
possible policy implications one can draw from these case studies?  Many countries have 
developed internal approaches to resolve water problems, although some have been more 
successful than others.  The riparian states in each of these basins are no exceptions. On 
an individual country basis, South Africa has been successful—to a fault.  When placed 
in a context incorporating its political and hydrological history, the extensiveness of its 
water infrastructure and successful implementation of its water development plans, South 
African’s continued success is marred, especially when one considers its continued 
inability to provide water delivery and sanitation to black townships—a deficiency that 
post-apartheid democratic South Africa is aggressively trying to remediate.  Still, the 
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water problems and plans are compounded by flows crossing national boundaries, its own 
hydro-hegemony, riparian position (up-stream, down-stream), and the shadow of the past, 
which may result in a clear advantage of one state over another, all of which forces the 
states into a situation of interdependence.  In addition, there is some debate over which 
‘water crisis’ to address first, and how that is determined, i.e. whether it is driven by 
donors, global water agendas, local stakeholders, regional cooperation regimes or 
individual states.  By determining which water issue to focus on or whether to address the 
multiple aspects, riparians define the terms of their positive conflict and delineate the 
obstacles to quality cooperation.   
One recommendation to actors trying to promote transboundary water cooperation 
would be to distinguish and identify which water issue they intend to address.  They 
would then need to divorce that issue from other water-related concerns, except where 
those issues directly impact the issue in question.  The risk, of course, is that IFI and 
donor support may choose a different focus, which results in less international funding to 
support an alternative agenda.   
 In each basin the national responses to transboundary water resources and 
cooperation regimes, ORASECOM and OKACOM, have not reached agreement or 
developed policy options for several critical issues, all of which are identified in the 
pyramid (Figure 2).  Chief among these critical issues are:  
(1) agreement on equitable shares of water;  
(2) concerns about sovereignty;  
(3) difficulties associated with co-operatively managing water across 
borders, which goes directly to the role of the hydro-hegemon and its 
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ability to either negatively or positively influence the behavior its co-
riparians;  
(4) viable streams of funding from donor or state actors,  
(5) as well as long-term skill and knowledge availability to improve 
sustainable water management processes.   
While each of these issues must be addressed, it is highly unlikely that either of 
the basin commissions, ORASECOM or OKACOM, is sufficiently mature or currently 
capable to handle these concerns, or their implications, because of limited resources and a 
lack of the necessary political clout to establish, implement, or enforce the necessary 
policies.   
 Consider for a moment the matter of equitable shares of water.  The matter of 
equity (and apportionment) has plagued states and been at the center of many disputes 
and conflict over shared water resources.331  Further, water equity and sovereignty are 
interrelated.  These riparians have not addressed the basic concerns about sovereignty 
issues.  “ The governments of Angola, Namibia, and Botswana see the judicious (small-
scale) use of water from the Okavango River (Angola and Namibia) or delta (Botswana) 
as entirely legitimate from a territorial sovereignty viewpoint (Heyns 1995b; Republic of 
                                                 
331 The territorial sovereignty-equitable apportionment water theory is also referred to as the Harmon 
Doctrine, named after US Attorney General Harmon in 1896, in connection with the controversy between 
the United States and Mexico over the use of the waters of the river Rio Grande. This theory holds that 
riparian states have exclusive or sovereign rights over the waters flowing through their territory.  However, 
such a position is not favored in the international global water community and has been refuted in the 
interest of ‘justice’ and the emergence of ecological-sustainable thinking.  Equitable utilization is the more 
current acceptable approach and is supported in several international accords, like the Helsinki Rules and 
conventions such as the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 




Botswana 1990; SADC 1995b).”332  If each country asserts that its water share should be 
based on either territorial rights (that is, the ability to actually extract and utilize all the 
water that flows through its sovereign territory) or how much water-flow a particular 
state contributes to the basin’s total, the challenge will then be to reach an alternative 
agreement for water sharing.  In such cases, however, the greater potential for conflict is 
most likely at the local or community level, unless there are prolonged or severe water 
shortages that result from non-state driven but natural circumstances, such as drought or 
climate change. With any increased demand for an already scarce resource, there is the 
potential for future conflict.  What then are potential options to constructively approach 
this problem?  Specific recommendations will depend on individual states, their specific 
needs and capabilities, and objectives.  Additionally, there will be regional and basin 
specific solutions. 
 If water supply and availability is the problem, the simple solution is to either find 
more of it or reduce demand.  Both options are viable.  However, finding more water may 
entail environmental and financial costs that exceed any one of these states’ ability to pay 
for.  For example, because Namibia’s freshwater surface water supplies are so limited 
and the state itself is under local, regional, and international pressure to not extract water 
from the upper reaches of the Okavango River where it crosses into its territory, Namibia 
should consider desalinization and increased ground water extraction.  Desalinating, 
unfortunately, can be very costly.  The United States Geological Survey333 suggests that 
desalinating seawater using a process called reverse osmosis costs upwards of $1,000 per 
                                                 
332 Ashton, “The Search for an Equitable basis for Water Sharing in the Okavango River Basin in the 
Okavango River Basin,” 170. 
333  A part of the United States Department of the Interior. 
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acre-foot or more compared to about $200 per acre-foot for water from normal supply 
sources.  The technology is available, but plants and a delivery infrastructure system 
would have to be constructed.  Likewise, training a skilled and knowledgeable staff to 
operate and maintain the desalination system would be necessary.   
 If a basin-wide solution is sought, each of the basin states will need to collectively 
identify and agree on the course of action that will be acceptable for determining each 
riparian’s current and future water needs as well as how to specifically allocate catchment 
sources.  Such an approach will be time-consuming and contentious, overwhelmingly 
burdened with politics, and will require re-negotiating over time as conditions and water 
need change.  Again, this assumes that water supply is the problem and the priority.   
If, however, water supply is not the problem, but is posited as the manifestation of 
a deeper matter of concern, a different set of solutions are necessary.  The dispute 
between South Africa and Namibia about the Orange River boundary is such an example.  
The resolution of this matter will be considerably complex and is likely to involve 
challenges to policy and rules established by the Organization African Unity334  and 
international law.  Inasmuch as the gains by Namibia are significant and potential losses 
to South Africa equally significant should the river boundary be redrawn, I anticipate this 
matter going to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for resolution—likely an 
unsatisfactory outcome for both.  Given Namibia’s experience with Botswana regarding 
ownership of disputed territorial islands in the Caprivi region, which stemmed from 
colonial treaty ambiguity, Namibia may be reluctant to resort to the ICJ.  An alternative, 
of course, is that South Africa could agree to share the financial gains it currently 
                                                 
334 The OAU was disbanded in 2002, and was replaced with the African Union. 
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receives from mineral resources located in the disputed river boundary territory with 
Namibia. Again, any decision to do so would have to be negotiated, which would require 
both countries to agree and to accept the negotiated outcomes.  Developing policy 
recommendations that address the remnants of the shadows of the past (SOP) are likely to 
prove more challenging than the more material matters of conflict and dispute.  One 
reason for this difference is the difficulty in quantifying what the specific problems 
associated with the SOP are likely to be, and to what extent they can be changed, not just 
recognized.  Recognition of past grievances or other related-SOP matters may serve as 
much purpose as actually solving them.   
Where colonial boundaries have left some states more water rich than others, 
better able to confront post-colonial governing, or with the challenge of redressing the 
both colonial and post-apartheid infrastructural inequities, policy recommendations must 
be specific to the matter of concern.  Almost without exception, each of the riparians is 
confronting the fact that large numbers of their population live in poverty, their citizens 
face a high rate of unemployment, and are so poorly educated that they may be unable to 
fill the jobs crucial for their national well-being, especially those jobs related to the 
sciences, water planning and infrastructure, and the environment.  As the current water 
elites decline in numbers, retire, or leave the field of transboundary water discourse, the 
shortages of a “next generation” become more apparent, and progress toward improved 
cooperation slowed or stopped altogether.  This is particularly important for the riparians 
in both the Orange-Senqu and Okavango River basins, and is certainly relevant to other 
states where the shadows of the past are likely to have a direct impact on the future.  
Therefore, attention to training and educating future hydro-political actors as well as 
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crafting scientifically based, politically unassailable, and very detailed agreements that 
include mutually agreed-upon details so that future cooperation in these and other river 
basins where there are shared water resources is guaranteed.   
 
Revisiting the Shadows of the Past   
The role of the past, its impact on the present, and the connections between 
historical events can be difficult to anticipate.  As illustrated in both the Okavango and 
OSRB cases, the colonial past, liberation struggles, and global cold-war politics are 
interconnected in unalterable ways.  The past has left indelible marks on the now-
independent southern Africa states.   
The Okavango and OSRB basin states share common colonial and early post-
colonial history.  For example, with the exception of the Portuguese in Angola, much of 
the basin riparian territory was under British domination, which has resulted in Anglo-
dominated linguistic, legal, political, and economic commonalities across borders.  Also, 
colonialism lasted longer in this region than anywhere else in Africa.335  Other 
connections include a regional migrant labor system fueled by diamond and gold 
discoveries in South Africa, where mine workers were brought in during the colonial 
period and also after independence.  During the liberation struggles, those fighting for 
independence in one country, like Namibia, would exile themselves to a neighboring 
                                                 
335 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa. 
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independent country which had gained its independence earlier. These revolutionaries 
might also seek support from socialist-communist external states.336   
Can the shadows of the past recede sufficiently to enable quality transboundary 
water cooperation?  Or will its influence require a conscious decision to re-examine the 
history and discern its positive and negative impacts on the present political climate? 
More importantly, will discussing the shadows of the past help determine how much 
influence history continues to have an impact on material conditions, and how long this 
influence will last?  This analysis doesn’t answer these specific questions; however, it 
states clearly that there are relationships between history, ideas, and institutions, and that 
these relationships need to be considered in conflict and cooperation analysis.  Given all 
the evidence of cooperation between Okavango and OSRB states, the high numbers of 
transboundary water agreements, SADC supported cooperation efforts, the Protocol, and 
country-level cooperation activities (studies, meetings, international donor support, and 
other efforts), this research leaves open the question of whether the tensions of history 
recede and cooperation increases as one moves further into the future.   
In this dissertation, I argue that this progression into the future cannot occur, 
unless and until the shadows of the past are incorporated into the discussions surrounding 
water resource allocation and development.  If one moves to the side the impact of 
colonialism on geo-political boundaries of modern African states, nowhere is the past felt 
more than in knowledge and skill gaps.  A recent Inter Press Service News Agency 
                                                 
336 Liberation struggles and post-apartheid efforts were supported both financially and militarily by Cuba, 
China, and the Soviet Union.  Cuba went as far as sending military troops to Angola to support its efforts to 
repel advances by South Africa.  
 273 
 
article, “South Africa:  Bleak Future for the Country’s Water”,337 makes this connection 
clear.  The article raises the alarm about the carcasses of several large crocodiles floating 
in the Olifants River in the Kruger National Park.  Once confirmed that pansteatitis338 
was the cause of death, Lang makes the argument that South Africa’s water resources and 
related infrastructure have deteriorated rather than improved.  He suggests that national 
authorities have neither maintained nor upgraded basic water infrastructure and that the 
“lack of maintenance can be partly attributed to the bleeding of skills in the water 
management sector.  Many hundreds of water professionals have left their jobs in local 
municipalities and have not been replaced with people of comparable skills.”339  Not 
acknowledging the vagaries of history, and their impact on educational access, would 
make this brain-drain a mystery.  As it is, the absence of skilled water professionals is 
one of the material reminders of South Africa’s colonial history.  
 
Future Research 
I envision several areas that logically extend this research. First and foremost is a 
more detailed examination of how history impacts transboundary water conflict and 
cooperation, as well as the way historical legacies structures the problem of 
transboundary shared and scarce water resources.  The post-colonial African state is a 
recent phenomenon, but the histories of these nations do not begin with their 
independence.  As a consequence, treaties signed between their respective colonial 
                                                 
337 Lang, “South Africa:  Bleak Future for the Country’s Water.” 
338 Pansteatitis is a condition usually associated with the consumption of rotten or rancid fish, which causes 
inflammation of body fats, which in turn causes death for the animal.  In this case, the animals were 
crocodiles, a protected species in the Kruger game reserve.  
339 Lang, “South Africa:  Bleak Future for the Country’s Water.”  
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powers may have a direct impact on water resource allocation.  On the other hand, how 
long are the shadows of the past in Europe, South East Asia, or the Americas?  Does this 
theoretical framework translate into understanding the hydro-politics of Hungary and 
Slovakia on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project in the Danube River or Mekong River 
Basin riparians and their respective efforts at transboundary water cooperation? 
Understanding precisely how history complicates cooperation, contributes to resource 
conflicts, or becomes a mechanism that mediates asymmetric power would mark a major 
contribution to the analysis of hydro-politics.  For even greater intellectual progress along 
these lines, directly connecting the shadows of the past to hydro-hegemony would enable 
scholars to advance the multi-disciplined meta-conversation and scholarship necessary to 
improve our understanding and policy development toward recommending solutions. 
Political, economic, and environmental conditions are undergoing rapid change in 
southern Africa. However, when compared with the rest of the global south, conditions of 
poverty and water scarcity remain high.340 Since most southern Africa states are still led 
by “. . . first-generation liberation movements cum governments. . .”341 or flawed second-
generation ones, it remains to be seen if the SADC cooperation regime, and basin 
agreements such as ORASECOM and OKACOM, can be sustained beyond current 
leadership.  Many of the current white African water elites are retiring, moving on, or 
being replaced by black Africans—due in part to post-colonial and post-apartheid 
affirmative action policies.  Are they as trained and qualified as those they are replacing?  
Will that make a difference in the types of riparian negotiations and agreements and 
                                                 
340 Human Development Report, Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. 
341 Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 13. 
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capacity?  Will the need to continue transboundary cooperation efforts remain an 
important government concern? 
Another area of research would be to further explore how international donors are 
influencing regional, national, and local transboundary hydro-politics and the 
implications for conflict should those resources decline significantly.  Much has been 
written about the level of international donor support for capacity building and 
environmental management of shared water resources and water supply.  There is less 
information on how those efforts act as driving forces behind African transboundary 
water law, agreements, institutional development, cooperation efforts, or conflict 
resolution.  What is the relationship between post-colonial transboundary water 
cooperation and institution building and external drivers? 
International relations scholars have demonstrated a long-standing interest in the 
dynamics of power particularly as a feature of nation-states in an international anarchic 
system.  What is less understood is the basis of asymmetric powers among states and the 
role such power plays in cooperative or conflictual resource politics.  Additional research 
in this area would contribute to a restructuring of the debate around hydro-hegemony, and 
a critique of the role of the hegemon in fostering transboundary cooperation or managing 
transboundary water conflict.  A better understanding of the nature of resource political 
conflict and what constitutes cooperation is needed.  Who is really in charge? What are 
the costs of cooperation and for whom?  What are the costs of conflict?  What happens if 
an upstream riparian exercises its sovereign right to utilize its water resources in such a 
way that the downstream riparian is adversely impacted?  Would such an action be 
considered a precursor to a major water conflict? How would a major water conflict be 
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defined?  Researching these questions would define several key concepts, and thereby aid 
in problem identification. 
A final future research effort would be to unpack the hierarchy of obstacles to 
cooperation (Figure 2, Pyramid), define its terms in greater detail, and further test its 
validity.  I believe the Pyramid offers a set of hypotheses; it suggests that riparian states 
must contend with factors at the base of the pyramid (sovereignty, hydro-hegemony, 
number of countries, and upstream-downstream conflict) before moving to the next level.  
Those factors, as well as asymmetry, riparian position, and conflicting political interests, 
must be dealt with in order to make cooperation efforts effective.  The case studies sought 
to illustrate this aspect of hydro-political transboundary analysis, but more study along 
these lines, including further quantitative research giving a weighted value to each of the 
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